To p, or not to p?: quantifying inferential decision errors

to assess whether significance truly is significant by Abdey, James Spencer
The London School of Economics and Political Science
To p, or not to p?
Quantifying Inferential Decision Errors
To Assess Whether
Significance Truly Is Significant
James Spencer Abdey
A thesis submitted to the Department of Statistics of the
London School of Economics and Political Science for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, September 2009
Declaration
I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the
London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than
where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent
of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted,
provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced
without the prior written consent of the author.
I warrant that this authorization does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the
rights of any third party.
Dedication
In loving memory of Mum
Susan Ivy Abdey
‘Sue’
1947-2008
Forever indebted to the sacrifices you made.
Abstract
Empirical testing is centred on p-values. These summary statistics are used to assess
the plausibility of a null hypothesis, and therein lies a flaw in their interpretation.
Central to this research is accounting for the behaviour of p-values, through density
functions, under the alternative hypothesis, H1. These densities are determined by
a combination of the sample size and parametric specification of H1. Here, several
new contributions are presented to reflect p-value behaviour.
By considering the likelihood of both hypotheses in parallel, it is possible to
optimise the decision-making process. A framework for simultaneously testing the
null and alternative hypotheses is outlined for various testing scenarios. To facilitate
efficient empirical conclusions, a new set of critical value tables is presented requiring
only the conventional p-value, hence avoiding the need for additional computation
in order to apply this joint testing in practice. Simple and composite forms of H1
are considered.
Recognising the conflict between different schools of thought with respect to
hypothesis testing, a unified approach at consolidating the advantages of each is
offered. Again, exploiting p-value distributions under various forms of H1, a revised
conditioning statistic for conditional frequentist testing is developed from which
original p-value curves and surfaces are produced to further ease decision making.
Finally, attention turns to multiple hypothesis testing. Estimation of multiple
testing error rates is discussed and a new estimator for the proportion of true null
hypotheses, when simultaneously testing several independent hypotheses, is
presented. Under certain conditions it is shown that this estimator is superior to an
established estimator.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
P -values have become a staple measure used in empirical research across a diverse
range of disciplines. Theoretical ideas are formulated into hypotheses of interest
and subsequently tested to allow researchers to assess the theory’s plausibility, and
hence application to the real world. Given the prevalence of p-value reporting, it is
important to establish the correct interpretation of this summary statistic so that
accurate inferences are made. This will therefore justify the widespread usage of
p-values among practitioners in response to numerous criticisms of the Fisherian
p-value. This tome considers the inferential issues surrounding p-values in detail.
Conditional on collected sample data, the process of statistical testing is to
evaluate the feasibility of the null hypothesis, H0, and, ideally, conclude firmly in
favour either of it or the alternative hypothesis, H1. Three prominent ‘schools’ of
testing exist, propelled by Fisher, Jeffreys and Neyman. Fisher extolled the virtue
of the p-value, whose magnitude signals the strength of evidence in favour of H0. In
contrast, Jeffreys’ approach favours the use of objective posterior probabilities using
a Bayesian framework, whilst Neyman resorted to fixed error probabilities, namely
the computation of Type I and Type II errors.
1
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Having such competing doctrines poses a conundrum for practitioners since the
schools typically yield different reported results. Which, if any, is uniformly
superior? Although Fisherian p-values are widely-utilised, does there exist a way to
combine all three approaches? A universal methodology is clearly in demand and its
widespread adoption would allow consistency of implementation and an
unambiguous interpretation of test results in empirical applications.
Berger, Brown, and Wolpert (1994) present the conditional frequentist approach
to testing which provides a basis for the methodological unification of the different
schools for simple versus simple hypothesis testing. Here a complementary link
with frequentist testing is presented which considers the actual density of the
p-values when either hypothesis is true. Such testing procedures are presented for
both simple and composite alternative hypotheses, hence are particularly suited for
testing non-zero parameters, i.e. when using statistical testing in an exploratory
capacity, for example when investigating the presence of a zero or non-zero effect.
Chapter 2 discusses p-value fundamentals incorporating a detailed literature
review. Here p-values are introduced as random variables, and their subsequent
distributions are discussed. Having examined the properties of the p-value, it is
evident that although it is an excellent summary statistic for representing the
distance that data fall from a null hypothesis (and being restricted to the
common unit interval for all test statistics), its namesake of a probability value
must be taken into account. That is, no p-value can offer a definitive
conclusion with regards to one or other of the hypotheses, merely that it should
be treated as an indicator flagging interesting results which warrant further
investigation. Nevertheless, even as an investigative tool the p-value is a most
welcome statistic for empirical researchers as a key component in their inferential
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arsenals.
Chapter 3 outlines a formal simultaneous hypothesis testing methodology which
takes into account the plausibility of H1 by considering a so-called second-order
p-value, p′. Critical value tables in terms of conventional p-values are provided to
allow for quick testing of H1 for a given sample size and effect size. Derivation of
the p-value distribution for t-distributed test statistics is presented, reflecting the
common use of estimated variances in many testing situations. Attention focuses on
the effect size and it is noted that when this takes a negative value (for simple forms
of H1) or a range of negative values (for composite forms of H1, where the effect
size follows a particular probability distribution), the p-value distribution under the
alternative departs from its usually perceived shape. The implications of this for
statistical inference are discussed.
Chapter 4 revisits the quest for a methodological unification of statistical testing.
The conflict between p-values and conditional measures is highlighted and the
adoption of the second-order p-value into the conditional frequentist approach is
given. This helps to cement the different testing schools by retaining the
desirable features of each. By defining a new conditioning statistic, p-value curves
and surfaces are constructed to ease the decision-making process for practitioners.
Chapter 5 investigates multiple hypothesis testing. Compound error rates (false
discovery and false nondiscovery rates) and their estimation are discussed. This
centres around the true proportion of tested hypotheses for which the null is true.
A new estimator for this proportion is proposed and its statistical performance
relative to an estimator in the literature is investigated. It is shown that under
certain conditions this new estimator is preferred. Chapter 6 concludes.
Chapter 2
Background to p-values
2.1 Statistical Testing
Statistical testing is employed across many fields as an elementary inferential
procedure for choosing between two specified hypotheses using a set of observed
sample data. From the social and behavioural sciences1 to the biological sciences
and beyond, use of this methodology is well-established and the reporting of test
results has become standard throughout the empirical literature, having flourished
over recent decades.
A designated null hypothesis, H0, is set a priori and held to be true. This is
tested against a prior alternative, H1, which for simplicity is assumed to be one-sided,
i.e. directional, at present.2 Construction of an appropriate test statistic dependent
on the integer sample size n, Xn, say, is carried out and its distribution under the
null hypothesis (assuming necessary data conditions are satisfied) is obtained.3
1A recent review of developments in significance testing in Sociology, for example, can be found
in Leahey (2005).
2For symmetrical test statistic distributions, a two-tailed H1 poses few problems, discussed
later.
3The distribution of Xn under H0 is assumed to be known, either exactly or asymptotically.
4
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At this point, from a pedagogical perspective and for completeness, it is
appropriate to distinguish between ‘hypothesis testing’ and ‘significance testing’
as subsets of ‘statistical testing’ as clarified in Huberty (1987) who notes that some
authors have failed to make explicit this distinction, for example Carver (1978) and
Sawyer and Peter (1983), though not all as in Kempthorne (1976) among others.
Hypothesis testing has its roots in the Neyman-Pearson framework of classical
statistics in which a prior (pre-experimental) fixed significance level, α, would be
set during the test design phase. α therefore corresponds to the size of a test
and probability of erroneously rejecting a true null hypothesis, i.e. a Type I error.
Typically α = 0.05, though other probabilities such as 0.01 or indeed 0.001 may be
used when more stringent safeguards are warranted by the researcher to avoid the
rejection of a true H0.
4 Given α and the distribution of Xn under H0, a critical
region, Cα, which spans sufficiently extreme (i.e. improbable) values of the test
statistic can be established5 such that if the realised xn ∈ Cα, then our belief in H0
becomes untenable, leading to the oft-cited phrase, ‘we reject the null hypothesis
in favour of H1’.
6 Scientific journal articles routinely publish asterisks alongside
reported xn values as appropriate to indicate the level of significance, such as
∗ for
statistically significant (0.01 ≤ p < 0.05) and ∗∗ for highly statistically significant
(p < 0.01).
4The precise setting of α should depend on the purpose of the statistical testing. If purely
an exploratory study, a liberal α should be set in order to detect potentially interesting results
which demand further research. However if the study is the result of previous investigation(s),
then a more conservative level should be used. Of course ultimately the choice of α is entirely
discretionary. As noted in Alberoni (1962), the choice of α should correspond to the researcher’s
“threshold for the dismissal of the idea of chance” for that particular hypothesis. Note that the
implicit subjectivity attached to α-setting counters the common criticism of Bayesian testing for
its use of a subjective prior distribution. This issue is returned to in Chapter 4.
5That is, the test statistic distribution is partitioned into two regions: reject and fail to reject.
6Another issue is how strictly should a critical region be enforced? If xn was within or outside of
C by an arbitrarily small amount ε, what conclusion should be drawn? Labovitz (1968) discusses.
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Significance testing is attributable to R. A. Fisher where the probability of
obtaining a draw from Xn at least as extreme as the sample value is used in lieu
of Cα, and therefore α. This probability is commonly referred to as the p-value
and can be assigned to any observed sample test statistic value. The actual term
‘p-value’ can be traced back to Deming (1943) as noted in David (1998). The p-value
acts as a summary statistic and is often cited in empirical studies to indicate the
observed level of significance of tested parameters. Consequently p-values are more
informative than a simple ‘reject’ or ‘fail to reject’ declaration as they allow the
reader to attach his/her own subjective α as appropriate for the study being
undertaken, see Kiefer (1977). This is beneficial when a researcher has no
justifiable reason to favour any particular statistical significance level. Hence the
p-value is a more useful data reduction technique and its prolific and popular
adoption as a conventional quasi-sufficient statistic for interpreting hypothesis test
results is testament of this.
In practice, applied inferential statistics is a mixture, or hybrid, of the two
approaches. Stallings (1985) cautions against treating α and p-values synonymously,
despite both camps of statistical tests being foremost probabilistic. An obvious
distinction is that the Neyman-Pearson theory is used to obtain a qualitative
decision (reject or not reject) while the Fisherian approach yields a significance
level. Also, α is a pre-experimental researcher-fixed constant whereas p-values are
random variables, sensitive to n under the alternative hypothesis.
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2.2 P -values as Random Variables
Suppose Xn is used to test H0 : θ = a against H1 : θ = b, a < b. Let Xn have the
left-continuous distribution function FXn(xn) = Pr(Xn ≤ xn) under H0, for realised
xn. The p-value statistic, i.e. significance probability, is then a random variable, P ,
whose realised value, p, is calculated for continuous7 test statistics as8
p = Pr(Xn > xn) = 1− FXn(xn) = F¯Xn(xn), (2.1)
hence p-values are one-to-one transformations of the random variable Xn, so are
themselves random variables.9 Pearson (1938) refers to this as the ‘probability
integral transformation’ of the sample data. Advantages of the p-value include
its simplicity, i.e. a single real number restricted to the unit interval, and also its
universal application across test statistics with any distribution under H0 due to the
transformation in (2.1). Consequently the unit interval [0, 1] is a common scale for
comparison allowing meta-analyses to be performed. Among the numerous examples
from social science research are Hedges (1980), Rosenthal (1984), Strube (1985) and
Bornstein (1989), though clearly this list is by no means exhaustive.
2.3 P -value Distributions
Given either hypothesis could be true, p-values will have different distributions
accordingly. As shown in many studies, under a non-composite null this is a
uniform distribution for any continuous test statistic. Let p be the realised p-value
7For discrete distributions a correction may be required — see Cox (1977).
8This yields exact p-values, as opposed to approximate p-values which are computed by using
an approximation of FXn , for example when FXn is unknown.
9As shown in (2.1), p-values can be viewed in terms of the survival function, F¯Xn .
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with FP (p|H0) being the corresponding distribution function under H0, then using
(2.1),
FP (p|H0) = Pr(P ≤ p|H0)
= Pr(1− FXn(xn) ≤ p|H0)
= 1− FXn(F−1Xn (1− p))
= 1− (1− p)
= p, (2.2)
for p ∈ [0, 1]. Hence this gives a density function, fp(p|H0) = 1, consistent with
a uniform density. It should be noted that this density is independent of the test
statistic distribution, sample size and effect size. Therefore under H0 it is impossible
to distinguish p-values obtained from small and large samples as well as between
tests engineered to have high power and those less powerful.
Denoting the left-continuous distribution function of Xn under the alternative
hypothesis by GXn(xn), then the p-value distribution function under H1, FP (p|H1),
becomes
FP (p|H1) = Pr(P ≤ p|H1)
= Pr(1− FXn(xn) ≤ p|H1)
= 1−GXn(F−1Xn (1− p)), (2.3)
which clearly depends on the test statistic’s distribution under both hypotheses.
The corresponding density function is merely the likelihood ratio for the hypothesis
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test, since by application of the chain rule
fP (p|H1) = ∂
∂p
FP (p|H1) =
gXn(F
−1
Xn
(1− p))
fXn(F
−1
Xn
(1− p)) , (2.4)
where the densities of Xn under the null and alternative are fXn(xn) and gXn(xn)
respectively. Equation (2.4) provides the density for generic test statistics, while
Hung, O’Neill, Bauer, and Ko¨hne (1997) derive this for the case of a standard t test
of a sample mean assuming a Gaussian response variable. Assuming simple (i.e.
non-composite) forms of H0 and H1, they show this to be
fP (p|H1) = gδ(p) = φ(Zp −
√
nδ)
φ(Zp)
, 0 < p < 1, (2.5)
where δ = µ/σ denotes the effect size, n the sample size, φ is the standard Gaus-
sian density and Zp its (1 − p)th percentile.10 It is clear therefore that for t tests
under the alternative, p-value densities are dependent on both the sample size and
the effect size. Hung, O’Neill, Bauer, and Ko¨hne (1997) proceed to investigate
how the distribution changes as n and δ are varied. Clearly test power increases
with n, hence fP (p|H1) becomes steeper (similarly when |δ| increases) which means
Pr(P < α|H1) increases. As a result the expected value and variance of P , E[P ] and
Var(P ) respectively, decrease under H1. Note that under the null H0 : µ = 0, (2.5)
reduces to 1, that is the uniform density. This concept will be revisited in Chapter 4
when a methodological unification of the Fisherian, Neyman-Pearson and Jeffreys’
approaches to testing is presented.
An interesting field which utilises p-values is multiple hypothesis testing. In such
10Invoking the Central Limit Theorem, the sample mean of data drawn from any distribution is
asymptotically Gaussian, with a resulting standard Gaussian test statistic.
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instances there is likely to be considerable heterogeneity amongst the p-values when
the alternative hypotheses are true, suggesting scope for a suitable approximating
methodology. Previous work concerning (2.4) focusing on single testing includes
Bahadur (1960) who used a lognormal distribution to approximate the finite
sampling distribution. Extensions of this work can be found in Lambert and Hall
(1982), who present sufficient conditions for asymptotic lognormality, and Becker
(1991) who studies non-null asymptotic distributions of various functions of p-values
from one-tailed t tests. Multiple testing will be revisited later in Chapter 5.
2.4 Null Hypothesis Types
The null hypothesis, H0, is customarily thought of as being either a pointwise null,
for example H0 : µ = µ0, or as a one-sided null, H0 : µ ≤ µ0 or H0 : µ ≥ µ0, with
two-sided and one-sided alternatives, H1 : µ 6= µ0 and H1 : µ > µ0 or H1 : µ < µ0,
respectively. Although at first sight these appear distinct forms, Schervish (1996)
shows that the two types lie at opposite ends of a continuum of null hypotheses
bridged by so-called ‘interval nulls’.
Such interval hypotheses are an intermediate species where the parameter of
interest is reckoned to be in a particular range bounded by lower and upper values,
µl and µu respectively, for example H0 : µ ∈ [µl, µu]. The corresponding alternative
will be the complement of this interval with respect to the parameter space Ω,
namely H1 : µ ∈ Ω \ [µl, µu]. It is then evident that the pointwise form is the limit
of an interval null as µl and µu converge, while a one-sided null is formed as either
µl or µu tends to minus or plus infinity for lower- and upper-sided nulls respectively.
Schervish (1996) continues to show that under the assumption that all tests
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considered are uniformly most powerful and also unbiased, p-values are continuous.
For a Gaussian test statistic with known variance σ2/n, such as X¯n ∼ N(µ, σ2/n),
p-values of the realised x¯n under H0 with the various types of null hypothesis are
therefore computed as,
H0 : µ = µ0 : p = 2× Φ
(
−
√
n(|x¯n − µ0|)
σ
)
, (two-tailed test) (2.6)
H0 : µ ≥ µ0 : p = Φ
(√
n(x¯n − µ0)
σ
)
,
H0 : µ ≤ µ0 : p = Φ
(√
n(µ0 − x¯n)
σ
)
,
H0 : µ ∈ [µl, µu] : p =
 Φ
(√
n(x¯n−µl)
σ
)
+ Φ
(√
n(x¯n−µu)
σ
)
if x¯n < 0.5[µl + µu]
Φ
(√
n(µl−x¯n)
σ
)
+ Φ
(√
n(µu−x¯n)
σ
)
if x¯n ≥ 0.5[µl + µu]
,
where Φ is the standard Gaussian distribution function. The p-value formulae for
interval nulls make use of the result in Lehmann (1986) which states that such
a null is rejected if
√
n(|x¯n − 0.5(µl + µu)|)/σ > c, for critical value c such that
Φ(0.5
√
n[µl − µu]/σ − c) + Φ(0.5
√
n[µu − µl]/σ − c) = α. Hence c is a function of
both α and (µu − µl), i.e. Cα,(µu−µl).
It is then established by Schervish (1996) that pointwise and one-sided null
hypotheses are indeed special cases of the interval null. This also extends to the
respective p-values, that is p-values of pointwise and one-sided nulls are limits of
interval null p-values. This result stems from the continuity of p-values and it is noted
that this is not just restricted to Gaussian test statistics, but other distributions
including uniform and exponential densities.
The beauty and relevance of this result concern testing the significance of
factors such as establishing whether a zero or non-zero effect exists. In clinical
trials, asset pricing theories and other deterministic models, we frequently desire to
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know whether a hypothesised explanatory variable does have a significant non-zero
effect on some response variable. Non-zero coefficients in linear regression models
are an example of the modelled effect on a real-world response.
Although any non-zero effect is an effect by definition, if the effect is very small,
say ±ε, then it still may not be worthwhile to view the explanatory factor as
significant in a practical sense once a feasibility study or cost-benefit analysis has
been carried out to assess the viability of acting on the statistical result of an
effect. Potential cases when it would not be appropriate to act on sufficiently small
non-zero effect sizes include:
1. The financial cost of manufacturing/supplying a new drug responsible for a
marginal improvement in the treatment of a particular disease crowds out the
marginal benefit to the patient or society of the new treatment (in terms of
increased life expectancy, say).
2. When transaction costs eclipse the expected marginal gain in asset price
movements from trading on the basis of an estimated pricing model.
Knowing the direction of an effect is insufficient to conclude that intervention is
cost-effective. Size of an effect is what matters. Admittedly, in medical situations,
there is an ethical obligation to resort to any strictly superior treatment if human
longevity can be improved, even if only marginally. Of course pragmatism dictates
that the economic marginal costs must influence the ultimate decision.11
So when testing for non-zero significance in the explanatory power of a given
factor, it would be appropriate to construct an interval null hypothesis such as
11In the UK, the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) is a special health
authority charged with assessing whether the health benefits of new treatments offset the financial
costs. Formally the quality-adjusted life-year (QALY), which measures an extra year of life after
discounting for any disability, pain or other impairment, is used as the decision rule with a cap
currently of £30,000 for treatment approval.
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H0 : θ ∈ [−ε, ε] ≡ θ ≤ |ε|.12 In practice, exact point nulls are rare, instead small
interval nulls are more realistic. The limit results referred to above imply that
a pointwise null, i.e. H0 : θ = 0, acts as a good approximation to the interval
version as argued by Zellner (1984) and justification of this in both the Classical
and Bayesian13 worlds is offered in Berger and Delampady (1987), hence is suitable
to use in clinical trials and related factor significance tests because a single parameter
value in H0 produces a single p-value density, the continuous uniform distribution,
thus simplifying matters. Of course, the smaller |ε| the better the approximation.
The distinction between statistical and practical significance has a long history, for
example Berkson (1938), Berkson (1942) and Hodges and Lehmann (1954).
2.5 Interpretation of P -values
As already noted above, statistical testing of hypotheses using the Neyman-Pearson
theory has its deficiencies due to the arbitrary nature of setting the pre-experimental
significance level of the test, α. True, the hypothesis testing methodology has a
worthy merit, namely by constructing a test which controls the Type I error through
α then the sample size n can be chosen to achieve the desired test power, equivalently
reduce the probability of a Type II error, subject to α. Such an approach bypasses
the interrelationship between the two types of inferential decision error.
12θ represents the parameter under investigation, such as a population mean, µ, or a regression
coefficient, βi, for factor i in a multiple linear regression. Here the interval null limits are
equi-distant from zero. This symmetry corresponds to the case where a practical significant
non-zero effect is associated with a true θ exceeding zero by some absolute arbitrarily small amount
ε. If the departure from zero for practical relevance depended on whether θ was positive or
negative, then the interval null limits would not be equi-distant. For example, if twice the positive
effect is required vis-a`-vis the negative effect, then H0 : µ ∈ [−ε, 2ε]. An economic interpretation
would relate to non-constant returns to scale, for example.
13The prior density, pi(θ), is assumed continuous but with a sharp spike near the value θ used in
H0.
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In addition to the ad hoc nature of α selection, another disadvantage is that the
designated significance level may not actually be fully attainable. This is potentially
the case when dealing with discrete parametric distributions under H0, but also in the
non-parametric world. In the latter case, lack of information regarding distributions
under the alternative hypothesis precludes consideration of Type II errors.
The p-value is a strictly superior method, since it contains more information
about the validity of H0. For a directional (one-sided) H1, the p-value of xn represents
the upper or lower (depending on the specification of H1) tail probability of the test
statistic’s sampling distribution for observing xn, or a more extreme result. This
was formalised in (2.1).
Extending the Neyman-Pearson methodology, it is noted that α ∈ [0, 1], hence
has a lower and upper bound. A p-value can therefore be interpreted as the minimum
lower bound such that H0 would be rejected. This reflects the “level attained by the
sample” terminology in Gibbons and Pratt (1975).
As mentioned, p-values have the advantage of being treated as subjective αs.
With this in mind, just as an α-based critical region offers no definitive conclusion
as to the significance of a test result, p-values should just as equally be viewed as
indicative. In fact, empirical research findings are essentially evaluated in terms
of their practical (in medical statistics, clinical) rather than statistical significance.
Therefore p-values should act as a partial aid when forming consequential decisions,
hence are ideal for exploratory analyses.
In conjunction with the significance probability, other factors to be taken into
account include the size of datasets used, robustness of the sampling procedure
implemented as well as its suitability for the application in question. Such issues
are clearly statistical in nature, whereas whether there are sufficient resources to
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND TO P -VALUES 15
collect good quality data, indeed whether the data are even representative of the
target population, are important factors which affect whether inference is reliable,
valid and worthwhile. Hence as a guide/indicator p-values are extremely useful, but
should not be the sole basis for practical or clinical inference when definitive answers
are sought.
2.5.1 Measure of support
Several authors have considered p-values as posterior probabilities. This is
understandable since test statistics, hence p-values, are computed once the data
have been observed, and posterior probabilities are used to measure the support for
hypotheses once data are collected. DeGroot (1973), Casella and Berger (1987) and
Berger and Sellke (1987) all explore this view.
By thinking of p-values as posterior probabilities, it is intuitive to view such
probabilities as measures of support for the tested hypotheses. The smaller the
p-value, the more evidence against H0, while larger p-values provide greater support.
In terms of the actual observed data (since p-values correspond to test statistics,
themselves functions of the data), the greater the distance between the sample
statistic and its expected value under H0, the more likely we would be to reject
H0. So for a two-tailed test for population parameter θ ∈ Θ, with sample estimator
θˆ, as a function of θˆ the p-value increases as |θˆ − θ| decreases, i.e. as the observed
statistic comes in closer proximity to its expected value under H0.
In addition, it would be expected that as H0 covers a greater proportion of the
parameter space, Θ, then a given dataset would provide more compelling support
in favour of H0. If Θ ≡ R, for a one-sided null H0 : θ ≤ θ0, as θ0 increases such that
the alternative encompassing (θ0,∞) is squeezed, the p-value becomes increasing in
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θ0.
Despite the desirable appeal of treating p-values as measures of support of a
null hypothesis, Schervish (1996) shows that if significance probabilities were indeed
measures of support, then a simple logical condition involving the breadth of the
parameter space covered by the null would be satisfied. However the logical condition
in question, which involves the coherence of p-values, fails to hold.
Coherence in simultaneous testing is covered in Gabriel (1969). For coherence
to hold, if one null is implied by another null, for example H0 : θ ≤ θ0 is implied by
H′0 : θ = θ0
14, then rejection of the implied hypothesis guarantees rejection of the
other. Hence the measure of support for the implied hypothesis must be at least as
great as the measure of support for the other. Schervish (1996) offers examples which
show that p-values are in fact incoherent whereby the p-value of a null hypothesis
whose parameter range is a proper subset of the parameter range covered in the
other null — using the above, the parameter value in H′0 is a proper subset of that
in H0 — is greater. In other words, this suggests we would be more confident that
θ = θ0 rather than the more liberal θ ≤ θ0.
Given pointwise null and one-sided null hypotheses are rarely considered
simultaneously, such incoherence is likely to be ignored by most researchers.
However, since both types of null are special cases of interval nulls, they can be
compared, hence this lack of coherence is relevant, and so p-values should not be
interpreted as measures of support. Consequently, we should restrict the
interpretation of p-values to the role of indicator for potentially interesting results
which require further investigation. However, the ratio of measures of support with
respect to H0 and H1 will be considered later.
14A proper subset implies the parent set, not vice versa.
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2.6 Note on Two-sided Tests
Thus far p-values have been characterised as the probability of a test statistic value
at least as extreme as that observed. For one-sided tests, i.e. directional alternative
hypotheses, visualisation of this concept is straightforward. However, two-sided tests
are appropriate when there is no prior justification for the nature of the directional
departure from H0.
Gibbons and Pratt (1975) offer some ways to accommodate two-sided
alternatives when reporting p-values. Briefly, these include simply reporting the
one-tailed p-value associated with the actual test statistic outcome plus some
probability reflecting the other tail. Of course, such an approach leads to a
continuum of potential p-values since the other tail probability to add is entirely
subjective.
However if the test statistic distribution under H0 is symmetric, it is natural
to report twice the one-tailed p-value as shown in the first equation of (2.6). This
corresponds to conventional hypothesis testing in which a test of size α is structured
into two equal-sized critical regions, each of area α/2. For asymmetric distributions,
partition in such a way such that the most unlikely values form the critical region.
The only caveat with a doubling of the one-tailed p-value (in the case of
symmetric test statistic distributions) occurs in the case of discrete distributions
when the final p-value is not a specific, realisable probability given the null
distribution, or indeed the final p-value could exceed one. To circumvent such a
problem, construction of the reported p-value should comprise a combination of the
one-tailed value plus an attainable probability representing the complementary tail,
with the constraint of the sum being no greater than one.
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Since statistical testing is based on the notion of the extent of departure from
a null hypothesis, this equates to the difference between the observed test statistic
value and its expected value, given H0. In most instances this measure of central
tendency is the mean, however other location measures could be considered,
specifically the median or mode. Symmetry is a sufficient condition for the mean
and median to be equivalent, though not necessarily for the mode, for example
continuous uniform densities have a continuum of modes.
Two-sided p-values could therefore be constructed as the one-sided value plus the
probability of being equi-distant from the desired location measure in the opposite
direction. Formally, for xn above location parameter l, i.e. in the upper tail, the
two-sided p-value would be computed as p = Pr(Xn > xn) + Pr(Xn < 2l − xn).
Similarly for xn below l, p = Pr(Xn < xn) + Pr(Xn > 2l − xn). This equates to the
doubling of the one-sided p-value when l is the population mean under H0 for
symmetric distributions. For asymmetric distributions such an approach is
legitimate when accompanied by an appropriate adjustment for skewness.
2.7 Effect of Sample Size on Interpretation
So far the sample size n has only been considered (besides its role in computing the
test statistic, Xn, and test power) with regard to its effect on the p-value density
function as highlighted in (2.5). Royall (1986), however, considers the contradictory
interpretations by previous authors concerning the impact of n on the strength of
evidence against H0 provided by p-values.
Most practitioners treat the magnitude of p-values as an indication of the
falsity of H0, with smaller values interpreted as providing stronger evidence. As a
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consequence of this, the α-postulate of Cornfield (1966) states that equal p-values
provide (approximately) equal weights of evidence for or against H0. Once n is taken
into account, this postulate is challenged. It is noted that Lindley and Scott (1984)
believe that statistically significant results at 5% carry greater weight against H0 the
smaller the trial size. This contrasts with Peto et al. (1976) who declare that for a
given p-value, larger trials afford stronger evidence. In fact both views are accurate
when distinguishing between specific p-values and merely significant p-values.
Let both hypotheses be simple when testing some arbitrary parameter γ, say,
such that H0 : γ = γ0 and H1 : γ = γ1. Also, let the appropriate test statistic
be defined for small samples, XS, and for large samples, XL, with corresponding
densities under H0 and H1 being f
S
0 (xS), f
S
1 (xS), f
L
0 (xL) and f
L
1 (xL) for small (S)
and large (L) trials respectively. Define x˜S under H0 such that Pr0(XS ≥ x˜S) = α
and similarly define x˜L under H0 such that Pr0(XL ≥ x˜L) = α. Without loss of
generality, assume the statistical test is upper-tailed such that γ0 < γ1, therefore
x˜L < x˜S. This is the case since increasing the sample size will reduce the variance
of the sampling distributions under both the null and alternative hypotheses.
We can proceed by generalising Royall (1986) by considering two sequences of
trials differing by sample size. Let the (arbitrary) prior probability ratio
Pr(H0)/Pr(H1) = k. Ideally, significant results are attributable to true discoveries,
rather than false discoveries (i.e. that H1 is true rather than a Type I error being
committed). Let “Sig.” denote a significant test statistic, then Bayes’ Theorem
yields,
Pr(H0|Sig.)
Pr(H1|Sig.) =
Pr(Sig.|H0)Pr(H0)/Pr(Sig.)
Pr(Sig.|H1)Pr(H1)/Pr(Sig.) =
α
β
k, (2.7)
where β is the test power, namely the ability of the test to reject a false H0. Larger
values of the ratio given in (2.7) represent a greater danger of misleading results.
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Figure 2.1: Arbitrary test statistic densities under H0 (mean 0) and H1 (mean 5)
using small and large sample sizes.
Specifically, when α
β
k = 1, then this means that a significant result is as likely to be
a false discovery (Type I error) as it is to be a genuine discovery. In multiple testing,
this translates into a false discovery rate of 50%. α
β
k > (<)1 means significant results
are more (less) likely to be false discoveries.
For sequences of small and large independent trials, k and α are fixed a priori,
leaving the power, β, to determine the value of the above ratio. Consequently,
increasing the sample size will increase β, hence reducing (2.7). This corresponds
to fewer misleading significant results (fewer false discoveries), a desirable outcome,
hence implies that larger sample sizes provide stronger evidence of the falsity of H0
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which is consistent with the Peto et al. (1976) view. So as expected, larger samples
increase inferential accuracy.
Figure 2.1 illustrates sample mean examples for the densities fS0 (xS) = N(0, 9),
fS1 (xS) = N(5, 9), f
L
0 (xL) = N(0, 1) and f
L
1 (xL) = N(5, 1) such that γ0 = 0 and
γ1 = 5. Therefore for α = 0.05, x˜S = 4.935 and x˜L = 1.645. It follows that under
H1 for small samples, βS = Pr1(XS ≥ x˜S) = 1− Φ
(
4.935−5
3
)
= 0.5086. Similarly for
large samples, βL = PrA(XL ≥ x˜L) = 1− Φ
(
1.645−5
1
)
= 0.9996.
To be consistent with the Peto et al. (1976) view that large trials yield stronger
evidence, let the prior ratio k = 5, so in each sequence of independent trials 5/6
are true under H0, hence 1/6 of trials are true under H1. Application of (2.7) gives
for small samples a ratio of 5 × 0.05/0.5086 ≈ 0.5, and for large samples a ratio of
5× 0.05/0.9996 ≈ 0.25. Therefore, for this parametric specification, approximately
33%15 of significant results are attributable to false discoveries for small samples;
however this reduces to around 25%16 for large samples. Note that this superiority
of large samples is independent of the choice of the prior ratio k and significance
level α.
How does this reconcile with the apparently differing views of Peto et al. (1976)
who advocate large samples, and Lindley and Scott (1984) who propose small
samples? The above likelihood ratio methodology is appropriate for significant
results, regardless of the specific p-values of individual test statistics. This approach
requires rationing the information provided by p-values into an indicator variable
transforming p-values greater than α into zeroes, and those less than α into ones.
By considering specific p-values only, the view of Lindley and Scott (1984)
becomes clear. (2.7) requires adjustment such that instead of clustering significant
15kα/β = 1/2 means 1 in 3 significant results are actually true under H0, i.e. false discoveries.
16kα/β = 1/4 means 1 in 5 significant results are actually true under H0, i.e. false discoveries.
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results together, only cases when the p-values of xS and xL, pxS and pxL respectively,
are both equal to α are considered. For small and large samples respectively, this
gives
Pr(H0|pxS = α)
Pr(H1|pxS = α)
=
Pr(pxS = α|H0)Pr(H0)/Pr(pxS = α)
Pr(pxS = α|H1)Pr(H1)/Pr(pxS = α)
=
fS0 (xS)
fS1 (xS)
k, (2.8)
Pr(H0|pxL = α)
Pr(H1|pxL = α)
=
Pr(pxL = α|H0)Pr(H0)/Pr(pxL = α)
Pr(pxL = α|H1)Pr(H1)/Pr(pxL = α)
=
fL0 (xL)
fL1 (xL)
k. (2.9)
The relative magnitudes of (2.8) and (2.9) clearly depend on the density ratios
evaluated at the test statistic values (xS and xL) such that their p-values are equal to
α. For all sample sizes, as illustrated in Figure 2.1 with xS = 4.935 and xL = 1.645,
the relation
fS0 (xS)
fS1 (xS)
<
fL0 (xL)
fL1 (xL)
(2.10)
holds. Therefore smaller sample sizes lead to a smaller proportion of false discoveries
because the relative probability of H0 is lower (equivalently the relative probability
of H1 is higher), thus supporting Lindley and Scott (1984).
Where does this leave us? Well, the α-postulate that equal p-values provide equal
weight against H0 can only be valid when comparing p-values when the sample sizes
used in each test are the same. If not, then the weightier evidence belongs to
the larger sample test when p-values are purely categorised as significant or not,
otherwise the smaller sample test has greater credence when comparing exact
p-values.
As noted in Birnbaum (1962), in general the likelihood function offers a better
indicator of evidence against H0 rather than p-value functions. Recall that p-values
are calculated under H0 and so a rare event as indicated by a small p-value does
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not suggest per se that such an event is common under H1. Consequently the test
power is key to assessing the link between p-values and departures from the null
hypothesis.
The effect of sample size on statistical testing is obviously an important
issue in meta-analyses. Such consolidation of previous study results is not the only
application of these sample size effects. Multiple hypothesis testing, that is
simultaneously testing several hypothesis, can lead to false discoveries. However
for study comparisons this issue can be circumvented by fixing n across all tests.
2.8 Summary
In this chapter, we have pursued a comprehensive literature review of the popular
p-value. Given its prominence in modern statistical testing across the spectrum of
empirical research, it is important to understand and properly interpret its true
meaning.
It has been shown that p-values are random variables (2.1), and as such they
have different distributions corresponding to the null and alternative hypotheses
denoted in (2.2) and (2.3) respectively. Since the uniform density of p-values under
H0 is fixed across all continuous test statistics regardless of their distributions, then
exploitation of this property can be extremely useful.
The remaining chapters chiefly focus on using the p-value distributions under
both hypotheses. Central to this approach is the appreciation that improbable
null hypotheses do not guarantee that the alternative hypothesis is more feasible.
Hence by accommodating this concept, it is possible to improve the decision-making
process. Recognising the fallibility of the real world, inferential mistakes will always
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occur. However, by restricting their occurrence and fully understanding the potential
extent of the conclusiveness of statistical tests, we can be better informed when
interpreting results.
Chapter 3
Purifying p: Extracting Maximum
p-value Information
P -values, in practice, are treated as a measure of evidence against H0 with small
values, typically those less than a designated significance level conventionally taken
to be α = 0.05, being deemed statistically significant — that is, based on the data
there is sufficient evidence to reject the null in favour of the alternative as the
probability of observing test statistic value xn or a more extreme value, given H0 is
true, is just p. However significance probabilities are purely a measure of how far
the observed data fall from the null hypothesis, although the temptation for some
is to interpret large p-values as automatic justification for the acceptance of H0,
or outright rejection of H1. Instead confidence intervals are preferred when faced
with insignificant test results, see Gardner and Altman (1986), yet p-values are still
popular and widely reported.1
However, as has been previously discussed, p-values are incoherent and
technically should not be used as measures of support. That said, due to the
1As previously argued, this popularity of use is justified when performing exploratory analyses.
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widespread use of p-values across many fields of empirical research, it is prudent to
extract the maximum value of the information contained in any significance
probability. Donahue (1999) pursues this view by considering not only the extent
of the data’s deviation from the null, but also the likelihood of the data given the
alternative hypothesis for a particular example involving simple hypotheses. This
concept is especially important since an improbable event under H0 does not by
default mean a likely event under H1.
It is noted that by convention Type I errors are considered more intolerable than
their Type II counterparts,2 hence most researchers control the former using α and
increase n to limit the latter, that is by increasing the test power. Whenever a Type
I or Type II error is committed, this is explicable by the data being improbably,
though it must be stressed not impossibly, extreme by pure chance alone.3 Of course
Type I errors equate to the reported p-values, though computation of the probability
of a true Type II error requires accurate specification of the alternative hypothesis.
Alternatively a power function can be derived.
The contribution to the academic literature included in this chapter comprises
the following. Beginning with simple hypotheses, testing for example a population
mean, a simultaneous testing methodology is presented in the classical and Fisherian
moulds taking into consideration traditional inferential errors as well as analogous
concepts when testing H1. To achieve this, new terminology is used. Pursuit of the
classical approach leads to the advent of critical value tables in terms of conventional
p-values which allow the simultaneous testing of H1 without the need to compute
2Choice regarding the precedence of decision errors is likely to be situation-dependent. As such
a cost-benefit analysis of these inferential decision errors might be appropriate as discussed in Nagel
and Neef (1977).
3Remember, events with very small probabilities do occur — just ask lottery jackpot winners.
Of course the flip-side of this are the many millions of players who do not win.
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so-called ‘second-order’ p-values which in essence are the p-values associated with
the p-value when used as a test statistic for testing H1.
In order to produce such tables, the p-value density under the alternative
hypothesis is required. This has previously been derived for standard Gaussian-
distributed test statistics, however here this is extended to Student t-distributed test
statistics reflecting the frequent use of estimated variances. Obviously t
distributions are asymptotically standard Gaussian in the degrees of freedom, but
for small sample studies use of the t distribution is necessary. As a result critical
value tables are also produced for various degrees of freedom.
3.1 Second-order p-values
Given two p-values both greater than α, say 0.4 and 0.8, although both ‘lend support’
to H0 under classical hypothesis testing, does it mean that the larger value offers
stronger evidence in favour of H0? This is an important issue, since most empirical
studies are only concerned about whether the null can be rejected and so ignore test
power and the consequences of H1. To answer this, Donahue (1999) considers not
only how far the data fall from the null hypothesis, but also how far the data fall from
a specific alternative hypothesis. To achieve this, reporting two summary statistics,
the original p-value and a ‘second-order’ p-value, p′, defined below, is required. Both
act as quasi-post hoc risk levels indicating certain inferential decision errors.
Utilising (2.3), for the general case covering all possible test statistic
CHAPTER 3. EXTRACTING MAXIMUM P -VALUE INFORMATION 28
distributions,
p′ = Pr(P > p|H1)
= 1− Pr(P ≤ p|H1)
= GXn(F
−1
Xn
(1− p)), (3.1)
from which an upper tail rejection region (for H1) can be obtained, for a given
significance level, say γ = 0.05. Consequently, instead of basing inference solely on
H0 as is frequently the case, assessments on the merits of both hypotheses can be
presented namely:
i. p provides a summary statistic measuring the deviation of the data from H0
ii. p′ provides a summary statistic measuring the deviation of the data from H1.
Using this methodology, we are in essence testing both hypotheses
simultaneously. Recall from (2.2) that under H0 all p-values have a uniform
distribution over [0, 1]. Meanwhile the density under H1 is given in (2.4) which
will be, sometimes, heavily positively skewed as smaller p-values are more likely
under the alternative hypothesis. Graphically this is illustrated in Figure 3.1 for the
testing of a population mean using two simple hypotheses.
Just as the test level α is entirely subjective, so too is the benchmark level γ
used to form decisions about H1 based on the computed p
′-values. Although there
is no theoretical necessity to force the condition that α = γ, it would seem sensible
and logical to set these levels the same, say 5%. This would then ensure that
the probability of erroneously rejecting the null and alternative hypotheses remains
equal.
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p−value densities under H0 and H1
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Figure 3.1: P -value densities under both H0 : µ = 0 (uniform distribution) and
H1 : µ = 2 (ratio of two Gaussian densities as per (2.5)) such that
√
nδ = 3.5.
Table 3.1: Outcome scenarios for the twin hypothesis testing of the null, H0, and alter-
native null, H1, for the exhaustive combinations listed.
Reject H0 Not reject H0 Reject H1 Not reject H1
H0 true Type I error Correct decision Correct decision Type IIa error
H1 true Correct decision Type II error Type Ia error Correct decision
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Generalising the ideas presented in Donahue (1999) to create a testing
methodology reflecting the traditional classical conventions, I propose to treat H1
as an ‘alternative null’. The rationale for this stems from the performing of two
separate significance tests, both based on the p-value of the test statistic under the
original H0. Just as in conventional statistical testing, when testing the alternative
null it is still possible to make inferential decision errors, namely rejecting a true
alternative null hypothesis and failing to reject a false alternative null hypothesis.
Table 3.1 presents the possible outcomes of this ‘twin statistical testing’ in terms
of outcome errors. The left-hand-side corresponds to the usual possible decisions
with respect to the rejection, or otherwise, of H0, and includes the familiar Type
I and Type II errors. The right-hand-side complements this with respect to the
rejection, or otherwise, of H1. As denoted in Table 3.1, inferential decision errors
are still possible in this case, and to remain consistent with the traditional error
names, I shall denote these as Type Ia and Type IIa errors respectively.4
4There have been many arguments advancing other types of hypothesis test error. Examples
include the Type III error, or error of the third kind, of Mosteller (1948) which represents
correctly rejecting H0, but for the wrong reason. This idea was extended in Kaiser (1960) to cover
two-tailed tests — for a two-tailed test, the alternative hypothesis specifies two directions, namely
above and below the null value. A Type III error is the correct rejection of H0, but inferring the
incorrect direction of the effect. Such an inferential error could easily occur in practice, because
most practitioners rejecting H0 in favour of a two-sided alternative will automatically conclude
the true direction is the one suggested by the sample. For example for a population mean, this
might represent a sample mean significantly smaller than the null value (resulting in rejection of
H0) drawn from a population whose mean is greater than the null value.
This implies the need for a revised power definition, as advocated in Leventhal and Huynh
(1996), that power should be the conditional probability of rejecting the null hypothesis and
correctly identifying the true direction of the difference between the population value of the tested
parameter and the null value. Consequently when performing three-choice tests, that is testing
three hypotheses, i.e. the null, alternative < null and alternative > null, the power will be reduced
when using this revised definition of power. Equivalently the number of observations required will
be underestimated during the test design phase if not adjusting the power definition. However,
the impact of a Type III error is likely to be small in practice.
Another candidate for ‘error[s] of the third kind’ is given in Kimball (1957) by providing
the right answer to the wrong problem, while Raiffa (1968) suggests this corresponds to answering
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It is known that a conventional Type I error (rejection of a true H0) is set a priori
to be the test size, α, since p-values are uniformly distributed under the null. With
respect to the alternative null, the analogous decision error is the incorrect rejection
of the alternative null, logically referred to here as a Type Ia error. Similarly a
Type II error is the failure to reject the null when false, hence the alternative null
equivalent is classified here as a Type IIa error, that is failure to reject H1 when
false. Equations (3.2) to (3.5) clarify these definitions for simple forms of H0 and
H1.
Pr(Type I error) = Pr(Reject H0|H0) = Pr(|Xn| > |c||H0) (3.2)
= Pr(P < α|H0)
= α (as P |H0 ∼ U [0, 1]),
Pr(Type Ia error) = Pr(Reject H1|H1) = Pr(P > d|H1) (3.3)
= Pr(P ′ < γ|H1)
= α′,
Pr(Type II error) = Pr(Not reject H0|H1) = Pr(|Xn| ≤ |c||H1) (3.4)
= Pr(P ≥ α|H1)
= β,
Pr(Type IIa error) = Pr(Not reject H1|H0) = Pr(P ≤ d|H0) (3.5)
= Pr(P ′ ≥ γ|H0)
= β′.
completing the wrong problem. Even a Type IV error is considered by Marascuilo and Levin
(1970) which is the incorrect interpretation of a correctly rejected hypothesis. Though this has
parallels with Mosteller (1948).
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Note that the appropriate test statistic for Type I and Type II errors is the usual
Xn, i.e. some direct function of the data. Then given α, a critical value, c, is
determined. For example, the upper-tailed test of a standard Gaussian test statistic
with α = 0.05 has c = 1.645. A substitute method of course, as discussed previously,
is to compare the p-value of the observed sample statistic, xn, with α. Hence α has
a dual role, namely:
i. as the test size (prior probability of a Type I error)
ii. as the critical value for rejection in the p-value world of testing.
However, when using second-order p-values to test the alternative null, the test
statistic is no longer the random variable Xn but the random variable P (namely
the conventional p-value), derived from Xn as given by (2.1). Given a simple
(non-composite) H1, the p-value density is known to be as per (2.4) in the
general case, and by (2.5) for a simple t test (assuming known variance). Using the
test statistic distribution functions FXn and GXn as appropriate, a critical value,
d ∈ (0, 1), can be computed such that if the observed p-value exceeds d we would
reject H1 (cf. p > d and |xn| > |c|). Again, there exists a parallel methodology, this
time involving the p-value of the p-value test statistic, namely the ‘second-order’
p-value, p′, which can be compared to the prior set tolerance, γ. Due to the close
relationship between Type I and Type Ia errors, also Type II and Type IIa errors,
the probabilities of Type Ia and Type IIa errors are denoted as α′ and β′ respectively.
3.2 Simultaneous Testing
Small p-values suggest implausible null hypotheses, similarly small p′-values
suggest implausible alternative hypotheses. What are the possible implications when
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performing these tests simultaneously? This depends on the skewness of fP (p|H1),
the p-value density under H1.
5 Let α = γ. The critical p-value for the rejection of H0
is always α because p-values are permanently uniform under the null. However, the
critical p-value for rejection of H1 will depend on the shape of the density fP (p|H1),
with d a decreasing function of the (positive) skewness.
So we seek d, such that Pr(P > d|H1) = γ. There are three scenarios to consider:
(i) d < α, (ii) d > α and (iii) d = α. The inferential conclusions for these different
cases are presented in Table 3.2. The critical values referred to as (α, d) only require
computation of d values, since α takes the usual value of the desired size of the test.
d values will depend on the test statistic distributions as identified in (2.4). Such
critical values for Gaussian and t-distributed test statistics are presented later in
this chapter.
Note that no mention is given to accepting a hypothesis, instead we restrict
the terminology only to whether we can reject or fail to reject a hypothesis. This
is because rejection of a specific hypothesis, either the null or the alternative, is
solely due to the implausibility of the observed test statistic (xn for testing H0, p for
testing H1). All we can say is that the data suggest that the rejected hypothesis is
implausible. In effect, we are rejecting a particular hypothesis in favour of anything
which is not the rejected hypothesis. For example, an upper-tailed test with µ0 < µ1,
the rejection of H1 only infers that µ 6= µ1. However given our objective is to form
some conclusion, a ‘net conclusion’ is suggested in each viable case.
It follows from Table 3.2 that some awkward (i.e. inconclusive) outcomes can
occur. When d < α, on occasions we may reject both hypotheses. This equates to
the implausibility of both H0 and H1. If the population parameter value specified
5Recall that this is a function of the test statistic densities under both the null and alternative
hypotheses, fXn and gXn respectively.
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Table 3.2: Inferential conclusions for the pair of significance probabilities, (p, p′) when
testing (H0,H1) with critical values (α, d) respectively such that H0 is rejected when p < α
and H1 is rejected when p > d, equivalently when p′ < γ. Three potential scenarios are
considered: (i) d < α, (ii) d > α and (iii) d = α. α does not necessarily equal γ. ‘-’
indicates impossible conditions.
(i) d < α (d < p ≤ 1) ≡ (0 ≤ p′ < γ) (0 ≤ p ≤ d) ≡ (γ ≤ p′ < 1)
0 ≤ p < α Reject H0, H1 Reject H0, fail to reject H1
Net conclusion: Choose neither Net conclusion: Choose H1
α ≤ p < 1 Fail to reject H0, reject H1 -
Net conclusion: Choose H0 -
(ii) d > α (d < p ≤ 1) ≡ (0 ≤ p′ < γ) (0 ≤ p ≤ d) ≡ (γ ≤ p′ < 1)
0 ≤ p < α - Reject H0, fail to reject H1
- Net conclusion: Choose H1
α ≤ p < 1 Fail to reject H0, reject H1 Fail to reject H0, H1
Net conclusion: Choose H0 Net conclusion: Choose both
(iii) d = α (d < p ≤ 1) ≡ (0 ≤ p′ < γ) (0 ≤ p ≤ d) ≡ (γ ≤ p′ < 1)
0 ≤ p < α - Reject H0, fail to reject H1
- Net conclusion: Choose H1
α ≤ p < 1 Fail to reject H0, Reject H1 -
Net conclusion: Choose H0 -
CHAPTER 3. EXTRACTING MAXIMUM P -VALUE INFORMATION 35
in H1 is considered to be of minimum practical relevance (for example marginal
benefit exceeds marginal cost, or marginal return not crowded out by transaction
costs) then the simultaneous conditions of p < α and p′ < γ equate to a statistically
significant result (p < α), but not a practically relevant one (p′ < γ).
When d > α, it is possible for a p-value to be in neither critical region. In such
instances it is necessary to carry out a randomisation, see Mood, Graybill, and Boes
(1974), to ultimately decide upon one of the hypotheses. Essentially in practice this
equates to a follow-up trial independent of the original sample, as repeat sampling
is a natural consequence having obtained inconclusive results. However in the event
that d = α, we have an unambiguous choice of rejection since we are always in one,
and only one, critical region for all possible p-values.
3.3 Practical Example
We turn now to the case of a test of a population mean. Let H0 : µ = 0 and
a non-composite, hence directional, alternative hypothesis (which without loss of
generality will be assumed to be upper-tailed) be H1 : µ = k, where k > 0 and
represents the minimum required population mean value to ensure practical
viability (clinical, economic etc.) of, and hence warrant adoption of, the real-world
consequence corresponding to H1 in the event of testing favouring this alternative.
This could represent the minimum improvement in survival rates necessary to justify
purchasing a new drug, or sufficient financial returns to offset transaction costs.
Let Y¯n be the sample mean random variable, formed from n independent
observations of Y , a Gaussian variable with mean µ and (assumed known)
variance, σ2. The test statistic Z =
√
nY¯n/σ has a standard Gaussian distribution
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under H0 with the p-value random variable, P = 1 − Φ(Z), having its usual
interpretation of a Type I error probability if H0 is rejected when actually true.
Under the alternative hypothesis Z ∼ N(√nk/σ, 1). It is then possible to compute
the second-order p-value, p′, which is the probability of observing at least p, given
H1 is true.
6
Applying the result of Hung, O’Neill, Bauer, and Ko¨hne (1997), and given in
(2.5), the distribution function of the p-value under H1 is
FP (p|H1) =
∫ p
0
φ(Zx −
√
nδ)
φ(Zx)
dx = 1− Φ(Zp −
√
nδ), (3.6)
where recall Zp is the (1 − p)-th percentile of the standard Gaussian distribution,
and δ = k/σ. Given the definition of the p′-value in (3.1) for generic test statistic
distributions, for the upper-tailed z test,
p′ = Pr(P > p|H1) = 1− FP (p|H1)
= Φ(Zp −
√
nδ). (3.7)
(3.7) can therefore be used to derive conditions between d and α in terms of the
sample size n. If we set α = γ, so that Pr(Type I error) = Pr(Type Ia error), then
we must equate (3.2) and (3.3) such that
α = γ
Pr(P < α|H0) = Pr(P > d|H1)
= Φ(Zd −
√
nδ). (3.8)
6This corresponds to p-values (not p′-values) which suggest incompatibility with H1. Recall that
the positively skewed p-value density under H1 is consistent with a small probability of observing
a large p-value.
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Table 3.2 ensures for all z ∈ Z we will always be able to reject one, and only one, of
the hypotheses if and only if d = α. It then follows from (3.8) that Φ(Zd −
√
nδ) =
Φ(Zα −
√
nδ) and so
√
nδ = 2Zα = 2Zγ in order for d = α.
7 If k is set a priori,
and, as in this example, σ is known, then the required sample size to obtain d = α
becomes
n =
(
2Zα
δ
)2
=
4Z2ασ
2
k2
. (3.9)
If the solution of (3.9) does not yield an integer, as is likely, then rounding n
up (or otherwise an even larger sample) will deliver d < α (since higher test power
increases the skewness of fP (p|H1)) potentially resulting in the rejection of both
H0 and H1 as per Table 3.2 if d < p < α, where p is the p-value of realised (here
Gaussian) test statistic z. As discussed this should be interpreted as a statistically
significant result (due to rejection of H0), but not practically or scientifically relevant
(due to rejection of H1) given k is the minimum value of µ to be a viable difference.
Similarly, if n is rounded down (or otherwise an even smaller sample) then d > α
reflecting lower power. Hence if α < p < d for the p-value of z then we would fail
to reject either hypothesis, therefore requiring a subsequent randomisation / further
sampling.
7
Φ(Zα −
√
nδ) = α
Φ−1(Φ(Zα −
√
nδ)) = Φ−1(α)
Zα −
√
nδ = Z1−α√
nδ = Zα − Z1−α√
nδ = Zα − (−Zα)√
nδ = 2Zα.
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3.3.1 Empirical illustration
Let Y ∼ N(µ, 16), Y¯n ∼ N(µ, 16/n), H0 : µ = 0 and H1 : µ = 2, i.e. simple
hypotheses. Given a random sample y1, . . . , y49, with y¯49 = 0.8, under H0, z =
√
49 × 0.8/4 = 1.4 with corresponding p-value, p = 0.081, hence significant for
α = 0.1, not so for α = 0.05 when testing H0. Under H1, δ = µ/σ = 0.5, therefore
the associated p′-value is p′ = Φ(Z0.081 −
√
49(0.5)) = 0.018, strongly suggesting
rejection of H1. Figure 3.1 illustrates the p-value densities under both H0 and
H1 (
√
nδ = 3.5).
Alternatively, for γ = 0.1, the critical value d, such that Pr(P > d|H1) = 0.1 is
0.013, for γ = 0.05, d = 0.032 and for γ = 0.01, d = 0.120. Hence a p-value of 0.081
leads to rejection of H1 at the 10% and 5% levels, but not at the 1% level, consistent
with the p′-value of 0.018. Note for d = α, given µ and σ implies, using (3.9), that
n = 26.28, 43.296 and 86.59 for α = 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively. Clearly such
sample sizes are unobtainable in practice, therefore increase n if you are willing to
accept d < α, otherwise decrease n to incur d > α allowing the possibility of future
randomisations, should α < p < d. However ceteris paribus higher test power is
preferred, hence the larger n the better.
3.4 Additional Issues
The alternative hypothesis so far has been constructed to be simple. Composite
forms of H1 will be considered later, because often when assessing the significance of
a potential explanatory variable for example, we are concerned with any non-zero
effect. In such circumstances it is appropriate to treat the parameter under the
alternative as a random variable with some distribution over a specified interval,
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typically following a Gaussian or uniform distribution, say.
However to perform statistical testing vis-a`-vis H1, we require the p-value
density under the alternative, fP (p|H1), hence thus far for simplicity an alternative
hypothesis with a specific-valued parameter has been used. This approach is the
reason for suggesting that the minimum commercially or scientifically viable
parameter value, k, (or other appropriate viability condition) be used in H1.
3.4.1 Critical values
Given the advent of critical value tables to aid hypothesis testing, there is a clear
need and advantage to produce such a table of the critical p-values, d, used in (3.8)
to assist in determining the significance of H1 without having to calculate p
′-values.
Table 3.3 achieves this for selected values of
√
nδ. For a range of desired γ and
√
nδ
values, the critical p-values are given, such that if the p-value is above d, we would
reject H1 at that γ level.
Note that this critical value table allows evaluation of the significance of H1 based
solely on the conventional p-value of the test statistic used to assess the plausibility,
given the data, of H0. Also, it is not essential to set α = γ (although as argued
earlier, it would seem logical to do so) as these critical values are independent of α.
fP (p|H1), as previously noted, is in general positively skewed as can be seen for
example in Figure 3.1. This skewness increases with n, due to the increased test
power when testing H0. Therefore for larger sample sizes the skewness will be ever
more marked resulting in lower critical values, d, through the effect on
√
nδ. Also
as |k − µ0| increases (that is, the distance between null and alternative parameter
values increases), power also rises which also affects
√
nδ since δ is a function of k.
From Table 3.3 it can be seen that for
√
nδ > 6, this critical value tends to, and is
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thus indistinguishable, from zero for all γ levels, indicative of permanent rejection
of H1 even for arbitrarily small p-values.
In the limit as
√
nδ −→ 0, for example as µ|H1 −→ 0, then this represents
convergence to H0. Consequently the p-value density under H1 converges to the
continuous uniform distribution. Therefore the upper bound on d in the limit as
√
nδ −→ 0 is just 1−γ, yielding an upper-tail probability of γ for a uniform density
over the unit interval, mirroring the p-value critical value α when testing H0.
However remember rejection of H1 does not automatically facilitate acceptance
of H0, merely implausibility of the parameter value hypothesised in the alternative.
Of course asymptotically thanks to the Central Limit Theorem the sample mean
random variable converges to an unbiased degenerate distribution as the variance
collapses towards zero. But for modest finite samples,
√
nδ will be small
permitting useful application of this twin statistical testing methodology. So
despite the restrictive nature of simple alternative hypotheses, for modest sample
sizes which yield modest values of
√
nδ, the use of such critical values as a substitute
for p′ is relevant.
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3.4.2 Unknown variance
In the above example it was assumed that the variance of the observed data, σ2,
was known. In practice this will probably not be the case, since it is unlikely that
we know the variance with certainty, but not the mean. In such instances, σ2 should
be replaced by its well-known unbiased sample estimator,
S2 =
∑n
i=1(Yi − Y¯n)2
n− 1 . (3.10)
Of course, if this is the case then the test statistic will only be asymptotically
standard Gaussian under H0, similarly asymptotically Gaussian under H1.
Furthermore, if we seek large sample sizes to obtain consistent variance
estimators, then this will have a consequential impact on p′-values due to the effect
of higher n on test power.
For small samples, we perform the popular (and uniformly most powerful) t test8
for H0 : µ = 0 versus H1 : µ = k. Again without loss of generality, assume k > 0.
Replacing σ with S, the revised test statistic becomes
T =
√
nY¯n
S
∼ tn−1 (3.11)
under H0. Define δˆ = k/S,
9 therefore T − √nδˆ also has a tn−1 distribution under
H1. As usual, fP (p|H0) = 1, and fP (p|H1) is obtainable via (2.4), page 9. Let Tp,n−1
8At this point it should be noted that since the t test is uniformly most powerful for such
problems when the variance is unknown, justification for its use relies on power considerations, i.e.
among all test procedures satisfying the level constraint, choose the most powerful one. Clearly
such an approach treats H0 and H1 asymmetrically, since the constraint is formulated under H0
while the objective is formulated under H1. Discussion of treating the hypotheses in a more
symmetric manner using a Bayesian approach will be discussed in Chapter 4.
9Since σ is estimated with S, the quasi-estimated effect size is thus denoted δˆ.
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be the (1 − p)-th percentile of a t distribution with n − 1 degrees of freedom. It
follows that for ν degrees of freedom,
fP (p; ν|H1) = fT (tp −
√
nδˆ; ν)
fT (tp; ν)
=
Γ( ν+12 )
Γ( ν2 )
√
piν
(
1 + (tp,ν−
√
nδˆ)2
ν
)− ν+1
2
Γ( ν+12 )
Γ( ν2 )
√
piν
(
1 +
t2p,ν
ν
)− ν+1
2
=
(
1 +
t2p,ν
ν
1 + (tp,ν−
√
nδˆ)2
ν
) ν+1
2
, (3.12)
where fT (t; ν) is the density function of a t-distribution with ν degrees of freedom.
Figure 3.2 illustrates fP (p|H1) for various degrees of freedom for
√
nδˆ = 3.5.
Compare this with Figure 3.1.
In a similar light to the z test, we can proceed to compute p′-values to test H1.
Again it is much more convenient to have access to critical p-values which preclude
the need to compute p′-values. Given the plethora of possibilities for the number of
degrees of freedom and for
√
nδˆ, extensive tables are required to provide a complete
resource. However Table 3.4 presents a sample of such critical d values for selected
√
nδˆ and degrees of freedom values which should prove sufficient in practice using
interpolation as an approximation for absent
√
nδˆ or ν values. Derivation of these
values stems from the distribution function of a Student’s t variable,
FT (t; ν) = Pr(T ≤ t; ν) = 1
2
+
tΓ((ν + 1)/2)2F1(
1
2
, (ν + 1)/2; 3
2
;− t2
ν
)√
piνΓ(ν/2)
, (3.13)
where 2F1 is the hypergeometric function. Using (2.3), the t-distribution equivalents
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p−value densities under H0 and H1
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Figure 3.2: P -value densities when variance unknown under both H0 : µ = 0 (uni-
form distribution) and H1 : µ = 2 (ratio of two Student’s t densities as per (3.12))
for 10, 20, 50 and 100 degrees of freedom such that
√
nδˆ = 3.5.
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of (3.6) and (3.7) become respectively,
FP (p|H1) =
∫ p
0
fT (tx −
√
nδˆ; ν)
fT (tx; ν)
dx = 1− FT (tp,ν −
√
nδˆ; ν) (3.14)
and
p′ = Pr(P > p|H1) = FT (tp,ν −
√
nδˆ; ν). (3.15)
Note that as
√
nδˆ −→ 0, we again approach the null hypothesis under which p-values
are uniformly distributed. Therefore the upper bound on d is again 1 − γ because
for a uniform density over the unit interval, the probability of being above 1− γ is
γ.
3.5 Supplementary Hypothesis Test Scenarios
3.5.1 Comparison of means — variances known
When testing the equality of means using two sample means, Y¯1 and Y¯2, with sizes
n1 and n2 and known variances σ
2
1 and σ
2
2 respectively, the test statistic
T =
Y¯1 − Y¯2√
σ21
n1
+
σ22
n2
(3.16)
has a standard Gaussian distribution under H0 : µ1 − µ2 = 0. For the specific
alternative H1 : µ1 − µ2 = k, then T − k√ω also has an N(0, 1) distribution, where
ω =
σ21
n1
+
σ22
n2
. Critical values in Table 3.3 can then be used replacing
√
nδ with k√
ω
.10
10
√
nδ could be written as k√
ω
with ω = σ
2
n for a single sample case.
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3.5.2 Comparison of means — variances unknown
The only difference with the known variance case above, is the use of estimated
variances in the standard error term. As per (3.10), let σ2i be estimated by the
sample estimator S2i , i = 1, 2. Acknowledging the Behrens-Fisher problem, allow
the revised test statistic under the null of equality to be
T =
Y¯1 − Y¯2√
S21
n1
+
S22
n2
, (3.17)
which is asymptotically Gaussian, but for small samples has a t distribution with
min(n1−1, n2−1) degrees of freedom. Therefore as T− k√wˆ has the same distribution,
Table 3.4 can be used for critical p-values when testing H1 as appropriate where
√
nδˆ
is replaced by k√
ωˆ
where ωˆ =
s21
n1
+
s22
n2
.
3.5.3 Comparison of means - variances unknown but
assumed equal
When the variances of Y1 and Y2 are unknown but assumed equal we use the standard
error based on the pooled variance estimator,
S2p =
(n1 − 1)S21 + (n2 − 1)S22
n1 + n2 − 2 . (3.18)
It follows that for small samples the test statistic
T =
Y¯1 − Y¯2
Sp
√
1
n1
+ 1
n2
(3.19)
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has a t distribution under H0 with (n1 + n2 − 2) degrees of freedom, but note is
asymptotically Gaussian. Again, as T − k√
ωˆp
has the same distribution, where
ωˆp = S
2
p(
1
n1
+ 1
n2
), then Table 3.4 is applicable with
√
nδˆ replaced by k√
ωˆp
.
3.5.4 Other situations
This twin-testing methodology is directly applicable to any hypothesis testing
scenario provided the test statistic distributions are known either exactly or
asymptotically. Clearly, depending on the test statistic distribution, different
critical value tables may be required, for example for χ2- or F -distributed test
statistics, but the principles of testing H1 are unchanged.
3.6 Negative Values for the Effect Size δ
Recall δ = µ/σ. Since σ > 0, it is possible to obtain negative effect sizes when
µ < 0. When testing H0 : µ = 0, the simple forms of H1 : µ = k considered so far
have been for positive k. Consequently for k > 0,
√
nδ > 0 and the critical values
provided in Table 3.3 are hence applicable. Similarly when variances have to be
estimated, Table 3.4 with
√
nδˆ > 0 should be consulted.
Previously it has been stated that the p-value distribution under the
alternative hypothesis is heavily skewed to the right which has meant the
probability of observing small p-values is large, and so a small p-value lends support
to H1. This is a fundamental tenet in hypothesis testing whether in the classical or
Fisherian mould. However this universal acceptance of right-skewed distributions
for fP (p|H1) breaks down when negative effect sizes are modelled in H1.
Consequently it will be shown that negative effect sizes induce large values of
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fP (p|H1) for large p-values, going against the common perception of the distribution
of fP (p|H1) as in Figure 3.1. Thus the cornerstone principle of only small p-values
being more common under H1 is not universally applicable. In such cases when
this fails, it follows that the conventional approach to hypothesis testing is wholly
inappropriate with significant implications for statistical inference.
To illustrate this phenomenon, Figure 3.3 plots the density and distribution
functions respectively for a range of
√
nδ values (note that under H0 : µ = 0,
√
nδ = 0) using (2.5) and (3.6). From this figure it is clear that under H1 the shape
of the p-value distribution mirrors the commonly perceived right-skewed distribution
for the generic p-value density under the alternative hypothesis, fP (p|H1). When
δ < 0, equivalently when
√
nδ < 0, larger p-values are more likely to arise under H1
than small p-values as evidenced by the distribution of the probability density. In
such cases, significant p-values (i.e. those less than the designated significance level,
α) tend to be more likely under H0 than H1. This result therefore calls into question
the appropriateness of allowing small p-values to signal automatic rejection of H0
when a negative δ is hypothesised in H1.
It is possible to conclude from Figure 3.3, page 52, that for simple alternatives
with δ < 0, improbable test statistic occurrences under H0 are even more improbable
under H1. Therefore if a small p-value occurs such that fP (p|H1) < fP (p|H0), then
the researcher should conclude in favour of the null hypothesis, even if p < α. The
next chapter will consider a methodological unification of Bayesian with classical
and Fisherian hypothesis testing taking this into account.
Appendix A provides critical value tables for negative effect sizes, analogous to
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 for positive effect sizes. The main difference is that a lower-tail
test is performed when testing H1, since sufficiently small p-values warrant rejection
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Table 3.4: Critical p-values, d, for various levels of γ and selected values of
√
nδˆ when
testing, for unknown variance, non-composite hypotheses featuring population mean pa-
rameter θ, i.e. H0 : θ = 0 and H1 : θ = k such that Pr(P > d|H1) = γ, where P is the
one-tailed p-value of the test statistic under H0. Under the null, the test statistic has a
t-distribution with ν = n− 1 degrees of freedom and under H1 the test statistic achieves
the same distribution once
√
nδˆ has been subtracted. n is sample size and δˆ = k/S where
k > 0 is the hypothesised parameter value of θ under H1, and S2 =
Pn
i=1(Yi−Y¯n)2
n−1 . Entries
in the table give 10% (top), 5% (middle) and 1% (bottom) significance points respectively.
ν 10 20 30 50 75 100 200 500√
nδˆ
0.25 0.8560 0.8525 0.8513 0.8503 0.8498 0.8496 0.8492 0.8490
0.9254 0.9221 0.9209 0.9199 0.9195 0.9192 0.9188 0.9186
0.9846 0.9831 0.9825 0.9819 0.9817 0.9815 0.9813 0.9812
0.50 0.7982 0.7905 0.7880 0.7859 0.7848 0.7843 0.7835 0.7831
0.8907 0.8825 0.8797 0.8774 0.8762 0.8756 0.8748 0.8742
0.9765 0.9720 0.9702 0.9686 0.9678 0.9674 0.9668 0.9664
0.75 0.7261 0.7143 0.7103 0.7072 0.7056 0.7048 0.7037 0.7030
0.8435 0.8293 0.8245 0.8205 0.8185 0.8176 0.8161 0.8152
0.9641 0.9547 0.9509 0.9477 0.9460 0.9452 0.9439 0.9431
1.00 0.6412 0.6258 0.6208 0.6168 0.6148 0.6138 0.6123 0.6114
0.7823 0.7615 0.7545 0.7489 0.7461 0.7447 0.7426 0.7413
0.9459 0.9289 0.9223 0.9166 0.9137 0.9122 0.9099 0.9086
1.25 0.5474 0.5297 0.5239 0.5193 0.5171 0.5159 0.5143 0.5133
0.7069 0.6799 0.6711 0.6640 0.6605 0.6587 0.6561 0.6546
0.9195 0.8921 0.8816 0.8729 0.8684 0.8661 0.8626 0.8605
1.50 0.4504 0.4316 0.4255 0.4206 0.4183 0.4171 0.4153 0.4142
0.6194 0.5878 0.5775 0.5695 0.5655 0.5635 0.5605 0.5588
0.8825 0.8419 0.8270 0.8146 0.8084 0.8052 0.8005 0.7976
1.75 0.3567 0.3378 0.3317 0.3269 0.3245 0.3233 0.3215 0.3204
0.5243 0.4900 0.4791 0.4706 0.4664 0.4643 0.4612 0.4594
0.8327 0.7772 0.7576 0.7417 0.7338 0.7298 0.7238 0.7202
2.00 0.2721 0.2538 0.2479 0.2432 0.2409 0.2397 0.2380 0.2369
0.4275 0.3930 0.3821 0.3736 0.3694 0.3674 0.3643 0.3625
0.7687 0.6983 0.6746 0.6558 0.6464 0.6418 0.6348 0.6307
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ν 10 20 30 50 75 100 200 500√
nδˆ
2.25 0.2003 0.1831 0.1775 0.1730 0.1708 0.1697 0.1681 0.1671
0.3355 0.3026 0.2923 0.2842 0.2803 0.2783 0.2754 0.2737
0.6907 0.6081 0.5814 0.5606 0.5504 0.5454 0.5378 0.5334
2.50 0.1429 0.1270 0.1218 0.1176 0.1156 0.1146 0.1131 0.1121
0.2537 0.2236 0.2142 0.2069 0.2033 0.2015 0.1989 0.1973
0.6013 0.5110 0.4831 0.4617 0.4513 0.4461 0.4385 0.4340
2.75 0.0992 0.0848 0.0802 0.0765 0.0746 0.0737 0.0724 0.0715
0.1853 0.1587 0.1504 0.1440 0.1408 0.1392 0.1369 0.1355
0.5054 0.4133 0.3859 0.3651 0.3551 0.3502 0.3430 0.3387
3.00 0.0673 0.0548 0.0507 0.0476 0.0460 0.0452 0.0440 0.0433
0.1312 0.1084 0.1013 0.0957 0.0930 0.0917 0.0897 0.0885
0.4090 0.3210 0.2957 0.2767 0.2676 0.2632 0.2567 0.2528
3.25 0.0449 0.0343 0.0309 0.0283 0.0270 0.0264 0.0254 0.0249
0.0906 0.0714 0.0655 0.0609 0.0586 0.0575 0.0559 0.0549
0.3186 0.2393 0.2171 0.2006 0.1928 0.1889 0.1833 0.1800
3.50 0.0296 0.0209 0.0182 0.0162 0.0152 0.0147 0.0140 0.0135
0.0612 0.0455 0.0407 0.0371 0.0353 0.0344 0.0331 0.0323
0.2393 0.1713 0.1527 0.1390 0.1325 0.1294 0.1248 0.1221
3.75 0.0194 0.0125 0.0104 0.0089 0.0082 0.0078 0.0073 0.0070
0.0407 0.0282 0.0245 0.0216 0.0203 0.0196 0.0186 0.0180
0.1736 0.1180 0.1030 0.0921 0.0869 0.0844 0.0808 0.0787
4.00 0.0126 0.0073 0.0058 0.0047 0.0042 0.0040 0.0036 0.0034
0.0268 0.0170 0.0142 0.0121 0.0111 0.0106 0.0099 0.0095
0.1223 0.0783 0.0667 0.0583 0.0544 0.0525 0.0498 0.0482
4.25 0.0082 0.0042 0.0031 0.0024 0.0021 0.0019 0.0017 0.0016
0.0175 0.0101 0.0080 0.0065 0.0058 0.0055 0.0050 0.0048
0.0840 0.0502 0.0416 0.0354 0.0325 0.0311 0.0291 0.0280
4.50 0.0054 0.0024 0.0017 0.0012 0.0010 0.0009 0.0008 0.0007
0.0114 0.0058 0.0044 0.0034 0.0029 0.0027 0.0024 0.0023
0.0566 0.0313 0.0250 0.0205 0.0185 0.0176 0.0162 0.0154
4.75 0.0035 0.0013 0.0009 0.0006 0.0005 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003
0.0074 0.0033 0.0024 0.0017 0.0014 0.0013 0.0011 0.0010
0.0375 0.0190 0.0145 0.0115 0.0101 0.0095 0.0085 0.0080
5.00 0.0023 0.0008 0.0004 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001
0.0048 0.0019 0.0012 0.0008 0.0007 0.0006 0.0005 0.0004
0.0247 0.0113 0.0082 0.0062 0.0053 0.0049 0.0043 0.0040
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of H1. Therefore it is necessary to restate the p
′-value for negative effect sizes as the
complement of the p′-value defined in (3.7). Hence,
(p′)c = 1− p′ = Pr(P ≤ p|H1) = FP (p|H1) = 1− Φ(Zp −
√
nδ). (3.20)
Consequently the revised critical values for negative
√
nδ are, from (3.7) and (3.20),
obtained by simply subtracting from one the critical value corresponding to the
equivalent |√nδ|. Table A.1 therefore provides critical p-values, d, such that
Pr(P ≤ d|H1) = γ, hence the d values correspond to p-values with associated
p′-values, (p′)c, equal to γ for the respective
√
nδ.
Similarly when variances are estimated, (3.15) leads to the following lower-tail
p′-value,
(p′)c = 1− p′ = Pr(P ≤ p|H1) = FP (p|H1) = 1− FT (tp,ν −
√
nδˆ; ν). (3.21)
Again subtracting the entries in Table 3.4 from one yields the corresponding critical
p-values for negative
√
nδˆ provided in Table A.2. Just as usual for obtaining critical
values, suitable interpolation should be performed when the exact
√
nδ,
√
nδˆ and ν
values required are not explicitly listed.
3.7 Composite Alternative Hypotheses
So far, analysis has been restricted to simple forms of H1. In practice the population
parameter is unknown, otherwise why test for its true value? Hence it may not
always be appropriate to invoke a simple alternative, rather it is better to model
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(i) Density functions
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(ii) Distribution functions
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Figure 3.3: P -value density and distribution functions for simple forms of H1 where
the effect size function
√
nδ takes negative values.
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the parameter as following some hypothesised distribution.11 In this light, the effect
size, δ, is now treated as a random variable over some prescribed interval of values
reflecting the domain of the modelled distribution.
Different distribution families will naturally lead to different p-value
distributional properties. As seen in the previous section, when the effect size
parameter takes negative values, the p-value density, fP (p|H1), is left-skewed
meaning small p-values are unlikely under the alternative. This phenomenon
extends to composite alternative hypotheses when the domain of the modelled
distribution for δ incorporates negative values. To illustrate this, let δ follow one of
two distributions — the Gaussian and uniform will be considered. Hung, O’Neill,
Bauer, and Ko¨hne (1997) derive the respective p-value density and distribution
functions. For the Gaussian case such that δ ∼ N(ζ, ω2) with sample size n,
fP (p|H1) = gζ,ω,n(p) =
[
ω(n+ ω−2)1/2
]−1
(3.22)
× exp
{
−1
2
[
(ζ/ω)2 − (√nZp + ζ/ω2)2/(n+ ω−2)
]}
,
FP (p|H1) = Gζ,ω,n(p) = 1− Φ
{
(Zp −
√
nζ)/(ω2n+ 1)1/2
}
, (3.23)
where (3.22) and (3.23) denote the density and distribution functions, under H1,
respectively. For the uniform case such that δ ∼ U [a, b] for arbitrary parameters a
11The argument previously advanced in defence of a simple H1 related to the minimum parameter
value required for commercial or scientific relevance, which is justified in certain circumstances.
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and b with sample size n,
fP (p|H1) = ga,b,n(p) = (2pi/n)1/2 exp(0.5Z2p) (3.24)
×{Φ(√nb− Zp)− Φ(√na− Zp)} /(b− a),
FP (p|H1) = Ga,b,n(p) =
{√
n(b− a)}−1 (3.25)
×
∫ ∞
Zp
{
Φ(v −√na)− Φ(v −√nb)} dv,
where (3.24) and (3.25) denote the density and distribution functions, under H1,
respectively.
Our interest concerns how the parametric specification affects the p-value
distribution. It is noted that each distribution takes three parameters, namely ζ, ω
and n for the Gaussian distribution and a, b and n for the uniform distribution.
3.7.1 Gaussian specification of δ in H1
Note that setting ζ = 0 corresponds to δ degenerating to 0 as ω2 −→ 0. (3.23)
reduces in this limit to G0,0,n = 1 − Φ(Zp) = 1 − (1 − p) = p, i.e. the continuous
uniform distribution function over [0, 1], which is consistent with the (simple) null
hypothesis with µ = 0.12
Clearly given the domain of the Gaussian distribution is the entire real line, R,
we have −∞ < ζ < ∞ and ω2 > 0. Therefore the domain of a Gaussian variable
always incorporates the entire real line, so the p-value density should exhibit large
values for p-values close to both 0 and 1 for modest ζ. For illustrative purposes,
Figure 3.4 plots the density and distribution functions for a variety of ζ and ω2
values for sample sizes of n = 100. It can be seen that these densities depart from
12Recall that δ = µ/σ.
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the conventional right-skewed distributions with both extremely small and large
p-values under H1 being highly likely. This is reflected in the right-hand side of the
figure which displays the corresponding distribution functions. Whereas Figure 3.1,
say, would be compatible with a fully concave distribution function, it is evident that
as the p-value increases convexity is obtained resulting in substantial probabilities
for observing p-values around both the lower and upper limits of the unit interval.
The specification of the two parameters, ζ and ω2, in the Gaussian distribution
of δ will affect the proportion of the distribution of δ which traverses negative values,
thus affecting the likelihood of observing large p-values under H1. Ceteris paribus,
as ζ increases then this proportion reduces corresponding to a decrease in the height
of fP (p|H1) for large p-values. However full concavity of the distribution function is
never achieved, since even as ζ −→ ∞, there still exists some positive probability
that δ < 0, and hence slight convexity of FP (p|H1) as p −→ 1.
It follows that the variance of δ, ω2, also affects the distributional shape of
fP (p|H1) and hence the proportion of δ’s probability distribution taking negative
values. For ζ > 0, larger ω2 values increase this proportion, while for ζ < 0 a
higher δ variance reduces this proportion, but as mentioned above this proportion
is always strictly positive resulting in a raised p-value density function towards the
upper bound of the unit interval.
3.7.2 Uniform specification of δ in H1
Under H1, δ ∼ U [a, b]. Figure 3.5 plots the p-value density function for three pairs
of [a, b] values for n = 100. For a = 0 and b = 2 we obtain the familiar right-skewed
characteristic as expected since this δ domain excludes negative values. However
a left-skewed mirror image is obtained for a = −2 and b = 0 (note encompassing
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Figure 3.4: P -value density and distribution functions for composite forms of H1
where the effect size parameter δ ∼ N(ζ, ω2) as per (3.22) and (3.23). a(i) =
g−0.25,ω,100(p), a(ii) = G−0.25,ω,100(p), b(i) = g0,ω,100(p), b(ii) = G0,ω,100(p), c(i) =
g0.5,ω,100(p) and c(ii) = G0.5,ω,100(p).
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parameter δ ∼ U [a, b] as per (3.24).
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exclusively negative δ values) reflecting the simple H1 analogue as illustrated in
Figure 3.3, implying that under the alternative, extremely large p-values are more
likely. Finally for a = −2 and b = 2 we have a mixture of positive and negative
δ values resulting in a distributional shape similar to that of the Gaussian cases
presented in Figure 3.4.
3.7.3 Choice of δ specification in H1
As a result, when the effect size parameter is hypothesised to be a random variable,
depending on the domain specification of the distribution of δ, it is possible that
small p-values could be more indicative of the null hypothesis rather than H1 when
negative δ values are feasible. Hung, O’Neill, Bauer, and Ko¨hne (1997) also derive
the p-value distribution when δ follows a lognormal distribution such that log(δ) is
Gaussian with mean θ and variance ν2, replicated here for completeness as
fP (p|H1) = gθ,ν,n(p) =
∫ ∞
−∞
φ(Zp −
√
neνu+θ)φ(u)/φ(Zp) du, (3.26)
FP (p|H1) = Gθ,ν,n(p) =
∫ ∞
−∞
Φ(
√
neνu+θ − Zp)φ(u) du, (3.27)
where (3.26) and (3.27) denote the density and distribution functions, under H1,
respectively. However since the support of a lognormal distribution is [0,∞), the
negative δ problem is not encountered and so no further consideration is given to
this distribution here.
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3.8 Conclusions
This chapter has focused on the distribution of the p-value under the alternative
hypothesis, H1. The motivation for doing so is that just because a given test statistic
value is improbable under the null, it cannot automatically be inferred that the
alternative specification is more likely. Consideration was given to the second-order
p-value, p′, to assess the plausibility of H1.
For simple forms of H1 testing for a non-zero effect, a simultaneous testing
methodology extending the conventional classical and Fisherian procedures to
incorporate testing of H1 was outlined, highlighting the possibility that both or
none of the two hypotheses might be rejected. In order to facilitate widespread
adoption of this testing approach, critical value tables were produced, reflecting the
popular use of such tables for numerous test statistic distributions. These tables
provided critical p-values for a range of significance levels, γ, which can be used
to determine, for a given sample size n and effect size δ, whether H1 should be
rejected. Derivation of the p-value distribution extended to the case of t-distributed
test statistics was introduced for use in common testing situations when unknown
population variances are estimated.
Another addition to the literature concerns the recognition that the sign of the
effect size influences the shape of fP (p|H1) such that for a simple alternative with
δ < 0, fP (p|H1) is left-skewed mirroring the case for a positive δ. Such scenarios
indicate that the conventional approach to hypothesis testing whereby small p-values
constitute automatic rejection of H0 and acceptance of H1 are misguided since an
improbable test statistic outcome under the null can be even more improbable under
the alternative.
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Attention then turned towards composite forms of H1. By modelling the
unknown effect size with a particular distribution, it was shown that when the
support of the distribution included negative values (for example the Gaussian and
some continuous uniform distributions), then departure from the typical
right-skewed form of fP (p|H1) resulted. Consequently this chapter has emphasised
an important caveat when performing such hypothesis tests, specifically that large
p-values can be indicative of H1.
With this in mind, the next chapter will look towards the methodological
unification of the different schools of hypothesis testing which will explicitly
incorporate the p-value distribution under the alternative hypothesis. Although
the Bayesian, Classical and Fisherian schools of hypothesis testing each have their
advantages, a single approach consolidating the best of all the doctrines is clearly
sought.
Chapter 4
Me´nage a` Trois Inference Style:
Unifying Three Hypothesis
Testing Doctrines
In recent years considerable attention in the literature has focused on the suitability
of conventional null hypothesis significance testing (NHST), with a frustrating lack
of agreement. For instance in wildlife research, Anderson, Burnham, and Thompson
(2000) report on the increasing number of papers criticising the NHST approach,
but Thompson’s data cite numerous defences as well. A common complaint concerns
the misuse of NHST, rather than the procedure itself. Incorrect interpretation of
the test conclusions however is hardly justification for an embargo on NHST (as
suggested in Schmidt (1996)), but rather simply a matter of researcher training.
This chapter seeks to extend previous attempts to provide a methodological
unification of the different schools of hypothesis testing (Neyman-Pearson,
Fisherian and Bayesian). Each school has its own merits, however each also suffers
from limitations which are discussed. Attention focuses on the concept of conditional
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frequentist testing which has been developed in recent years to help provide unity.
New results presented here include a revised conditioning statistic taking into
account the behaviour of the p-value under H1 by considering its density, fP (p|H1).
As a consequence, new critical p-value curves and surfaces are constructed to
provide a quick-and-easy method for researchers to employ this conditional
methodology, with computation limited to obtaining a conventional p-value and
determining certain parameter values which are a product of the specification of H1.
4.1 Bayesian Hypothesis Testing
Prior to the 1920s, statistical inference was foremost Bayesian, following on from the
pioneering work of Bayes and Laplace. As a simple illustrative example, consider
n independent Bernoulli trials used to test H0 : θ = θ0 against H1 : θ 6= θ0 for
0 < θ < 1. Prior probabilities for the two hypotheses, Pr(Hi), i = 0, 1, are stated
as well as the prior density for θ, pi(θ).1 Objective Bayesians would use default
probabilities of 0.5 and a default prior density pi(θ) = 1 over 0 < θ < 1 for a
typical Bernoulli problem. A subjective approach would choose probabilities and a
density based on personal beliefs or real extraneous information. Once data, say x,
have been collected, the posterior probabilities of the hypotheses can be computed,
representing the posterior distribution. For example for the null hypothesis, from
Bayes’ theorem,
Pr(H0|x) = Pr(H0)f(x|θ = θ0)
Pr(H0)f(x|θ = θ0) + Pr(H1)
∫
{θ 6=θ0} f(x|θ)pi(θ)dθ
, (4.1)
1One can view this as a weight function permitting calculation of an average likelihood under
the alternative hypothesis.
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where f(x|θ) is the sample distribution of x, given parameter θ. Hence, it is necessary
to be able to evaluate the integral analytically, or at least approximate it numerically
by Monte Carlo methods. Equation (4.1) then gives a measure of the likelihood of H0
taking into account pi(θ). This contrasts and conflicts with a conventional p-value,
an issue returned to later.
An alternative quantity to report is the Bayes factor which yields a measure
of the odds of H0 to H1, given the data — essentially a weighted likelihood ratio.
Formally the Bayes factor, say B0,1 of H0 to H1, is the posterior odds ratio over the
prior odds ratio,
B0,1 =
Pr(H0|x)/Pr(H1|x)
Pr(H0)/Pr(H1)
(4.2)
=
f(x|θ = θ0)∫
θ 6=θ0 f(x|θ)pi(θ)dθ
. (4.3)
The interpretation of the specification in (4.3) is as the likelihood of the data
under H0 divided by the average likelihood under H1, with the advantage that the
Bayes factor is independent of the prior hypothesis probabilities, and so reflects the
observed data only. Clearly for the objective approach with Pr(H0) = Pr(H1) = 0.5,
the Bayes factor is simply the posterior odds ratio. Given (4.3), the posterior
probability of H0 can alternatively be stated as
Pr(H0|x) =
[
1 +
Pr(H1)
Pr(H0)
· 1
B0,1
]−1
. (4.4)
Berger and Delampady (1987), for example, derive the Bayes factor for pi(θ) ∼
N(θ0, τ
2) in contrast to the Cauchy C(θ0, τ
2) preferred by Jeffreys (1961), where τ 2
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is a hyperparameter. Berger (1985) provides useful references in defence of
objective priors in response to the frequentist criticism of Bayesian techniques
requiring a prior specification.2 Having equal prior probabilities is intuitively
acceptable as representing objectivity due to the symmetry of the prior beliefs
(despite the fact that just considering Bayes factors removes the need to even
consider such probabilities), however there is no clear objective choice for pi(θ).
In Berger and Delampady (1987) it is argued that pi(θ) should be symmetric
about θ0 for a parameter space spanning the entire real line, and possibly be non-
increasing in |θ−θ0| to avoid bias towards θ 6= θ0. They note that the functional form
of pi(θ) is largely irrelevant, however in the Gaussian versus Cauchy specification,
the scale factor τ is influential in both Bayes factor and posterior probabilities
which means that τ must be specified, and for that matter specified subjectively
since there is no obvious default, objective value. Of particular note however, are
the ‘automatic’ Bayesian significance tests of Jeffreys (1961) (specifying a Cauchy
C(θ0, σ
2) prior) and Smith and Spiegelhalter (1980) (specifying a constant default
prior) which, although not completely objective, do yield superior results vis-a`-vis
p-values.
Whereas non-Bayesians would be inclined to report a p-value and perhaps a
confidence interval of likely values of the unknown parameter, a Bayesian approach
would be to report the posterior Pr(H0|x) with, say, a 95% posterior credible
interval for the parameter. So fundamentally, we have two competing statistics
for point statistics for empirical conclusions, namely the p-value and the posterior
probability, Pr(H0|x).3 Although both seem intuitively appealing, it is possible to
2Berger and Berry (1988) note the disguised subjectivity within the frequentist ideology.
3The focus here will be on these summary statistics rather than confidence intervals and
posterior credible intervals.
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encounter an inferential conflict between p-values and the conditional measures of
Bayes factors and posterior probabilities for two-sided tests, such as a small (i.e.
significant) p-value occurring in parallel with a large Pr(H0|x). When such cases
occur, p-values are very misleading resulting in an irreconcilability between p-values
and posterior probabilities. In terms of quantities to report, such as reporting
posterior probabilities for a range of (subjective) prior inputs, see Dickey (1973).
4.1.1 Example of inferential conflicts
Take as an example the interesting experiment investigating the presence of
psychokinesis, that is the ability of the mind to influence matter. In 1987, an
experiment by Schmidt, Jahn and Radin (see Jahn, Dunne, and Nelson (1987))
seemed to prove the existence of this phenomenon. Particles arrived at a quantum
gate and the experiment was set up such that the probability of particles veering
towards one of two directions was 0.5. Of the 104,900,000 independent Bernoulli
trials, there were 53,263,000 successes providing allegedly strong evidence in favour
of the paranormal, with the test of H0 : θ = 0.5 yielding a p-value of 0.0003. So does
this imply that the X-Files are true? Sadly, no. If the Bayesian approach outlined
above is used, then Pr(H0|x) = 0.94, so psychic ability is unlikely. Hence here the
p-value is extremely misleading. Of course in practice we would not expect p to be
exactly equal to Pr(H0|x), however although p < Pr(H0|x), the magnitude of the
difference is particularly startling. Other examples of such a conflict can be found in
Diamond and Forrester (1983). Note the focus here on two-sided tests, i.e. a simple
or small interval null hypothesis being tested against H1 : Ω \Θ0.
Clearly the (very) large sample size used would easily yield a (very) small p-
value when the sample proportion deviates even slightly from 0.5 due to the standard
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error. Some departure from H0 is likely to occur precisely because in any
experiment there is likely to be some systematic deviation from the strict H0 such
as a calibration issue in the experimental design as well as the stochastic nature of
the experimental particles. Consequently the p-value will be decreasing in n, the
sample size. Therefore with a sample size of several million, even minor deviations
from a strict H0 will be statistically significant as a result of false positives.
So the Fisherian approach which produces a p-value, i.e. the probability of
the observed outcome or a more extreme one, seems to be flawed. Much better,
therefore, to report the likelihoods of all the different hypotheses assessing their
strengths conditional on the data, as achieved in Bayesian testing. In essence the
hypotheses are all in direct competition with one another4 and the posterior
probabilities allow the researcher to discriminate between them. Should no
hypothesis emerge the ‘winner’, i.e. we have inconclusive results, then more data
should be collected. Note that in practice it is never possible to be 100% certain
in accepting or rejecting a particular hypothesis — an open mind must be
maintained since new observations might cause a revision in the posterior
probabilities culminating in a previously preferred hypothesis becoming less likely
while the less endeared hypothesis might suddenly become in vogue. Initial data
may be compatible with the sample distribution f(x|θ), however the true sampling
distribution could be of a completely different functional form, but the data x might
be compatible with both distributions by pure coincidence, unlike new observations
(from the true distribution) which may be incompatible with f(x|θ).5
4In model choice problems, it is possible to have several hypotheses each representing a different
model.
5This argument reflects the questions facing any theory, i.e. model assumptions and
simplifications should be reasonable and the core theoretical implications should be reflected in the
data. However this does not prove that a model is true, rather a completely different mechanism
may have generated the data, but the incorrect model provides a good fit by pure coincidence,
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A basic deficiency with Fisherian hypothesis testing is that it answers the
question ‘Given H0 is true, what is the probability of these (or more extreme) data?’
i.e. Pr(x|H0), however what one really wants to answer is ‘Given these data, what is
the probability that H0 is true?’ i.e. Pr(H0|x), that is the conditioning is reversed.
The important point is that in general Pr(x|H0) 6= Pr(H0|x).6 The reason for the
considerable disparity between Pr(H0|x) and the p-value for two-sided tests stems
from the conditioning set. The posterior probability takes into account only the
data, while the p-value considers the probability of observing the data or a more
extreme result . As Jeffreys (1980) commented,
‘I have always considered the arguments for the use of P absurd. They
amount to saying that a hypothesis that may or may not be true is
rejected because a greater departure from the trial value was improbable;
that is, that it has not predicted something that has not happened.’ (p.
453)
Cohen (1994) provides an entertaining review and critique of the pitfalls of Fisherian
and Neyman-Pearson testing citing the ‘mechanical dichotomous decisions around
a sacred .05 criterion’ (italics in original) and his ‘temptation to call it statistical
hypothesis inference testing’, with an eye on its acronymous namesake.
Berger and Sellke (1987) investigate lower bounds on the posterior probability,
Pr(H0|x), for different priors for testing point null hypotheses, and include references
to other papers testing Bayesian point nulls. They report that p << Pr(H0|x) where
although the likelihood of this decreases with more data.
6Although Fisherian advocates may argue that the definition of a p-value as Pr(x|H0) is no
secret and hence it is foolish to treat a p-value as measuring Pr(H0|x), the fact is that most
practitioners are non-specialists who confuse the distinction between Pr(x|H0) and Pr(H0|x) —
see Diamond and Forrester (1983). Therefore given this conflict for two-sided tests, the reporting
of p-values inevitably leads to a culture of rejecting H0 too liberally. As already mentioned, such
Type I errors are by convention more intolerable than their Type II counterparts.
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equality can only be achieved provided the prior is heavily biased in favour of H1, for
example Pr(H1) = 0.85, where the probability mass is symmetrically spread out to
most favour H1, can achieve a posterior probability of 0.05 for a two-sided z-statistic
of 1.96. Clearly such a biased prior would be unpalatable to most, if not all, however
a practitioner wishing to reject the null (if a ‘significant’ result was especially sought)
can easily circumvent this perceived bias by just reporting the conventional p-value,
citing ‘standard practice’. Since these lower bounds all exceed the p-values regardless
of prior choice, then it is not possible to dismiss this inferential conflict between
p-values and conditional measures based on the subjective choice of pi(θ). Edwards,
Lindman, and Savage (1963) are considered the first to expose the magnitude of this
irreconcilability, such that p-values are typically at least an order of magnitude less
than conditional measures.
4.2 Unifying Bayesians and Frequentists
The previous section highlighted the conflict between classical p-values and
conditional measures, namely Bayesian posterior probabilities and, through (4.4),
Bayes factors. Researchers have sought to bridge the divide between the various
schools of testing (Neyman-Pearson, Fisherian and Bayesian). Bayarri and Berger
(2004) review achievements in developing a methodological, if not philosophical,
union between the opposing camps citing the pedagogical benefits which inevitably
result from consistent inference.7 For a discussion concerning the adverse effects of
divided methodologies, see Goodman (1999a) and Goodman (1999b). Synthesising
7Robinson and Wainer (2001) present a critique of null hypothesis significance testing (NHST)
to educate researchers in the art of best practice. They conclude that NHST has its merits but
should be treated as an adjunct to other forms, such as Bayesian testing when a probabilistic
statement concerning the hypotheses is sought.
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the best of both worlds is naturally appealing.
It should be noted that as far as estimation is concerned, frequentist and Bayesian
approaches typically yield the same, or at least similar, results for common
parametric problems involving continuous parameters, allowing the adoption of
either frequentist or Bayesian interpretations. Yet despite frequentist estimation
being effective, Bayesian tools should be implemented to assess estimator accuracy.
Many frequentist methods require asymptotic approximations, and are also used in
Bayesian cases (see LeCam (1986) and Schervish (1995) for further details), however
unlike frequentist methodologies exact small sample solutions can be obtained for
Bayesian procedures, often more easily than asymptotic methods.
4.2.1 Review of testing doctrines
Three distinct schools of hypothesis testing exist advocated by Neyman, Fisher and
Jeffreys.8 The trouble arises due to the considerable disagreement in the test results
of simple, or small interval, null hypotheses reported by each method.9 Efron and
Gous (2001) consider the differences in the scales of evidence. For a historical review
of the different approaches, see Carlson (1976), Savage (1976), Spielman (1978), Hall
and Sellinger (1986), Zabell (1992) and Lehmann (1993). For completeness, a brief
review of the different techniques and common criticisms of them is now provided.
8Interestingly, despite the ideological clash concerning testing, the schools reach agreement on
estimation and confidence procedures (in terms of the numerical values to report), disagreeing only
in the correct interpretation.
9Casella and Berger (1987) and Berger and Montera (1999) consider one-sided, i.e. composite
null hypotheses with the former highlighting the similarity between results.
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Neyman-Pearson approach
Both H0 and H1 need to be specified (in order to produce error probabilities and to
assess test power). A pre-experimental significance level, α, is chosen which is used
to define a critical region, C, and an appropriate test statistic, say T , is used. A
simple decision rule follows. Reject H0 when t ∈ C,10 otherwise fail to reject. As
appropriate, report Type I or Type II errors, α and β respectively. This approach
is justified by way of the frequentist principle:
In repeated11 use of a statistical procedure, the long-run average actual
error should not be greater than (and ideally should equal) the long-run
average reported error.
An oft-cited criticism with the Neyman-Pearson approach is that the error
probabilities are fixed a priori , and so fail to adequately reflect variation in test
statistic values. Also H1 must be specified to enable computation of Type II errors
and consequently power functions, which rely on parameters which are typically
unknown. Classical tests specify H1 and choose n to achieve the desired power, but
surely choice of the parameter under H1, θ1, is subjective, hence neutralising the
critics of Bayesian methods who dispute the use of a prior distribution. A
possible remedy is to use a prior distribution for θ1 and consider average power
with respect to this distribution. Also since the goal is to maximise power subject
to the pre-experimental α, there exists an asymmetric treatment of the hypotheses.
10t is the observed realisation of the random variable T .
11An important consideration concerns the repeatability of an experiment, however this may not
always be feasible, for example a nuclear war.
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Fisher approach
Fisher’s approach champions p-values, as defined in Chapter 2, as reflecting the
strength of evidence against H0. Unlike the Neyman-Pearson framework, the
(subjective) specification of an alternative hypothesis is not required. The original
Fisher approach advocated the replication of small studies, and so false negatives
were considered costlier (to society) than false positives. The rationale for this is
that a significant result would then be tested many more times, resulting in it being
discarded if subsequent rejections failed to occur. A false negative on the other hand
would be ignored from the start.
Criticisms include violation of the frequentist principle and the very definition
of p-values, i.e. the questionable justification for providing the probability of the
data ‘or a more extreme value’, as remarked upon above. A client is concerned with
inference on his/her actual data, not hypothetical data by considering what might
have been observed under repeated sampling.
The condition p < α acts as a screen for potentially useful innovations. The
original idea of p-value testing in the context of a continuing series of experiments
is intuitively sensible. Originally, inference was performed as follows: p < 0.05
identified an effect, p > 0.2 indicated no effect or one too small to be discovered in
an experiment of the current size, inbetween these cases a revision to the
experiment would be proposed. In practice most studies are ‘single-shot’ studies
with no replications and any p > 0.05 is automatically ignored. However such
one-off studies can be combined to form meta-analyses such as the Cochrane
Collaboration. Also, because of the potentially high-cost consequences of
rejection errors, it is unlikely that in practice high-stakes decisions would be based
on a single study.
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Jeffreys approach
Jeffreys favoured an alternative hypothesis which allows the Bayes factor, as per
(4.3), to be specified. Inference can then be based on a balance-of-probabilities
basis, whereby we reject H0 if B0,1 ≤ 1 and fail to reject if B0,1 > 1. (Recall the
Bayes factor is a likelihood ratio, hence values sub-unity suggest that H0 is less
likely, hence its rejection.) In addition, objective posterior error probabilities are
reported. If equal prior probabilities are used, i.e. Pr(Hi|x) = 0.5, i = 0, 1, then the
posterior probabilities are,
Pr(H0|x) = B0,1
1 +B0,1
= α(B0,1), (4.5)
Pr(H1|x) = 1
1 +B0,1
= β(B0,1). (4.6)
Intuitively, a fully accurate subjective prior distribution should result in optimal
inferential decision-making. However to be fully accurate requires all prior beliefs
to be incorporated which in principle means an infinite number of assessments, i.e.
Fθ(θ = k) ∀ k ∈ Θ ⊆ R, for distribution function F and parameter space Θ, need to
be reflected in pi(θ). Partially-elicited priors, for example pi(θ) reflecting particular
quartiles or moments, are problematic due to the omitted prior beliefs concerning
the remainder of the distribution. Therefore it is appropriate to work with a class
of prior distributions, Γ, encompassing the residual uncertainties. Hence use of
an objective prior is prudent. However, is it really possible to have a completely
impartial prior distribution? Adoption of different types of prior distributions may
not achieve such impartiality, for example use of conjugate priors for analytical
convenience and tractability. For a collective review of the different approaches, see
Berger (2003).
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4.3 Conditional Frequentist Testing
Although frequentist and Bayesian methods yield similar results in terms of
estimation, this is not so for testing as characterised by the conflict between
p-values and conditional measures. The problem with conventional frequentist
testing is a lack of suitable conditioning. Berger, Brown, and Wolpert (1994) offer
a helpful unification focusing on simple hypothesis tests following in the footsteps
of Kiefer (1977) and also Brownie and Kiefer (1977) who propose the conditional
confidence approach.12
The goal of conditional frequentist testing (CFT) is to obtain agreement over the
numerical values to report when performing hypothesis tests, if not agreement in
terms of interpretation (i.e. a methodological unification rather than a philosophical
one), similar to estimation and confidence procedures.
The unconditional error probabilities α and β in the Neyman-Pearson world
suffer from their inflexibility, i.e. Type I and Type II errors fail to distinguish
between test statistic values on (or just inside) the critical region boundary and
those values deep within it. To remedy this deficiency, Berger, Brown, and Wolpert
(1994) recommend reporting the conditional error probabilities given in (4.5) and
(4.6). Since α(B0,1) and β(B0,1) are functions of the Bayes factor, the Bayesian
influence has now been incorporated into the Neyman-Pearson framework.
Birnbaum (1961) referred to these as ‘intrinsic significance levels’ providing a
likelihoodist interpretation.
So the basic conditional test can be summarised as follows13 for critical value c,
12Alternative approaches have been suggested, such as Hwang, Casella, Robert, Wells, and
Farrell (1992).
13Berger, Brown, and Wolpert (1994), report that CFT can also be used for sequential testing,
noting that the Bayes factor is not affected by the chosen stopping rule.
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• If B0,1 ≤ c, reject H0 and report conditional error probability α(B0,1).
• If B0,1 > c, do not reject H0 and report conditional error probability β(B0,1).
If the Bayes factor is evaluated on a balance-of-probabilities basis, then set c = 1.
From a decision-theoretic perspective, consider H0 : θ ∈ Θ0 and H1 : θ ∈ Θ1 ≡
Ωθ \Θ0, for parameter space Ωθ. Consider the ‘0-1’ loss function, L, on action space
A = {a0, a1} where a0 = do not reject H0 and a1 = reject H0. Then,
L(θ, a0) =
 0 if θ ∈ Θ0,1 if θ ∈ Θ1, L(θ, a1) =
 1 if θ ∈ Θ0,0 if θ ∈ Θ1. (4.7)
The Bayes decision rule is not to reject H0, provided
Pr(θ ∈ Θ0|x) > Pr(θ ∈ Θ1|x). (4.8)
Berger, Brown, and Wolpert (1994) do consider a ‘no decision’ region14 for
inconclusive values of B0,1, i.e. ² < B0,1 < ν for arbitrary constants ² and ν, typically
such that ² < 1 < ν. However for simplicity it is easier to partition B0,1 ∈ R+ into
solely ‘reject’ and ‘not reject’ sets and report a large conditional error probability
if ² < B0,1 < ν. Readers can then readily interpret the conclusiveness of the test
result based on this information themselves.
Up to this point, CFT unifies and satisfies frequentist, likelihoodist and Bayesian
principles. It remains to explicitly incorporate p-values in order to offer a plausible
methodological unification of hypothesis testing.
14Compare with the decision criteria presented in Chapter 3 Table 3.2.
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4.3.1 Conditioning
Reid (1995) and Bjørnstad (1996) discuss conditioning, although the following basic
example from Berger and Wolpert (1988) nicely highlights the benefits of conditional
frequentism. Consider the observations Xi, i = 1, 2, such that
Xi =
 θ + 1 with probability
1
2
,
θ − 1 with probability 1
2
.
(4.9)
Define a confidence set, C(X1, X2), for the unknown parameter θ as
C(X1, X2) =

1
2
(X1 +X2) if X1 6= X2
X1 − 2 if X1 = X2,
(4.10)
which yields unconditional frequentist coverage of 0.75. However this can be
considerably improved if we condition on the observed data. The sample mean
provides the precise value of θ when x1 6= x2 with probability 1, yet if x1 = x2, then
all we know is that this observed value is θ + 1 or θ − 1. If we define a
conditioning statistic, S = |X1 − X2|, then S can only take two values, i.e. 0
or 2. Hence conditional on S,
Prθ(θ ∈ C(X1, X2)|S = 0) = 1
2
(4.11)
Prθ(θ ∈ C(X1, X2)|S = 2) = 1. (4.12)
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Such conditioning still satisfies frequentist as well as Bayesian ideology through the
conditional error probabilities (4.5) and (4.6) which can also be viewed as
α(B0,1) = α(s) = Pr(Type I error|S(X) = s) = Pr0(Reject H0|S(X) = s),
β(B0,1) = β(s) = Pr(Type II error|S(X) = s) = Pr1(Not reject H0|S(X) = s).
All that is required now is to introduce p-values into the methodology. Wolpert
(1995) and Sellke, Bayarri, and Berger (2001) consider the conditioning statistic for
simple hypotheses
S = max{p0, p1} (4.13)
where pi is the p-value when testing hypothesis Hi against H1−i, i = 0, 1. It follows
that the decision rule should be
If p0 ≤ p1 : Reject H0, report α(s)
If p0 > p1 : Do not reject H0, report β(s).
Of course, any strictly increasing function ψ(pi) would yield the same decision, hence
the importance of the use of p-values in (4.13) is less than their interpretation as a
measure of evidence in support of a hypothesis.
4.3.2 Alternative conditioning statistic, S
However the conditioning statistic in (4.13) requires two separate hypothesis tests:
H0 v. H1 and H1 v. H0 in order to obtain p0 and p1 respectively. A new alternative
to this approach presented here is to make use of the second-order p-value, p′, as
detailed in Chapter 3, Section 3.1. The advantage of doing this is that p′ can be
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computed directly from p0 = p as per (3.1) for the general case, which is easily
applicable to specific test statistic distributions. Hence the proposed variant of
(4.13) is
S = max{p, p′}. (4.14)
where p is the conventional p-value obtained from testing H0 against H1, and p
′ is the
corresponding second-order p-value. Given the p-value density under H1, fP (p|H1)
from (2.4), is readily computable then there should be no additional computational
burden of obtaining p′ as opposed to p1. Indeed, since most common hypothesis
tests involve Gaussian and t-distributed test statistics, fP (p|H1) is already known
for these instances as presented in Chapter 3.
4.3.3 Use of conditional error probabilities in S
The conditional error probabilities, α(s) = α(B0,1) and β(s) = β(B0,1), sum to
one as evident from (4.5) and (4.6). Therefore it could be said that a conditioning
statistic S with p-value arguments is redundant, as decision making could also be
based on the conditional error probabilities instead which require the computation
of the Bayes factor.
An intuitive decision rule would be to conclude in favour of the hypothesis which
minimises the reported conditional error probability, i.e. α(B0,1) if H0 is rejected,
or β(B0,1) otherwise. This leads to the following conditioning statistic,
min{α(B0,1), β(B0,1)}. (4.15)
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So the corresponding decision rule would be:
If α(B0,1) < β(B0,1) : Reject H0, report α(B0,1) (4.16)
If α(B0,1) ≥ β(B0,1) : Do not reject H0, report β(B0,1). (4.17)
4.4 Critical p-value Curves and Surfaces
Although the concept of conditional frequentist testing is appealing, for a particular
methodology to be widely employed in practice it is necessary to have a simple
implementation along qualitative lines, i.e. a simple-to-understand reject or not
reject rule.
This section develops a new concept of critical p-value curves and surfaces which
can be constructed for simple and composite hypotheses respectively. The idea is to
find the p-value which yields equality between the rejection regions under fP (p|H0)
and fP (p|H1), p and p′ respectively, for a particular effect size δ. Hence if p = p′, the
researcher should conclude that each hypothesis is equally likely to be true, perhaps
resulting in a randomisation or further testing. However, should p 6= p′ we should
invoke the conditioning statistic in (4.14), but for ease the appropriate conclusion
can be quickly established from the curve/surface. The following examples illustrate.
4.4.1 Simple hypotheses with standard Gaussian-distributed
test statistics
For
√
nδ > 0, Figure 3.1 illustrated the typical shape of fP (p|H1). Under H1,
the concentration of the probability density near zero provides the rationale for
sufficiently small p-values to warrant rejection of H0 (lower ‘tail’ of fP (p|H0)) and
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sufficiently large p-values to warrant rejection of H1 (upper tail of fP (p|H1)). To
obtain the associated critical p-value curve, we solve
p = p′ (4.18)
= Φ(Zp −
√
nδ) (from (3.7)) (4.19)
which rearranges to
√
nδ = Zp − Φ−1(p). (4.20)
For
√
nδ < 0, fP (p|H1) is left-skewed, as per Figure 3.3 (i).15 Consequently
sufficiently large p-values warrant rejection of H0 (upper ‘tail’ test of H0), while
sufficiently small p-values warrant rejection of H1 (lower tail test of fP (p|H1)). This
translates into
1− p = 1− Φ(Zp −
√
nδ) (from (3.20)) (4.21)
which still rearranges to (4.20). Figure 4.1 plots the corresponding critical p-value
curve. So all a researcher needs to do is obtain the conventional p-value from the
test statistic in the usual way and determine
√
nδ using H1. Using this information
all that is required is to determine where the observed co-ordinates (p,
√
nδ) fall in
relation to the critical p-value curve. If the point is on the curve itself, then p = p′
and so the hypotheses are equally plausible, however if the point departs from the
curve, then it is appropriate to reject or not reject H0 as indicated. Note the x-axis
15Note Figure 3.3 depicts t-distributed test statistics, but the standard Gaussian case is just the
limiting distribution in terms of degrees of freedom.
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Critical p−value curve for Gaussian−distributed test statistics with simple hypotheses
p − value
n
δ
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Not reject H0, p>p ’
Not reject H0, p>p ’
Reject H0, p<p ’
Reject H0,
p<p ’
Figure 4.1: Critical p-value curve for standard Gaussian-distributed test statistics
with simple forms for H0 and H1.
represents the divide between the decision rule. Formally, we have
For
√
nδ > 0 :
 Reject H0, report α(s) if
√
nδ < Zp − Φ−1(p)
Do not reject H0, report β(s) if
√
nδ > Zp − Φ−1(p).
(4.22)
For
√
nδ < 0 :
 Reject H0, report α(s) if
√
nδ > Zp − Φ−1(p)
Do not reject H0, report β(s) if
√
nδ < Zp − Φ−1(p).
(4.23)
Of course, having a graphical depiction of the critical p-value curve removes
the need for any formal computation along the lines of (4.22) or (4.23), making
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implementation of the methodology fast and simple.16
4.4.2 Simple hypotheses with t-distributed test statistics
Critical p-value curves and surfaces involve setting p = p′. fP (p|H0) is known to be
uniform, while fP (p|H1) depends on the test statistic distribution. In the previous
subsection, standard Gaussian test statistics were considered, however curves can be
constructed for a variety of distributions. Here critical p-value curves are presented
for t-distributed test statistics for various degrees of freedom for simple forms of H1
in Figure 4.2. As can be seen there is little change in the position of the curve as
the degrees of freedom are adjusted, with Figure 4.1 representing the limiting case.
For p = p′ in this environment, we seek
p = FT (tp,ν −
√
nδˆ; ν) (from (3.15)) (4.24)
for
√
nδˆ > 0, with compliments for negative
√
nδˆ comparable with (4.21) which still
yields (4.24) upon rearrangement, analogous to the standard Gaussian case above.
Formally, the decision rule can be stated as
For
√
nδˆ > 0 :
 Reject H0, report α(s) :
√
nδˆ < tp,ν − T−1ν (p)
Do not reject H0, report β(s) :
√
nδˆ > tp,ν − T−1ν (p).
(4.25)
For
√
nδˆ < 0 :
 Reject H0, report α(s) :
√
nδˆ > tp,ν − T−1ν (p)
Do not reject H0, report β(s) :
√
nδˆ < tp,ν − T−1ν (p).
(4.26)
Note tp,ν is the (1−p)-th percentile of a Student’s t variable on ν degrees of freedom
16Obviously the conditional error probabilities, α(s) and β(s) will need to be calculated, however
the critical p-value curve itself is indicative of the level of significance of a particular p-value.
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Critical p−value curve for t20−distributed test statistics with simple hypotheses
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Critical p−value curve for t50−distributed test statistics with simple hypotheses
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Critical p−value curve for t100−distributed test statistics with simple hypotheses
p − value
n
δ^
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Not reject H0, p>p ’
Not reject H0, p>p ’
Reject H0, p<p ’
Reject H0,
p<p ’
Figure 4.2: Critical p-value curve for t-distributed test statistics with 10, 20, 50 and
100 degrees of freedom with simple forms for H0 and H1.
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(analogous to Zp in the standard Gaussian case) and T
−1
ν is the quantile function
for such a distribution (analogous to Φ−1).
4.4.3 Critical p-value surfaces for composite alternative
hypotheses
The critical p-value curves presented above are ideal for testing simple hypotheses.
However when testing a null, say, of H0 : µ = 0, very often we are interested in
composite forms of H1, for example H1 : µ 6= 0. In Chapter 3 the results from Hung,
O’Neill, Bauer, and Ko¨hne (1997) concerning the densities of fP (p|H1) when the
effect size δ is assumed to follow a probability distribution, such as the Gaussian
case, i.e. δ ∼ N(ζ, ω2), were given.
This construction introduces two new parameters, namely ζ and ω2. In order to
provide a graphical depiction for when p = p′, it is possible to construct a critical
p-value surface by controlling for one of these additional parameters. ζ will be chosen
for this purpose.
As Figure 3.4 demonstrated, when the domain of δ under H1 encompasses both
positive and negative values (as is the case for the Gaussian distribution), fP (p|H1)
has significant density concentration around both 0 and 1, achieving a minimum in
the vicinity of 0.5. In order to accommodate these features it is necessary to re-state
the subsets of the respective densities which define the p and p′ regions.
Given we seek to reject H0 when the observed p-value is sufficiently unlikely
vis-a`-vis H1, it is necessary to associate extremely small and extremely large
p-values with this region, due to the distribution of fP (p|H1). Similarly, p′ will
be associated with low probabilities of p under fP (p|H1) vis-a`-vis fP (p|H0). Such a
region exists around p ≈ 0.5.
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Surface for ζ = 0
Controlling for the mean parameter ζ, by setting it to zero the distribution of δ under
H1 is symmetric about zero. To obtain equality between p and p
′, it is necessary to
solve the following,
2p = FP (1− p|H1)− FP (p|H1) (from (3.23)). (4.27)
The left-hand-side value of 2p represents the rejection region p being comprised
of two equal-sized tails (each of area p), the lower covering [0, p] and the upper
[1 − p, 1] with total area of 2p. Meanwhile the right-hand-side specifies p′, that is
the probability of being between p and 1−p under H1, whose area can be computed
from the distribution function under H1.
Consequently the critical p-value surface comprises a floor and a ceiling due to the
dual-nature of unlikely p-values under H0, namely the lower and upper tails. Figure
4.3 presents these. With respect to the floor (ceiling), as the p-value decreases, p
decreases (1 − p increases), while p′ increases, hence for p-values below the floor
(above the ceiling) H0 should be rejected, while it should not be rejected between
the floor and ceiling. Formally,
Reject H0, report α(s) if
1
2
(
Φ
(
Zp −
√
nζ
(ω2n+ 1)1/2
)
− Φ
(
Z1−p −
√
nζ
(ω2n+ 1)1/2
))
> p
Do not reject H0, report β(s) if
1
2
(
Φ
(
Zp −
√
nζ
(ω2n+ 1)1/2
)
− Φ
(
Z1−p −
√
nζ
(ω2n+ 1)1/2
))
< p.
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p−value floor for δ~N(0,ω2)
ω2
n
p−value
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
p−value ceiling for δ~N(0,ω2)
ω2
n
p−value
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
Figure 4.3: Critical p-value surface floor and ceiling for δ ∼ N(0, ω2) under H1.
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Surface for non-zero ζ
For ζ 6= 0, fP (p|H1) is no longer symmetric about p = 0.5, as demonstrated in Figure
3.4. Therefore the critical p-value floor/ceiling surfaces cannot simply be obtained
using p and 1 − p, as the density fP (p|H1) has different weights around 0 and 1.
Therefore to equate p and p′, we must solve
a+ (1− b) = Fp(b|H1)− Fp(a|H1), s.t. a < m < b, (4.28)
where m = argp fp(p|H1). Note ζ = 0 is simply a special case of (4.28) with a = p
and b = 1−p. Sample floors and ceilings for ζ = 0.5 and ζ = −1 are given in Figure
4.4. Note in particular the behaviour of the ceiling for small values of ω2. Also,
recall each point on the surface corresponds to a different distribution fP (p|H1) due
to the specification of changing values for the ω2 parameter. Interpretation of the
surfaces in terms of when to reject H0 is analogous to the ζ = 0 case.
4.5 Conclusions
This chapter has sought to extend the methodological unification of the Neyman-
Pearson, Fisherian and Bayesian schools of hypothesis testing. Although each
doctrine has its merits, each also carries limitations, as discussed. To date, the
concept of conditional frequentist testing has offered a plausible unification,
however results in this chapter extend this methodology by explicitly considering
the behaviour of the p-value under H1 through fP (p|H1).
A variant of an oft-cited conditioning statistic has been proposed making use
of the so-called second-order p-value, p′, which is obtainable from the original
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p−value floor for δ~N(0.5,ω2)
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p−value floor for δ~N(−1,ω2)
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0.00
0.01
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0.03
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p−value ceiling for δ~N(−1,ω2)
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n
p−value
0.84
0.86
0.88
0.90
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0.96
Figure 4.4: Critical p-value floors and ceilings for δ ∼ N(0.5, ω2) and δ ∼ N(−1, ω2)
respectively under H1.
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p-value. By taking the maximum of p and p′, the researcher can conclude in favour
of the most plausible hypothesis, conditional on the observed data. By reporting the
conditional error probability in conjunction with the reject/not reject decision, the
end-user of the test result can decide the strength of the conclusion themselves.
In order to offer a simple-to-use framework of this methodology, the research
above also presents new critical p-value curves and surfaces. By graphically
displaying, for a range of parametric specifications relating to H1, the p-value which
results in equality between the p and p′ rejection regions under H0 and H1
respectively, it is possible to quickly identify the correct decision in relation to
whether to reject H0 while taking into account the specification of H1 and
sample size.
Applying this methodology allows informed decision making, by accommodating
the plausibility of both hypotheses for a given set of data. Just as in conventional
hypothesis testing, inferential errors can occur but these are reflected in the more
useful conditional error probabilities. Collectively, this approach helps in the quest
for the holy grail of a unified inferential framework universally accepted by
proponents of the various testing schools.
Chapter 5
Is Significance Significant?
Estimating Inferential Decision
Error Rates
Inferential decision errors come in two forms: a Type I error will be deemed a false
discovery, while a Type II error will be labelled as amissed discovery. Ideally we seek
to minimise the probability of both occurring, although the trade-off which exists
between the two is well-documented. Therefore despite elimination of these errors
being infeasible, accurate quantification of the two error rates at least is desirable.
Single hypothesis tests were the subject matter of the preceding chapters and for
which the concepts of Type I and Type II errors are well-known. Our attention now
turns toward the idea of multiple hypothesis testing. Suppose we simultaneously
test m independent hypotheses. For each individual test we will conclude in favour
of either the null or alternative hypothesis (ignoring second order p-value-induced
indecision possibilities), though on each occasion we are liable to potentially commit
a decision error.
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Multiple hypothesis testing has received considerable attention in the literature
in recent years, fuelled for example by gene expression microarray studies in the
biological sciences when potentially thousands of hypotheses are run simultaneously.
This chapter will propose a new improved technique for estimating these multiple
testing error rates (specifically for large numbers of p-values) by synthesising
established methodologies, through introducing the behaviour of p-values under H1
— an approach not previously considered in the literature.
Before considering the concept of false discovery rates, we begin by revisiting
the Bonferroni correction and some of its extensions. Here the idea of a collection
of hypotheses satisfying free association can be established and extended to other
techniques.
5.1 Bonferroni Procedure Family
The classic Bonferroni inequality establishes an upper bound on the familywise error
rate (FWER). The FWER gives the probability that at least one false
positive occurs after testing a hypothesis series, therefore this equates to FWER =
Pr(# false positives ≥ 1). Using the Bonferroni method, we can obtain FWER ≤ α
for m hypothesis tests by controlling each individual test such that p-values ≤ α
m
are
deemed significant. For m hypothesis tests on the set of test statistics T1, . . . , Tm
with corresponding p-values p1, . . . , pm we have,
Pr
(
m⋃
i=1
(
pi ≤ α
m
))
≤ α, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, (5.1)
which guarantees an upper bound of α on the probability of rejecting at least one
truly null hypothesis overall; equivalently 1−α is the lower bound for the probability
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of no false discoveries. As can be seen in (5.1), this equates to setting each individual
hypothesis test to level 1
m
· α. Hence for m = 1, we return to a single α-level test.
Versions of the Bonferroni procedure aimed at improving power include Holm
(1979) which comprises a sequentially rejective procedure. For the ordered p-values
p1, . . . , pm, with corresponding null hypotheses H
1
0, . . .H
m
0 , we reject H
i
0 when
pj ≤ α
m− j + 1 , (5.2)
for all j = 1, . . . , i. (5.2) therefore controls the FWER in the strong sense because it
tests all subset intersection hypotheses. In Lehmann and Romano (2005), Chapter
9 features the strong optimality conditions of the Holm procedure. Westfall and
Young (1960) also sought to improve power by handling test statistic dependence.
For large m though, these power improvements are restricted.
The desirability of the Bonferroni procedure of needing no distributional
assumptions is offset however by its too conservative nature, particularly in the
presence of highly correlated test statistics. In order to remedy this, Simes (1986)
defines the modified Bonferroni procedure which weakly controls the FWER,
Pr
(
m⋃
i=1
{
pi ≤ i · α
m
})
≤ α, (5.3)
so that Hi0 is rejected when its associated p-value, pi, is no greater than i · αm . For
independent test statistics, hence independent p-values, this yields a Type I error
with probability α. Simulations were run to show an upper bound of α for a range
of multivariate distributions — normal, gamma and chi-squared.
Hommel (1988) provides an extended Simes procedure which strongly controls
the FWER, making use of the closure principle of Marcus, Peritz, and Gabriel
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(1976). In addition, Hochberg (1988) provides a sharper procedure than that of
Holm (1979) which is a simplification of the extended Simes procedure. A summary
of alternative improvements to the Bonferroni method which yield greater average
test power can be found in Shaffer (1995).
5.2 False Discovery Rate
Use of classical single-inference procedures in a multiple-testing context leads to false
positive significance rates and hence an exaggeration of reported positive results.
The false positive significance rate is derived from the proportion of the results
deemed significant for which the null hypothesis is actually true. As such, in order
to extend the single hypothesis paradigm to the multi-test setting, it is helpful to use
a compound error measure providing a threshold tolerance on the false positive rate,
and subsequently develop a method for controlling the error rate whilst retaining
test power.
The Bonferroni-related procedures outlined above concern controlling the
familywise error rate when testing multiple hypotheses. However, the rather
stringent testing of ‘at least one’ Type I error is for most purposes inadequate, as
researchers are usually more concerned about the overall proportion of false
discoveries. Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) proposed a revised approach to
multiple significance testing. They consider a p-value step-up method in which the
ordered p-values from m simple, independent hypothesis tests are given such that
p1 ≤ p2 ≤ . . . ≤ pm with associated null hypotheses H10,H20, . . . ,Hm0 . If we reject the
CHAPTER 5. IS SIGNIFICANCE SIGNIFICANT? 93
Table 5.1: Outcome scenarios for m hypothesis tests with significance level α
Not reject null Reject null Total
Null true A(α) U(α) m0
Alternative true B(α) T (α) m1
R(α) W (α) m
k-th p-value, pk, then it follows that we reject all pi, ∀ i ≤ k. So by defining
kˆ = arg max
1≤k≤m
{k : pk ≤ k
m
· α}, (5.4)
we reject H10, . . . ,H
kˆ
0. No hypotheses are rejected if no such kˆ exists. Given the
subset of p-values p1, . . . , pkˆ, the False Discovery Rate (FDR) is given by
m0
ms
· α
where m0 factors are truly null, and ms being the total number of significant results
when testing m hypotheses at level α. In their paper, Benjamini and Hochberg
(1995) show via simulations that the more relaxed control of Type I errors by way
of the FDR is superior to the FWER resulting in greater power and therefore call for
control of the FDR instead. Benjamini and Yekutieli (2001) extend this procedure
to allow for highly correlated test statistics, i.e. positive regression dependence.
Sarkar (2002) extends this work further.
5.2.1 Model set-up
Consider simultaneously testing m null hypotheses, m0 of which are truly null, while
the remaining m−m0 = m1 have a true alternative. This is represented in Table 5.1
along with the various possible outcomes from hypothesis tests with some designated
significance level, α.
The values U(α), T (α) and W (α) are themselves random variables representing
the realised quantity of false, genuine and total discoveries respectively, that is all
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test statistics with p-values ≤ α. Naturally these values are monotonically non-
decreasing functions of the significance level as when α is made larger, we increase
our threshold for acceptable significant p-values and therefore we reject a greater (or
at least the same) number of the tested hypotheses. A prudent error measure which
accounts for the inclusion of false positives and genuine discoveries, U(α) and T (α)
respectively, is
U(α)
U(α) + T (α)
=
U(α)
W (α)
. (5.5)
Being stochastic variables though, it is appropriate to consider the FDR in terms of
expected values. Assuming independence of p-values,
FDR = E
[
U(α)
U(α) + T (α)
]
= E
[
U(α)
W (α)
]
≈ E[U(α)]
E[W (α)]
for large m. (5.6)
Given the possibility that P (W (α) = 0) > 0 is likely to exist in certain circumstances
almost surely, (5.6) is undefined when W (α) = 0. Therefore for the sake of rigour, a
non-negativity constraint must be imposed on the denominator to give the positive
FDR (pFDR)
pFDR = E
[
U(α)
W (α)
∣∣∣∣W (α) > 0] . (5.7)
Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) proposed the following solution to the undefined
problem which is the ‘official’ FDR definition
FDR = E
[
U(α)
W (α)
∣∣∣∣W (α) > 0] · Pr(W (α) > 0). (5.8)
Confusion between the two error measures can occur as noted by Zaykin, Young,
and Westfall (2000) in response to a study by Weller, Song, Heyen, Lewin, and
Ron (1998). However as m increases, Pr(W (α) > 0) → 1 asymptotically. This is
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so because, assuming all m tested hypotheses are independent and truly null, then
Pr(W (α) = 0) = (1 − α)m, which tends to zero as m → ∞, since we are unable to
reject any null hypothesis when all p-values are greater than α. Hence the difference
between FDR and pFDR becomes trivial. Storey (2002) discusses further.
5.2.2 FDR estimation
In order to estimate the FDR, estimates of E[U(α)] and E[W (α)] are required.
The total number of ‘significant’ factors, W (α), is readily obtained by counting the
observed number of p-values less than or equal to α which can then be used as
an estimate of E[W (α)]. Estimation of E[U(α)] makes use of the fact that under
the simple1 null hypothesis, say, of a zero parameter, for example H0 : θi = 0,
i = 1, . . . ,m, test statistic p-values are uniformly distributed over [0, 1], hence the
U(α) p-values are uniformly distributed on [0, α]. This argument was shown in
Section 2.3.
Given a two-sided framework, then for an amount m0 of hypotheses which are
truly null, E[U(α)] = m0 ·α. This is because we would expect, on average, that this
proportion of the sample parameter estimates would yield significant p-values when
testing at level α by chance alone when H0 is true. However, the quantity m0 from
m hypotheses is typically unknown and therefore needs a data-dependent estimate.
Define pi0 =
m0
m
to be the proportion of the m hypotheses which are true under the
null. Having obtained an estimate for the proportion of true null hypotheses in the
1As discussed previously, in order to establish the p-value distribution to be uniform under the
null, H0 must be simple, i.e. single-valued.
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population, pˆi0, the estimated FDR can be computed as
F̂DR(α) =
pˆi0 ·m · α
W (α)
=
pˆi0 ·m · α
#{pi ≤ α; i = 1, . . . ,m} . (5.9)
5.3 Missed Discoveries
As previously highlighted, false discoveries represent only half the story with regards
to inferential decision errors. Missed discoveries (i.e. Type II errors) are also of
concern, therefore a complementary statistic is required to quantify the extent of
these. During exploratory analyses, researcher indifference to any missed
discoveries can lead to significant (hidden) opportunity costs — to borrow from
economists’ vocabulary. For example, failure to identify a life-saving new drug has
clear implications, although people would be completely unaware of the potential
life-saving capacity being undetected and subsequently discarded.
Genovese and Wasserman (2002) introduce the dual notion of false non-rejections
in multiple testing — the so-called false nondiscovery rate (FNR). This measures
the proportion of non-significant hypotheses for which the alternative hypothesis is
true. In terms of Table 5.1, the FNR can be thought of as an error measure based
on both false negatives and genuine negatives, B(α) and A(α) respectively, denoted
B(α)
A(α) +B(α)
=
B(α)
R(α)
. (5.10)
As with the FDR, dealing in random variables means expected values must be
considered. Again assuming independent p-values,
FNR = E
[
B(α)
A(α) +B(α)
]
= E
[
B(α)
R(α)
]
≈ E[B(α)]
E[R(α)]
for large m. (5.11)
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Because Pr(R(α) = 0) may occur with strictly positive probability almost surely,
(5.11) will be undefined when R(α) = 0. Once again, a non-negativity constraint is
required on the denominator to give the positive FNR (pFNR),
pFNR = E
[
B(α)
R(α)
∣∣∣∣R(α) > 0] , (5.12)
as per Storey (2003). Following Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) this can be extended
to provide a robust FNR definition,
FNR = E
[
B(α)
R(α)
∣∣∣∣R(α) > 0] · Pr(R(α) > 0). (5.13)
However as m increases asymptotically, Pr(R(α) > 0) → 1 implying the difference
between FNR and pFNR becomes trivial.
5.3.1 FNR estimation
Estimation of the FNR therefore needs estimates of E[B(α)] and E[R(α)] in (5.11).
The latter is easily obtainable by counting the observed number of p-values greater
than the significance level, α. Of course in order to estimate the FDR for m
hypotheses we already have an estimate for E[W (α)], the observed count W (α),
and we require E[R(α)] + E[W (α)] = m. Therefore Ê[R(α)] = m−W (α).
Similarly we have Ê[B(α)] = Ê[R(α)]− Ê[A(α)], where Ê[A(α)] = pˆi0 ·m · (1−α)
which makes use of the parameter estimator pˆi0 used in the estimation of the FDR.
So the FNR equivalent of (5.9) is
F̂NR(α) =
R(α)− pˆi0 ·m · (1− α)
R(α)
= 1− pˆi0 ·m · (1− α)
#{pi > α; i = 1, . . . ,m} . (5.14)
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5.4 Estimation of pi0
Estimation of both false discovery and false nondiscovery rates, in (5.9) and (5.14)
respectively, requires a point estimate of pi0 =
m0
m
, the proportion of the m
hypotheses that are true under H0. This section will consider a new, alternative
approach to deriving an estimator pˆi0 taking into account knowledge of the p-value’s
distribution under H1 — an approach not previously attempted.
Previous efforts at estimating pi0 have exploited the uniformity of p-values under
H0 and automatically assumed that under H1 p-values tend to be clustered near zero.
As has been examined in earlier chapters, this is not always the case – specifically
when the effect size can take negative values in the H1 space.
5.4.1 Histogram-motivated approach
Assuming p-values under H1 have a distribution characteristic of Figure 3.1, one
approach to estimating pi0, and subsequently the FDR and FNR, focuses on
plotting a density histogram of computed p-values and exploiting the uniformity
of these under H0 to obtain a conservative estimate of pi0. Under the assumption
of a right-skewed fP (p|H1), it is expected that such a histogram would display a
relatively flat appearance on the right-hand-side, consistent with the underlying
uniform population distribution for p-values of test statistics true under the null
hypothesis, fP (p|H0).
In principle, (nearly) all p-values located at the upper end of the unit interval
are representative of hypotheses for which the null is true. So it is anticipated that
the density histogram is relatively flat above some defined nominal threshold level,
say λ. Choice of the λ parameter can be made casually by histogram inspection
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or heuristically using a data-driven bootstrap procedure in which we minimise the
mean-squared error of the estimator, pˆi0. Details of this procedure can be found
in Storey, Taylor, and Siegmund (2004). This method for choosing an appropriate
value for the λ tuning parameter is considered more suitable for limited numbers
of p-values. Utilisation of a smoother method is employed in Storey and Tibshirani
(2003) and offers an alternative approach for pˆi0 estimation which is conducive to
large m.
It is this latter context, i.e. large m, which will be the main focus here. The
Storey and Tibshirani (2003) approach involved estimating pi0 for a range of λ values,
such as 0, 0.01, 0.02, . . . , 0.95, through
pˆi0 =
#{pj > λ}
m(1− λ) , j = 1, . . . ,m. (5.15)
They note that the plot of pˆi0 versus λ displays a trade-off between bias and variance
when choosing the optimal λ. They also note that for “well formed p-values” the
bias of pˆi0 decreases as λ increases, and so it is concluded that it is sensible to
estimate limλ→1 pˆi0 ≡ pˆi0(λ = 1). To achieve this they fit a natural cubic spline with
three degrees of freedom, fˆ , to the plot of pˆi0(λ) against λ to accommodate the
bias/variance issue and use the estimator pˆi0 = fˆ(1).
Consequently, pˆi0 is a function of λ and is thus given by
pˆi0(λ) =
Rˆ(λ)
m(1− λ) =
#{pˆi > λ; i = 1, . . . ,m}
m(1− λ) . (5.16)
This estimator is unbiased only if all p-values in the interval (λ, 1] are from the truly
null population. As the inclusion of a few truly alternative p-values is a possibility, it
is likely that pˆi0 will prove to be a conservative estimator, that is tend to overestimate
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pi0.
This data-driven estimator is intuitively appealing for “well formed p-values”
under H1, but negative effect sizes in H1 result in different shapes for the density
fP (p|H1). Therefore it is possible that a density histogram of all m p-values will
exhibit relatively flat behaviour in a location other than the right-hand-side. For
example the density functions plotted in Figure 3.3 would be consistent with a mirror
image about p = 0.5 with the left-hand-side displaying a flat appearance.
In such instances, the Storey and Tibshirani (2003) approach would need to
be adjusted. This can be easily achieved by symmetry for simple forms of H1 with
negative δ. Now pi0 should be estimated for the range of λ values that is 0.05, 0.06, . . . ,
1. This would result in
pˆi0 =
#{pj < λ}
mλ
, j = 1, . . . ,m. (5.17)
By symmetry, the same bias-variance trade-off exists in the plot of pˆi0 against λ
when choosing the optimal λ. Now the bias of pˆi0 decreases as λ decreases , hence
we seek limλ→0 pˆi0 ≡ pˆi0(λ = 0). Natural cubic spline fitting is again applied, and we
should take as our estimator pˆi0 = fˆ(0).
As things stand, this represents a trivial contribution to the literature. However
a new alternative methodology is now considered which is motivated by this spline-
fitting approach.
5.4.2 P -value plot regression approach
Schweder and Spjøtvoll (1982) present “P -value plots” (a simple transformation
of (half-)normal plots) as a graphical technique for estimating the number of true
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null (and therefore alternative) hypotheses when multiple simultaneous testing is
performed. Such plots have many applications such as those shown for multiple
equality of means, correlation coefficient and contingency table tests.
As previously mentioned on numerous occasions, regardless of the test statistic
distribution, under H0 all p-values are uniformly distributed, whereas under the
‘conventional’ alternative (i.e. a right-skewed fP (p|H1)), p-values will tend to be
small because a false H0 should be rejected more often than a true H0 under a
‘p < α’ rejection rule. By letting Np be the number of p-values strictly greater than
p, and T0 be the (unknown) number of true null hypotheses out of T , T0 ≤ T , for
sufficiently large p (equivalently sufficiently small (1− p)),
E(Np) ≈ T0(1− p). (5.18)
This is analogous to E[U(α)] = m0 · α in Section 5.2.2. Consequently there is an
approximate linear relationship between E(Np) and (1− p) for non-small p.2 Hence
a P -value plot of E(Np) against (1 − p) should allow the fitting of a line for large
values of p (the left-hand side of the plot), the slope of which acts as an estimator
for T0. Of course large values of T0 will assist line-fitting (the greater T0/T , the
fewer p-values from fP (p|H1) to distort the linear relationship), though any p-value
correlation will affect the plot variance.3 For simplicity, we will restrict attention
to independent p-values drawn either from fP (p|H0) = Uniform[0, 1] or the same
fP (p|H1). The T − T0 hypotheses true under the alternative, as stated above, will
generally be small (for a right-skewed fP (p|H1)), hence plots are expected to deviate
2If all the p-values were consistent with H0 then a P -value plot would approximate a straight
line across the entire unit interval, consistent with an empirical distribution function of a continuous
uniform distribution over [0, 1].
3For example, Schweder and Spjøtvoll (1982) note this problem when exhaustively comparing
means from a one-way layout as the cross-correlation increases the sampling variation.
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upwards from the line for large values of (1− p).
Figure 5.1 displays P -value plots constructed by simulation for 1000 independent
p-values drawn from either H0 or H1 for various parametric specifications. Plot (i)
was generated by setting pi0 = 1, i.e. all p-values are drawn from test statistics
for which H0 is true. Given fP (p|H0) = 1, this P -value plot (plotting Np against
(1− p)), thus depicts an empirical distribution function for the continuous uniform
distribution over the unit interval. Plots (ii) and (iii) depict P -value plots for a
mixture of p-values simulated from fP (p|H0) and fP (p|H1) for positive effect sizes,
subject to the weighting factor pi0. Under H1, the p-values are modelled as being
from Gaussian-distributed test statistics with simple forms of H1, i.e. positive effect
sizes corresponding to distribution function (3.6). Given the positive effect sizes
shown, the P -value plots display linear behaviour for small values of (1 − p), with
the upper end of the plots diverging upwards due to the presence of numerous small
p-values (equivalently large values of (1− p)).
Plot (iv) considers the impact of a negative effect size for a simple H1 on a typical
P -value plot. Now large p-values are likely under the alternative hypothesis, linearity
of the P -value plot shifts to the upper end. Hence estimation in such circumstances
requires line-fitting to this part of the plot. Therefore unlike plots (ii) and (iii), a
best-fitting line would not be forced through the origin.
Finally, plots (v) and (vi) consider composite forms of H1 with the effect size
δ ∼ N(ζ, ω2). Given such forms of fP (p|H1) lead to the majority of the density being
split amongst small and large p-values, this translates into linearity of the P -value
plot being confined to the central portion.
Just as the histogram approach required the tuning parameter λ, so this
regression approach needs to determine the linear range of the p-value plot in order
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(iii) P−value plot: pi0 = 0.5, nδ = 2
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(iv) P−value plot: pi0 = 0.3, nδ = −2
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(v) P−value plot: pi0 = 0.7, ζ = 0, ω2 = 0.25
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(vi) P−value plot: pi0 = 0.4, ζ = 0.1, ω2 = 0.1
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Figure 5.1: Simulated P -value plots of Np against (1 − p), where Np denotes the
number of p-values strictly greater than p for 1000 p-values, for the following cases:
(i) pi0 = 1, i.e. all p-values drawn from U [0, 1], (ii) pi0 = 0.5,
√
nδ = 1, (iii) pi0 = 0.5,√
nδ = 2, (iv) pi0 = 0.3,
√
nδ = −2 where (ii), (iii) and (iv) refer to Gaussian-
distributed test statistics under a simple H1, (v) pi0 = 0.7, ζ = 0.1, ω
2 = 0.25 and
(vi) pi0 = 0.4, ζ = 0.1, ω
2 = 0.1 where (v) and (vi) refer to composite forms of H1
where the effect size δ ∼ N(ζ, ω2).
CHAPTER 5. IS SIGNIFICANCE SIGNIFICANT? 104
to perform ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. This problem arises as there
will be no obvious rigid break (akin to a structural break) and so local regression
estimation is required. Schweder and Spjøtvoll (1982) themselves offer no formal
approach, merely using a line “drawn by visual fit”, although they acknowledged the
possibility that the technique “could be formalized using some form of least squares
fit”. Here a new formal procedure will be outlined, motivated by the spline fitting
of Storey and Tibshirani (2003).
The fact that Schweder and Spjøtvoll (1982) resort to fitting the line of best fit
visually leaves scope for improvement by automating the choice of (1 − p) below
which the p-value plot is considered linear4 (just as Storey and Tibshirani (2003)
sought to automate the choice of λ).
5.4.3 P -value plot spline-fitting algorithm for pˆi0 estimation
A new estimator for pi0 is now proposed based on a spline-fitting procedure applied to
regression estimation of P -value plots. The general algorithm for this new estimator
is as follows. For m p-values, assumed for simplicity to be independent:
• Sort the p-values into order statistics, i.e. p(1) ≤ p(2) ≤ . . . ≤ p(m).
• Determine Np(i) for each p(i) (the number of p-values greater than p(i)), such
that Np(i) = m− i. Hence Np(i) ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m− 1}.
• Use OLS successively n = m− 1 times5 to estimate the slope coefficient T0 in
4Again, considering ‘conventional’ right-skewed fP (p|H1) density functions.
5A minimum of two points are required for OLS estimation. Suppression of the regression
through the origin could lead the origin to be considered as a ‘point’, however without loss of
generality this can be ignored here.
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the model
Np(m+1−j) = α+ T0(1− p(m+1−j)) + ²j, j = 1, . . . , n, ²j ∼ N(0, σ2² )
(5.19)
for n = 2, . . . ,m. This yields m − 1 separate estimates for T0. Here for
‘conventional’ fP (p|H1) (that is as per Figure 3.1) the intercept is suppressed
to zero (α = 0) to force the line of best fit through the origin.
• Fit a cubic smoothing spline with seven6 degrees of freedom, fˆ , to Tˆ0,k/m
against k, for k = 1, . . . ,m− 1, where k denotes the k-th regression coefficient
estimate.
• If it exists, obtain the global minimum of fˆ , fˆmin, and let pˆi0 = fˆmin. If there
are multiple local minima, choose the one corresponding to the largest k.
• Otherwise, obtain the saddle point of fˆ , fˆsaddle, and let pˆi0 = fˆsaddle. If
there are multiple saddle points, choose the one corresponding to the largest
k.
This algorithm accommodates the spirit of the Storey and Tibshirani (2003)
procedure by incorporating spline fitting. Figure 5.2 provides two simulated
examples showing how the smoothing spline fits the regression-obtained pˆi0 point
estimate values. This provides a more pleasing fit than the analogous case
presented in Storey and Tibshirani (2003) for their histogram-based approach which
suffers from wide variability in pˆi0 estimates as λ tends to 1 (0 in the modified method
for
√
nδ < 0).
6Seven degrees of freedom are chosen as this amount provides a pleasing visual fit. Storey and
Tibshirani (2003) choose three degrees of freedom in their words to limit the natural cubic spline’s
curvature “to be like a quadratic function, which is suitable for our purposes”. In a similar vein,
seven degrees of freedom are suitable for this purpose.
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Figure 5.2: These plots show examples of simulated results of the proposed new
spline-fitting algorithm. In each example m = 500, pi0 = 0.5, and
√
nδ = 2. As can
be seen, the smoothing spline proves to be a good fit and, following the criteria of
the algorithm, both yield point estimates close to 0.5 — specifically 0.470 and 0.482
for the two plots respectively.
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It remains to compare these two different estimation techniques for pi0 to
determine our preferred estimator. Note attention will be restricted to simple forms
of H1 in order to facilitate a comparison. For composite forms of H1, the behaviour
of fP (p|H1) has been well-documented in discussions above. In such instances the
Storey and Tibshirani (2003) approach is not readily applicable since in its
original form it assumes that fP (p|H1) has the shape characteristic of Figure 3.1
(under
√
nδ > 0), which can easily be transformed for negative
√
nδ as discussed
above. However, given the p-value density under composite H1, p-value histograms
would not be relatively flat at either end of the unit interval, rather in the middle.
Hence the spline-fitting procedure at limit of λ = 1 (for
√
nδ > 0) or λ = 0 (for
√
nδ < 0) is not appropriate for composite H1.
Of course, the new regression-based estimator can readily accommodate this
issue by taking the median (1 − p) value as a starting point, and then iteratively
running regressions taking the nearest (1 − p) value each time. However, since the
objective here is to evaluate the performance of two estimators, for which the Storey
and Tibshirani (2003) approach is not valid in such circumstances, attention will be
restricted to simple forms of H1, for which direct comparisons can be made.
5.5 Evaluation of Estimators
In order to compare these two estimators for pi0 (either of which can then be used to
compute false discovery and non-discovery rates via (5.9) and (5.14) respectively),
Monte Carlo simulations are performed for a variety of
√
nδ values. Recall that
for
√
nδ < 0, the histogram-based approach of Storey and Tibshirani (2003) has
to be modified in light of fP (p|H1), as detailed above. Also, the regression-based
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estimator, extending the P -value plots of Schweder and Spjøtvoll (1982), differs
slightly for positive and negative
√
nδ values, since regression lines for
√
nδ > 0 can
have the intercept suppressed to zero as argued from Figure 5.1.
Figures 5.3 to 5.6 provide the simulation results when estimating a range of pi0
values from 0.3 to 0.8 across 0.5 ≤ |√nδ| ≤ 5. The simulated p-values replicate those
from Gaussian-distributed test statistics with simple forms of H0. For each of these
values, the mean simulated point estimate is provided, along with the corresponding
MSE value to allow a ready comparison of the two estimators. Tabulated values of
the results can be found in Appendix B.
It can be seen that in general for |√nδ| ≤ 2 both estimators tend to be (quite
substantially) positively biased. This is to be expected, since as
√
nδ → 0,
fP (p|H1) → fP (p|H0), which of course is uniform over [0, 1]. The reason for this
upward bias in pˆi0 values is that the ‘flat’ region of both histogram and P -value plot
is heavily contaminated with drawings from fP (p|H1) which both methods have
difficulty distinguishing from p-values drawn from fP (p|H0), that is Uniform[0, 1].
As such these estimators will tend to overestimate pi0 for relatively small absolute
values of |√nδ|.
As |√nδ| increases, the more the ‘flat’ region of the histogram and P -value
plot becomes cleansed of p-values from fP (p|H1), and therefore the spline-fitting
procedures which are tuned to this region are more accurate in their estimation of
pi0, on average. Figures 5.3 to 5.6 illustrate this, although it is noted that as |
√
nδ|
increases, the Storey and Tibshirani (2003) approach does converge to an unbiased
estimator of pi0. This contrasts with the new regression-based approach offered in
this chapter, which tends to (slightly) underestimate the parameter — more so for
negative
√
nδ — suggesting scope for a suitable bias correction method.
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Clearly bias is not our only concern when evaluating estimator performance.
Estimator variability is also of particular interest, hence we consider alongside the
mean of the simulated estimates its mean-squared error (MSE), plotted on the right-
hand-side of Figures 5.3 to 5.6.
In all cases, the MSE of both estimators improves (i.e. gets smaller) as |√nδ|
increases, again this is consistent with expectations, since the larger |√nδ| the lower
the likelihood for estimation error due to the ‘flat’ regions being almost entirely
composed of p-values from truly null hypotheses resulting in minimal variation in
pˆi0.
Of particular interest here is the relative performance of the two estimators based
on the MSE criterion. In short, for all pi0 values, the new regression-based estimator
yields universally lower MSE values for larger values of |√nδ|. That is, we would
prefer this new estimator when |√nδ| is sufficiently large. As can be seen from
the plots, this critical point where the new estimator outperforms the Storey and
Tibshirani (2003) estimator does vary with pi0, but tends to be around |
√
nδ| = 1.5.
5.6 Conclusions
Based on the simulation results presented, it can be concluded that neither estimator
is uniformly preferred. Instead, the choice of estimator will depend on
√
nδ in these
multiple hypothesis testing contexts, with |√nδ| > 1.5 indicating that the new
regression-based estimator should be employed, while |√nδ| ≤ 1.5 should lead to
the Storey and Tibshirani (2003) methodology being used.
Of course, noting the bias in pˆi0 estimates, further research can attempt to
determine an appropriate bias correction method for both estimators. Consequently,
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Figure 5.3: pˆi0 estimation simulation results performed by 1000 Monte Carlo simula-
tions comparing spline-fitting applied to regression based estimators (Regression ap-
proach) and to histogram-based estimators (Histogram approach). These methods,
designed for large m, were applied to 250 and 500 p-values during each simulation
for a range of
√
nδ values. Graphics provide mean pˆi0 estimate in each case (LHS)
and corresponding MSE (RHS).
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Figure 5.4: pˆi0 estimation simulation results performed by 1000 Monte Carlo simula-
tions comparing spline-fitting applied to regression based estimators (Regression ap-
proach) and to histogram-based estimators (Histogram approach). These methods,
designed for large m, were applied to 250 and 500 p-values during each simulation
for a range of
√
nδ values. Graphics provide mean pˆi0 estimate in each case (LHS)
and corresponding MSE (RHS).
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Figure 5.5: pˆi0 estimation simulation results performed by 1000 Monte Carlo simula-
tions comparing spline-fitting applied to regression based estimators (Regression ap-
proach) and to histogram-based estimators (Histogram approach). These methods,
designed for large m, were applied to 250 and 500 p-values during each simulation
for a range of
√
nδ values. Graphics provide mean pˆi0 estimate in each case (LHS)
and corresponding MSE (RHS).
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Figure 5.6: pˆi0 estimation simulation results performed by 1000 Monte Carlo simula-
tions comparing spline-fitting applied to regression based estimators (Regression ap-
proach) and to histogram-based estimators (Histogram approach). These methods,
designed for large m, were applied to 250 and 500 p-values during each simulation
for a range of
√
nδ values. Graphics provide mean pˆi0 estimate in each case (LHS)
and corresponding MSE (RHS).
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this will lead to a reduction in the MSE. Given that the Storey and Tibshirani (2003)
estimator appears to already be unbiased for large |√nδ|, the MSE will not be
affected, however there is certainly scope for bias reduction of the new estimator
which, combined with its already low relative variance, would provide a very
reliable estimator. Also, for smaller values of |√nδ|, it is the excess bias of the
new estimator relative to the Storey and Tibshirani (2003) one which contributes to
the comparatively larger MSE, hence it is possible that bias reduction of the new
estimator could yield a uniformly preferred estimator if the MSE reduction helps to
lower the MSE below that of the Storey and Tibshirani (2003) estimator.
It should also be reported that simulation studies were also undertaken for
m = 100 (recall m is the number of hypotheses being simultaneously tested).
However the Storey and Tibshirani (2003) approach frequently failed under repeated
simulation due to the failure of the spline-fitting procedure. This problem did not
occur when the new estimator was used. Although Storey and Tibshirani (2003)
state their estimator is suitable for testing ‘large’ numbers of hypotheses, 100 is
hardly on the small side, hence the new estimator is advantageous down to a smaller
m since it can at least return a point estimate in these cases.
Finally, recall the purpose of estimating pi0 in the first place is to allow the
subsequent estimation of the FDR and FNR in (5.9) and (5.14) respectively. It
therefore follows that an improved estimator for pi0 results in an improved estimator
for these multiple hypothesis error rates.7 Back to this chapter’s title, we are in
a position to state the following. Question: Is significance significant? Answer:
Sometimes.
7Appendix C considers a somewhat related concept of multiple error rates along the lines of
FDR and FNR applied to a legal framework.
Chapter 6
Conclusions
Here we summarise the key results of the preceding chapters and offer suggestions
for future research.
6.1 Summary
The key motivation for this research was to investigate the true meaning of p-values,
and ensure their correct interpretation when employed in practice. Their widespread
use in empirical research is well-known and this emphasises the need to accurately
elicit the full informational content of p-values.
Central to this work is the recognition that an improbable null hypothesis does
not by default mean the alternative is more likely. This concept is consistent with
exploring the distributional behaviour of p-values under both hypotheses. It was
noted early on that p-values are random variables and their distributions under H1
vary according to whether the alternative hypothesis is simple or composite, and
the p-value density is also determined by the sample size and effect size.
The main contributions to the literature are:
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• Presentation of a framework for simultaneously testing H0 and H1 based solely
on the conventional p-value summarised with the construction of critical value
tables to facilitate quick inferential decision making.
• Derivation of p-value densities under H1, fP (p|H1), for Student’s t-distributed
test statistics.
• Extending previous attempts at a methodological unification of the different
schools of hypothesis testing, using alternative conditioning statistics.
• Construction of critical p-value curves and surfaces to permit test conclusions
to be drawn using visual media.
• For multiple hypothesis testing, a new estimator for the proportion of
hypotheses true under H0 is given and its statistical performance, relative to
another estimator, investigated. Under certain conditions the new estimator
is preferred. This has subsequent implications for compound error measures.
Collectively the above contributions have endeavoured to ‘bridge’ different areas
of the literature. P -values have been investigated by numerous authors, often from
different perspectives. For example, although the behaviour of the p-value under H1
was researched by Hung, O’Neill, Bauer, and Ko¨hne (1997), its practical relevance
was not widely explored. In contrast, Donahue (1999) used second-order p-values,
but failed to generalise their implementation.
This thesis has attempted to consolidate and extend earlier thoughts in this
domain. By no means is it claimed to be an exhaustive study. Indeed, there is
considerable scope for further research into this area. Therefore, it is appropriate to
outline some preliminary suggestions for the interested reader.
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6.2 Suggestions for Future Research
The p-value density under H1, fP (p|H1), has been a core theme in this research. In
the preceding chapters, the primary focus has been on Gaussian-distributed, and
by extension Student’s t-distributed, test statistics due to their prominent use in
inferential testing.
Of course, this does not exhaust all test statistic distributions. Clearly, efforts
need to be deployed researching other probability distributions. The χ2 would be a
good candidate, given its widespread use in statistics and econometrics. Also, the F
distribution, due to its links with Student’s t. Fortunately, all the concepts involved
with assessing the plausibility of H1 are readily applicable to other test statistic
distributions, with the only differentiating factor being fP (p|H1). The general results
contained in Hung, O’Neill, Bauer, and Ko¨hne (1997) make such future research
readily achievable.
The multiple hypothesis testing work in Chapter 5 discussed the possibility
of applying a bias correction method to the proposed new estimator. Obviously
research into a suitable bias correction method is needed. In addition, the
simplifying assumption of independent p-values was made such that, under H1, all
p-values were drawn from the same fP (p|H1). Inevitably the feasibility of such an
assumption in practice is open to criticism. Indeed, there is likely to be considerable
heterogeneity of p-values, with clear implications for the pi0 estimation
methodologies outlined above. This therefore represents another avenue for future
research. Incorporating mixture distributions seems a sensible approach, as these
provide a convenient framework to work with when sampling from heterogeneous
populations.
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6.3 Closing Remarks
Of course any testing procedure based on sample data is liable to yield incorrect
conclusions. Given the absence of a perfect world, such errors, though unwanted,
are inevitable. Our main objectives have to be to correctly assess the chances of
error and to provide a suitable caveat to any inferential conclusions drawn. The use
of p-values is well-established, but the general interpretation of them by researchers
has room for refinement. So in response to the question ‘To p, or not to p?’, the
conclusion is that we should indeed continue to p, though perhaps in a different way.
Appendix A
Critical Value Tables for Negative
Effect Sizes
Table A.1 provides critical p-values, d, for testing H0 : θ = 0 against H1 : θ = k
for k < 0. Since fP (p|H1) is left-skewed, as illustrated in Figure 3.3, testing H1
corresponds to a lower-tail test hence the interpretation of table values is such that
Pr(P ≤ d|H1) = γ.
In the limit as
√
nδ −→ 0, i.e. as θ|H1 −→ 0, then this represents convergence
to H0. Therefore the p-value density under the alternative converges to that under
the null, that is the continuous uniform distribution. This means that the lower
bound on d as
√
nδ −→ 0 is γ, akin to the p-value critical value α when testing H0.
Conversely as
√
nδ −→∞, fP (p|H1) given by (2.5) degenerates on 1. Interpolate as
appropriate for
√
nδ values not provided.
Table A.2 provides equivalent critical p-values when estimated population
variances are used in the test statistic which therefore follows a Student’s t
distribution. Note the entries in both tables are simply the complement of those in
Tables 3.3 and 3.4.
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Table A.2: Critical p-values, d, for various levels of γ and selected values of
√
nδˆ when
testing, for unknown variance, non-composite hypotheses featuring population mean pa-
rameter θ, i.e. H0 : θ = 0 and H1 : θ = k such that Pr(P < d|H1) = γ, where P is the
one-tailed p-value of the test statistic under H0. Under the null, the test statistic has a
t-distribution with ν = n− 1 degrees of freedom and under H1 the test statistic achieves
the same distribution once
√
nδˆ has been subtracted. n is sample size and δˆ = k/S where
k < 0 is the hypothesised parameter value of θ under H1, and S2 =
Pn
i=1(Yi−Y¯n)2
n−1 . Entries
in the table give 10% (top), 5% (middle) and 1% (bottom) significance points respectively.
ν 10 20 30 50 75 100 200 500√
nδˆ
-0.25 0.1440 0.1475 0.1487 0.1497 0.1502 0.1504 0.1508 0.1510
0.0746 0.0779 0.0791 0.0801 0.0805 0.0808 0.0812 0.0814
0.0154 0.0169 0.0175 0.0181 0.0183 0.0185 0.0187 0.0188
-0.50 0.2018 0.2095 0.2120 0.2141 0.2152 0.2157 0.2165 0.2169
0.1093 0.1175 0.1203 0.1226 0.1238 0.1244 0.1252 0.1258
0.0235 0.0280 0.0298 0.0314 0.0322 0.0326 0.0332 0.0336
-0.75 0.2739 0.2857 0.2897 0.2928 0.2944 0.2952 0.2963 0.2970
0.1565 0.1707 0.1755 0.1795 0.1815 0.1824 0.1839 0.1848
0.0359 0.0453 0.0491 0.0523 0.0540 0.0548 0.0561 0.0569
-1.00 0.3588 0.3742 0.3792 0.3832 0.3852 0.3862 0.3877 0.3886
0.2177 0.2385 0.2455 0.2511 0.2539 0.2553 0.2574 0.2587
0.0541 0.0711 0.0777 0.0834 0.0863 0.0878 0.0901 0.0914
-1.25 0.4526 0.4703 0.4761 0.4807 0.4829 0.4841 0.4857 0.4867
0.2931 0.3201 0.3289 0.3360 0.3395 0.3413 0.3439 0.3454
0.0805 0.1079 0.1184 0.1271 0.1316 0.1339 0.1374 0.1395
-1.50 0.5496 0.5684 0.5745 0.5794 0.5817 0.5829 0.5847 0.5858
0.3806 0.4122 0.4225 0.4305 0.4345 0.4365 0.4395 0.4412
0.1175 0.1581 0.1730 0.1854 0.1916 0.1948 0.1995 0.2024
-1.75 0.6433 0.6622 0.6683 0.6731 0.6755 0.6767 0.6785 0.6796
0.4757 0.5100 0.5209 0.5294 0.5336 0.5357 0.5388 0.5406
0.1673 0.2228 0.2424 0.2583 0.2662 0.2702 0.2762 0.2798
-2.00 0.7279 0.7462 0.7521 0.7568 0.7591 0.7603 0.7620 0.7631
0.5725 0.6070 0.6179 0.6264 0.6306 0.6326 0.6357 0.6375
0.2313 0.3017 0.3254 0.3442 0.3536 0.3582 0.3652 0.3693
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ν 10 20 30 50 75 100 200 500√
nδˆ
-2.25 0.7997 0.8169 0.8225 0.8270 0.8292 0.8303 0.8319 0.8329
0.6645 0.6974 0.7077 0.7158 0.7197 0.7217 0.7246 0.7263
0.3093 0.3919 0.4186 0.4394 0.4496 0.4546 0.4622 0.4666
-2.50 0.8571 0.8730 0.8782 0.8824 0.8844 0.8854 0.8869 0.8879
0.7463 0.7764 0.7858 0.7931 0.7967 0.7985 0.8011 0.8027
0.3987 0.4890 0.5169 0.5383 0.5487 0.5539 0.5615 0.5660
-2.75 0.9008 0.9152 0.9198 0.9235 0.9254 0.9263 0.9276 0.9285
0.8147 0.8413 0.8496 0.8560 0.8592 0.8608 0.8631 0.8645
0.4946 0.5867 0.6141 0.6349 0.6449 0.6498 0.6570 0.6613
-3.00 0.9327 0.9452 0.9493 0.9524 0.9540 0.9548 0.9560 0.9567
0.8688 0.8916 0.8987 0.9043 0.9070 0.9083 0.9103 0.9115
0.5910 0.6790 0.7043 0.7233 0.7324 0.7368 0.7433 0.7472
-3.25 0.9551 0.9657 0.9691 0.9717 0.9730 0.9736 0.9746 0.9751
0.9094 0.9286 0.9345 0.9391 0.9144 0.9425 0.9441 0.9451
0.6814 0.7607 0.7829 0.7994 0.8072 0.8111 0.8167 0.8200
-3.50 0.9704 0.9791 0.9818 0.9838 0.9848 0.9853 0.9860 0.9865
0.9388 0.9545 0.9593 0.9629 0.9647 0.9656 0.9669 0.9677
0.7607 0.8287 0.8473 0.8610 0.8675 0.8706 0.8752 0.8779
-3.75 0.9806 0.9875 0.9896 0.9911 0.9918 0.9922 0.9927 0.9930
0.9593 0.9718 0.9755 0.9784 0.9797 0.9804 0.9814 0.9820
0.8264 0.8820 0.8970 0.9079 0.9131 0.9156 0.9192 0.9213
-4.00 0.9874 0.9927 0.9942 0.9953 0.9958 0.9960 0.9964 0.9966
0.9732 0.9830 0.9858 0.9879 0.9889 0.9894 0.9901 0.9905
0.8777 0.9217 0.9333 0.9417 0.9456 0.9475 0.9502 0.9518
-4.25 0.9918 0.9958 0.9969 0.9976 0.9979 0.9981 0.9983 0.9984
0.9825 0.9899 0.9920 0.9935 0.9942 0.9945 0.9950 0.9952
0.9160 0.9498 0.9584 0.9646 0.9675 0.9689 0.9709 0.9720
-4.50 0.9946 0.9976 0.9983 0.9988 0.9990 0.9991 0.9992 0.9993
0.9886 0.9942 0.9956 0.9966 0.9971 0.9973 0.9976 0.9977
0.9434 0.9687 0.9750 0.9795 0.9815 0.9824 0.9838 0.9846
-4.75 0.9965 0.9987 0.9991 0.9994 0.9995 0.9996 0.9997 0.9997
0.9926 0.9967 0.9976 0.9983 0.9986 0.9987 0.9989 0.9990
0.9625 0.9810 0.9855 0.9885 0.9899 0.9905 0.9915 0.9920
-5.00 0.9977 0.9992 0.9996 0.9997 0.9998 0.9998 0.9999 0.9999
0.9952 0.9981 0.9988 0.9992 0.9993 0.9994 0.9995 0.9996
0.9753 0.9887 0.9918 0.9938 0.9947 0.9951 0.9957 0.9960
Appendix B
Monte Carlo Simulation Results
B.1 Estimation of pi0
Tabulated values below report Monte Carlo simulation results for estimating pi0,
the proportion of tested hypotheses for which H0 is true. Two estimators are
employed (i) a new regression-based estimator (RBE) with its origins rooted in
the P -value plots of Schweder and Spjøtvoll (1982) documented in Chapter 5, and
(ii) the histogram-based estimator (HBE) of Storey and Tibshirani (2003), again
detailed in Chapter 5. Graphical depictions of these results are presented in Figures
5.3 to 5.6.
Tables B.1 to B.6 provide results for estimating a specific value of pi0 from 0.3
to 0.8 for various values of
√
nδ. These estimators are designed for large numbers
of (independent) p-values when multiple hypothesis testing is performed. As such
simulations were conducted for 500 and 250 p-values in each run for 1,000 simulations
in each case. The values reported are the mean pˆi0 estimate and the corresponding
mean squared error (MSE).
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Table B.1: pi0 is the parameter to be estimated. m = number of p-values per simulation.
RBE = regression-based approach, HBE = histogram-based approach. Tabulated values
are the mean estimates, pˆi0, with their respective mean-squared errors in parentheses.
pi0 = 0.3
√
nδ RBE m = 500 HBE m = 500 RBE m = 250 HBE m = 250
5 0.294625 0.295202 0.293257 0.294840
(0.000362) (0.003278) (0.000636) (0.005918)
4 0.295244 0.295087 0.294009 0.294729
(0.000373) (0.003277) (0.000653) (0.005916)
3 0.299778 0.293655 0.299640 0.293242
(0.000467) (0.003254) (0.000783) (0.005870)
2 0.332633 0.291843 0.341946 0.291242
(0.002058) (0.003158) (0.003550) (0.005712)
1.75 0.364344 0.296355 0.382732 0.295558
(0.005971) (0.003125) (0.010330) (0.005704)
1.50 0.420855 0.308015 0.443446 0.307412
(0.018721) (0.003245) (0.026822) (0.005923)
1.25 0.502636 0.332074 0.519437 0.330933
(0.047878) (0.004425) (0.057021) (0.007301)
1 0.592749 0.376631 0.598263 0.375934
(0.093977) (0.009834) (0.099296) (0.013224)
0.75 0.679392 0.451059 0.673363 0.451030
(0.152922) (0.027707) (0.150809) (0.032210)
0.50 0.756327 0.569598 0.744975 0.570707
(0.218333) (0.078954) (0.211588) (0.085701)
-0.50 0.752144 0.575230 0.733115 0.575372
(0.230299) (0.081669) (0.214823) (0.087500)
-0.75 0.676872 0.455849 0.655872 0.455717
(0.169969) (0.028847) (0.156732) (0.033240)
-1 0.581677 0.380738 0.570129 0.101085
(0.101085) (0.010177) (0.100091) (0.013941)
-1.25 0.493613 0.336334 0.488696 0.336026
(0.052261) (0.004547) (0.055166) (0.008034)
-1.50 0.412293 0.312427 0.415909 0.311623
(0.020749) (0.003138) (0.025087) (0.006433)
-1.75 0.358284 0.301054 0.367386 0.300352
(0.007490) (0.002938) (0.011492) (0.006152)
-2 0.329609 0.296846 0.335230 0.296027
(0.003269) (0.002951) (0.005577) (0.006152)
-3 0.293682 0.298805 0.290416 0.298020
(0.001168) (0.003042) (0.002115) (0.006392)
-4 0.287941 0.300234 0.283720 0.299428
(0.001105) (0.003066) (0.002089) (0.006442)
-5 0.287593 0.300339 0.284346 0.299537
(0.001212) (0.003068) (0.002514) (0.006445)
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Table B.2: pi0 is the parameter to be estimated. m = number of p-values per simulation.
RBE = regression-based approach, HBE = histogram-based approach. Tabulated values
are the mean estimates, pˆi0, with their respective mean-squared errors in parentheses.
pi0 = 0.4
√
nδ RBE m = 500 HBE m = 500 RBE m = 250 HBE m = 250
5 0.392053 0.396220 0.388397 0.395094
(0.000557) (0.004530) (0.001043) (0.008377)
4 0.392544 0.396120 0.388938 0.395000
(0.000569) (0.004529) (0.001068) (0.008375)
3 0.396500 0.394873 0.393501 0.393701
(0.000651) (0.004501) (0.001196) (0.008331)
2 0.422951 0.392814 0.425292 0.391298
(0.001671) (0.004409) (0.002562) (0.008149)
1.75 0.443534 0.396390 0.450726 0.394660
(0.003447) (0.004384) (0.005302) (0.008131)
1.50 0.479798 0.405988 0.495153 0.404282
(0.008969) (0.004456) (0.013398) (0.008238)
1.25 0.541749 0.426301 0.556238 0.424187
(0.024762) (0.005263) (0.031005) (0.009194)
1 0.621745 0.464422 0.627614 0.462833
(0.055975) (0.009207) (0.059821) (0.013588)
0.75 0.703365 0.528090 0.703724 0.527491
(0.099983) (0.022310) (0.101506) (0.027655)
0.50 0.775620 0.629811 0.769932 0.630331
(0.149885) (0.059940) (0.148898) (0.066987)
-0.50 0.761467 0.634508 0.768546 0.635158
(0.151381) (0.061490) (0.147676) (0.068138)
-0.75 0.685203 0.531410 0.677096 0.532519
(0.102949) (0.022625) (0.101942) (0.028026)
-1 0.606155 0.466478 0.602884 0.467656
(0.059100) (0.009031) (0.062725) (0.013720)
-1.25 0.529143 0.428331 0.531378 0.429864
(0.027616) (0.005059) (0.032856) (0.009400)
-1.50 0.472852 0.407944 0.476519 0.409229
(0.011885) (0.004123) (0.015740) (0.008279)
-1.75 0.435601 0.398448 0.440865 0.400015
(0.005245) (0.004050) (0.008797) (0.008142)
-2 0.414025 0.395123 0.415822 0.396808
(0.003254) (0.004076) (0.005351) (0.008151)
-3 0.385187 0.397217 0.380487 0.399192
(0.002108) (0.004139) (0.003363) (0.008393)
-4 0.380969 0.398455 0.375144 0.400417
(0.002017) (0.004157) (0.003229) (0.008429)
-5 0.380983 0.398545 0.374686 0.400507
(0.001849) (0.004158) (0.003204) (0.008431)
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Table B.3: pi0 is the parameter to be estimated. m = number of p-values per simulation.
RBE = regression-based approach, HBE = histogram-based approach. Tabulated values
are the mean estimates, pˆi0, with their respective mean-squared errors in parentheses.
pi0 = 0.5
√
nδ RBE m = 500 HBE m = 500 RBE m = 250 HBE m = 250
5 0.489270 0.495539 0.485326 0.495536
(0.000857) (0.005753) (0.001477) (0.010583)
4 0.489542 0.495455 0.485721 0.495456
(0.000880) (0.005753) (0.001506) (0.010580)
3 0.492404 0.494388 0.489413 0.494362
(0.000967) (0.005735) (0.001659) (0.010540)
2 0.514030 0.492470 0.514231 0.492088
(0.001588) (0.005647) (0.002628) (0.010399)
1.75 0.529251 0.495305 0.533500 0.494630
(0.002574) (0.005609) (0.004071) (0.010381)
1.50 0.558486 0.503101 0.564979 0.502396
(0.005767) (0.005607) (0.008130) (0.010421)
1.25 0.604987 0.519859 0.611125 0.519047
(0.014508) (0.006084) (0.017771) (0.011126)
1 0.665468 0.551543 0.668892 0.551155
(0.032623) (0.008708) (0.035563) (0.014315)
0.75 0.738593 0.604738 0.732080 0.605318
(0.063242) (0.017691) (0.062406) (0.024299)
0.50 0.799462 0.689974 0.796872 0.691006
(0.097634) (0.043796) (0.097852) (0.051627)
-0.50 0.792746 0.694062 0.791635 0.694670
(0.094697) (0.044828) (0.096575) (0.051825)
-0.75 0.710159 0.607655 0.709160 0.607991
(0.061695) (0.017812) (0.064225) (0.023525)
-1 0.641628 0.553271 0.645586 0.553308
(0.033982) (0.008459) (0.039964) (0.013477)
-1.25 0.586701 0.521568 0.587118 0.521729
(0.017470) (0.005787) (0.022168) (0.010629)
-1.50 0.546465 0.504995 0.546676 0.504772
(0.008731) (0.005221) (0.013516) (0.009972)
-1.75 0.518349 0.497400 0.516508 0.497323
(0.005206) (0.005194) (0.009067) (0.009974)
-2 0.501390 0.494918 0.497593 0.494957
(0.004048) (0.005227) (0.007314) (0.010049)
-3 0.479473 0.497014 0.470743 0.497313
(0.003072) (0.005273) (0.005853) (0.010271)
-4 0.478391 0.498036 0.468297 0.498348
(0.002415) (0.005290) (0.005354) (0.010295)
-5 0.478527 0.498110 0.468428 0.498423
(0.002335) (0.005292) (0.005226) (0.010296)
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Table B.4: pi0 is the parameter to be estimated. m = number of p-values per simulation.
RBE = regression-based approach, HBE = histogram-based approach. Tabulated values
are the mean estimates, pˆi0, with their respective mean-squared errors in parentheses.
pi0 = 0.6
√
nδ RBE m = 500 HBE m = 500 RBE m = 250 HBE m = 250
5 0.588488 0.596213 0.582318 0.594131
(0.001073) (0.006955) (0.002092) (0.012258)
4 0.588469 0.596146 0.582506 0.594066
(0.001116) (0.006954) (0.002144) (0.012255)
3 0.590849 0.595285 0.585318 0.593198
(0.001226) (0.006940) (0.002314) (0.012227)
2 0.607999 0.593608 0.606099 0.591223
(0.001773) (0.006858) (0.003017) (0.012151)
1.75 0.620563 0.595698 0.619926 0.593070
(0.002415) (0.006801) (0.003904) (0.012117)
1.50 0.641714 0.601823 0.642156 0.599103
(0.004263) (0.006761) (0.006054) (0.012115)
1.25 0.674264 0.614991 0.676958 0.612284
(0.008794) (0.006983) (0.011122) (0.012491)
1 0.719785 0.640251 0.721532 0.638135
(0.018795) (0.008624) (0.020969) (0.014551)
0.75 0.774301 0.682899 0.771066 0.681597
(0.035667) (0.014353) (0.036962) (0.020883)
0.50 0.829931 0.751234 0.832525 0.749489
(0.059104) (0.031097) (0.061213) (0.037591)
-0.50 0.827655 0.754523 0.845235 0.755998
(0.058656) (0.031707) (0.059087) (0.039624)
-0.75 0.749951 0.684948 0.766343 0.686717
(0.034932) (0.014318) (0.037855) (0.021033)
-1 0.694348 0.641496 0.689487 0.643303
(0.019666) (0.008377) (0.024361) (0.014291)
-1.25 0.654220 0.616298 0.647498 0.618104
(0.011318) (0.006701) (0.015358) (0.012313)
-1.50 0.624306 0.603324 0.617060 0.604847
(0.007029) (0.006369) (0.010911) (0.011842)
-1.75 0.604319 0.597470 0.598387 0.599117
(0.005324) (0.006357) (0.008873) (0.011805)
-2 0.592618 0.595594 0.584108 0.597336
(0.004376) (0.006380) (0.007899) (0.011848)
-3 0.576453 0.597487 0.568658 0.599310
(0.003197) (0.006418) (0.006019) (0.012047)
-4 0.577055 0.598307 0.566974 0.600142
(0.002308) (0.006435) (0.005451) (0.012070)
-5 0.577009 0.598364 0.567054 0.600202
(0.002262) (0.006437) (0.005358) (0.012072)
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Table B.5: pi0 is the parameter to be estimated. m = number of p-values per simulation.
RBE = regression-based approach, HBE = histogram-based approach. Tabulated values
are the mean estimates, pˆi0, with their respective mean-squared errors in parentheses.
pi0 = 0.7
√
nδ RBE m = 500 HBE m = 500 RBE m = 250 HBE m = 250
5 0.686051 0.694864 0.680018 0.692515
(0.001514) (0.007786) (0.002573) (0.014432)
4 0.685751 0.694814 0.680288 0.692464
(0.001583) (0.007786) (0.002602) (0.014431)
3 0.687496 0.694162 0.682475 0.691825
(0.001711) (0.007778) (0.002791) (0.014414)
2 0.700714 0.692760 0.699187 0.690485
(0.002124) (0.007705) (0.003293) (0.014342)
1.75 0.709461 0.694228 0.709706 0.691869
(0.002524) (0.007648) (0.003760) (0.014300)
1.50 0.725249 0.698614 0.725882 0.696265
(0.003355) (0.007583) (0.004974) (0.014249)
1.25 0.748127 0.708222 0.749504 0.705941
(0.005546) (0.007643) (0.007472) (0.014376)
1 0.778880 0.727201 0.781180 0.724911
(0.010169) (0.008519) (0.012598) (0.015301)
0.75 0.818718 0.759233 0.840045 0.756702
(0.018756) (0.011647) (0.022193) (0.018307)
0.50 0.887856 0.810069 0.894241 0.805879
(0.026535) (0.020459) (0.030123) (0.026198)
-0.50 0.895665 0.815427 0.891232 0.817290
(0.026435) (0.021743) (0.031523) (0.030090)
-0.75 0.837587 0.762982 0.835134 0.765869
(0.019545) (0.011874) (0.023143) (0.019449)
-1 0.757367 0.730420 0.777460 0.733640
(0.012532) (0.008510) (0.014534) (0.015442)
-1.25 0.725200 0.711635 0.725544 0.714629
(0.008304) (0.007555) (0.012215) (0.014151)
-1.50 0.706248 0.701927 0.701462 0.704714
(0.006238) (0.007373) (0.010045) (0.013787)
-1.75 0.693216 0.697574 0.687372 0.700495
(0.005442) (0.007365) (0.008795) (0.013730)
-2 0.684214 0.696239 0.679906 0.699224
(0.004875) (0.007388) (0.007957) (0.013743)
-3 0.673648 0.697692 0.667586 0.700902
(0.003668) (0.007430) (0.005958) (0.013864)
-4 0.674064 0.698308 0.666659 0.701521
(0.003185) (0.007443) (0.005488) (0.013883)
-5 0.674740 0.698350 0.666532 0.701564
(0.003091) (0.007446) (0.005418) (0.013884)
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Table B.6: pi0 is the parameter to be estimated. m = number of p-values per simulation.
RBE = regression-based approach, HBE = histogram-based approach. Tabulated values
are the mean estimates, pˆi0, with their respective mean-squared errors in parentheses.
pi0 = 0.8
√
nδ RBE m = 500 HBE m = 500 RBE m = 250 HBE m = 250
5 0.784260 0.795054 0.778794 0.791525
(0.001901) (0.008379) (0.003193) (0.015248)
4 0.784375 0.795020 0.778375 0.791492
(0.001923) (0.008379) (0.003299) (0.015248)
3 0.785346 0.794604 0.779374 0.791121
(0.002043) (0.008378) (0.003527) (0.015241)
2 0.794382 0.793685 0.790302 0.790361
(0.002408) (0.008363) (0.003981) (0.015317)
1.75 0.800628 0.794552 0.797985 0.791178
(0.002611) (0.008325) (0.004272) (0.015312)
1.50 0.810272 0.797282 0.817465 0.793799
(0.003044) (0.008263) (0.005014) (0.015231)
1.25 0.825391 0.803409 0.829144 0.799685
(0.003883) (0.008200) (0.006425) (0.015141)
1 0.845662 0.815666 0.840988 0.811298
(0.005774) (0.008442) (0.007353) (0.015232)
0.75 0.863121 0.836255 0.856436 0.830009
(0.011545) (0.009460) (0.013424) (0.015618)
0.50 0.941254 0.867600 0.947555 0.858659
(0.020455) (0.012167) (0.026354) (0.017038)
-0.50 0.942355 0.877913 0.946758 0.877684
(0.029305) (0.015196) (0.030144) (0.023590)
-0.75 0.856525 0.842928 0.867745 0.843377
(0.016342) (0.010550) (0.021564) (0.018692)
-1 0.824353 0.821349 0.831276 0.821769
(0.010943) (0.008887) (0.018460) (0.016737)
-1.25 0.804618 0.808874 0.803143 0.808959
(0.007195) (0.008384) (0.014142) (0.016097)
-1.50 0.791291 0.802606 0.796465 0.802061
(0.006453) (0.008261) (0.009123) (0.015885)
-1.75 0.782636 0.799839 0.778826 0.799146
(0.005989) (0.008235) (0.008575) (0.015866)
-2 0.776115 0.799087 0.771918 0.798196
(0.005806) (0.008253) (0.008063) (0.015874)
-3 0.771456 0.800155 0.762065 0.799251
(0.004134) (0.008277) (0.007017) (0.015891)
-4 0.771806 0.800547 0.763326 0.799689
(0.003734) (0.008288) (0.006264) (0.015896)
-5 0.772367 0.800572 0.763266 0.799719
(0.003664) (0.008291) (0.006216) (0.015898)
Appendix C
Beyond Reasonable Doubt
C.1 Introduction
Criminal prosecutions endeavour to filter out the innocent from the guilty. In
most countries the burden of proof required for a successful prosecution is “beyond
reasonable doubt” but there is no standardised, quantifiable measurement of this.
This precludes the possibility of miscarriages of justice due to the conviction criteria
not being well-defined. Mixture distributions allow us to view defendants as being
drawn from two heterogeneous populations, that is defendants are either truly guilty
or truly innocent with certainty. Unfortunately this is private information, and the
former have an incentive to plead not guilty. Given the two types of defendant, the
distributions of the likelihood of innocence (based on court evidence) differ.
This appendix sets out a theoretical model of a typical judicial system. New
measures based on compound error testing are presented, namely the false conviction
rate (FCR) and false acquittal rate (FAR). Identification of the actual densities of
the component distributions and level of proof required for “reasonable doubt” will
allow estimates of FCR and FAR to be made. A potential estimation methodology is
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subsequently discussed. State legislatures can then assess the acceptability of these
conviction errors in light of the costs to society — principally compensation resulting
from quashed convictions and repeat offences committed by the wrongly-acquitted.
If judicial reform is required, limits on FCR and FAR can be imposed, which can be
solved for a well-defined, standardised value for the threshold of reasonable doubt.
C.2 The Truth, the Whole Truth and Nothing
but the Truth?
Traditionally, criminal justice systems have endeavoured to administer the law for
the good of society. In an ideal world, the “bad guy” ends up behind bars while the
unsullied law-abiding citizen enjoys his or her liberty. Occasionally things go wrong.
History is littered with cases of miscarriages of justice — although the term is often
associated with wrongful convictions, it can also be applied to errors of impunity
whereby guilty parties walk free. However, the social costs of false convictions are
generally perceived by society to outweigh those of false acquittals.1
Decision-making by juries in court has many parallels with classical hypothesis
testing. Just as we assume a stated null hypothesis is true unless we have sufficiently
strong evidence to reject it, in the legal setting all defendants are presumed innocent
1Apart from the obvious loss of freedom imposed by the incarceration of the innocent, there
is a financial cost to society (specifically taxpayers) due to the monetary compensation often
awarded as damages for wrongful convictions. However it could be argued that those who are
wrongly-acquitted pose a (possibly greater) cost in terms of future offences that they may be
tempted to commit, believing that they have an “untouchable” status (i.e. an air of impunity) as
they have managed to evade justice. Also in the UK, if guilty of violent, indictable offences,
repeat attacks could increase publicly-funded compensation to victims through the Criminal
Injuries Compensation Authority. However in countries where some offences are punishable by
the death penalty, a posthumous acquittal is a remedy of little consolation to the individual
concerned.
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until proven guilty proxying prior belief in the “null”, here of innocence.2
Judicial errors of false convictions and false acquittals can be viewed analogously
to Type I and Type II errors respectively which occur in conventional hypothesis
testing. Just as researchers dislike making errors and seek to minimise them,3 in its
pursuit of justice an ideal court system would convict all the guilty and acquit all
the innocent.
A significant handicap of modern criminal justice systems around the world
is the criterion for deciding between guilt and innocence. A jury returns a guilty
verdict if it believes the defendant committed the offence “beyond reasonable doubt”.
This qualitative approach clearly lends itself to biases attributable to subjective
interpretation by jurors who may have different opinions as to the level of proof
required to exceed reasonable doubt. Consequently this long-established, and long-
accepted, benchmark of determining guilt has the potential to create a significant
number of miscarriages of justice due to a lack of a standardised and quantifiable
measurement of reasonable doubt.
An unambiguous and consistent threshold is necessary to ensure the oft-cited
need, and demand, for fair trials, hence a quantitative evaluation of the current
success of trial verdicts can allow an objective assessment of whether there is a need
to reform the jury system. It is somewhat surprising that given the modern world’s
obsession with standardisation, for example technological and political integration,
English as the global lingua franca etc., the archaic judicial process has remained
virtually unchanged and unchallenged. Given the importance of a well-functioning
2This presumption of innocence is typical of legal systems with their roots in the Anglo-Saxon
tradition. Some authoritarian regimes apply the presumption of guilt and hence the burden of
proof of innocence falls on the defence. This discussion will concentrate on the fairer presumption
of innocence approach.
3It is well-known however that there is a trade-off between Type I and Type II errors, with
reduction of one being at the expense of an increase in the other.
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judiciary to uphold the law, it is important to ensure the consistent application of
justice.
Previous studies into the quantification of reasonable doubt include Simon and
Mahan (1971), Tribe (1971) and Kagehiro and Stanton (1985). To the author’s
knowledge, little research has been carried out using a mixture distribution-based
model. This paper will outline a method for assessing the effectiveness of current
practice by viewing defendants as being drawn from two heterogeneous populations
— the truly innocent and the truly guilty. As such it is appropriate to employ
mixture distributions as a modelling approach. Difficulties in estimation of the
model are discussed, and a potential methodology is outlined.
C.3 Court Trials as Hypothesis Tests
In order to mitigate the possibility of false convictions, a defendant is considered to
be innocent until proven guilty. The burden of proof then falls on the prosecution
to present sufficient evidence to convince a jury (consisting of reasonable, rational
and impartial individuals) of a defendant’s guilt. The defence counsel will present
counter-arguments and offer evidence in favour of innocence. Therefore when guilty
verdicts are reached, it can be assumed that the likelihood of guilt exceeds the
threshold of reasonable doubt, i.e. beyond reasonable doubt.
Parallels with classical hypothesis testing can readily be drawn. We begin by
assuming the declared null hypothesis, H0, to be true. A relevant dataset is obtained
and an appropriate test statistic, T , is constructed and its distribution under the null
noted. The test statistic is then evaluated using the dataset to yield a real number.
A significance level, α, is chosen and the corresponding critical value(s), c,4 hence
4A one-tail test will have a single critical value, a two-tail test will have two. Clearly if the test
APPENDIX C. BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT 134
critical region, obtained. Should the sampled value of T lie in the critical region then
the null hypothesis is rejected in favour of the alternative, H1. Another approach
is to compute the p-value associated with the sampled test statistic to provide a
measure of the likelihood of obtaining the sample data given the null hypothesis
is true. Small p-values therefore suggest improbable likelihoods, indicative of the
alternative.
Just as it is stressed that we never accept a hypothesis but merely reject or fail
to reject the null hypothesis (because under the null any test statistic value within
the support of its distribution is possible), so trial verdicts of guilty and not guilty
are based solely on court evidence (assuming no juror biases) hence there is either
sufficient or insufficient evidence of guilt, hence no verdict can offer a definitive
proof of guilt. This concept therefore precludes the possibility of decision errors.
The analogies between hypothesis testing and criminal trials are summarised in
Table C.1.
An important issue raised in Table C.1 is the significance level applied to criminal
trials. Whereas in hypothesis testing a nominal level is chosen, such as 5%, there
is no explicit equivalent for criminal trials. Instead we are restricted to the also
nominal, but non-standardised, idea of reasonable doubt. Hence the equivalent
term to α would be indifference between guilt and innocence.
At this point it is worth expressing the difference between criminal and civil
trials. The former is the subject of this discussion and concerns the prosecution, on
behalf of the state, of individuals charged with common law offences or cases where
statute law has been broken. In the UK cases are brought by the Crown Prosecution
statistic’s distribution is symmetric about zero, then comparison of the observed test statistic with
the critical value can be performed in absolute terms, i.e. check whether |T | ≥ |c|. Should the
distribution be skewed when a two-tailed test is performed, for example the F distribution when
testing equality of variances, then such a comparison is not possible.
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Table C.1: Analogies between hypothesis tests and criminal trials.
Hypothesis Test Criminal Trial
Investigation H0 v. H1 Not Guilty v. Guilty
Prior Belief H0 Not Guilty
Evaluation Method Test Statistic, Xn Prosecution / Defence Evidence
Significance Level α, typically 5% No Standardised Value
Critical Region C = {xn ∈ R : |xn| ≥ |c|} Beyond Reasonable Doubt (BRD)
Decision Criterion Reject H0 if xn ∈ C Guilty if Evidence BRD
Service (CPS) following police investigation when the CPS considers that there is
sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. Offences can be categorised as either
summary or indictable, representing minor and serious offences respectively. The
former are usually heard in magistrates courts, and the latter in Crown Courts.
Civil lawsuits are brought by claimants, also referred to as plaintiffs, who seek
a legal remedy (for example, the awarding of damages or issue of an injunction)
to a particular grievance.5 As such, civil actions are less serious than the criminal
variety.6 A consequence of this is the burden of proof required to be found liable (the
civil equivalent of guilty). This is given as being “on the balance of probabilities”
which has an obvious probabilistic interpretation of α = 50%.
An attempt to estimate the significance level associated with likelihood of guilt
was made in Simon (1970). The method employed consisted of two student groups.
5For completeness, UK civil cases are heard in county and high courts, again commensurate
with the level of the claimant’s grievance.
6Having a criminal conviction is more socially unacceptable than being found liable in a civil
case.
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For a given trial, members of one group each selected whether they thought the
defendant was guilty, while the others each gave opinions of the likelihood of guilt
expressed as a percentage. Matching up the highest percentages with the guilty
verdicts, similarly lowest likelihoods with innocent verdicts, the indifference point
was found to be in the interval [0.70, 0.74]. Although not a definitive solution, it at
least provides a ballpark figure.7
Hung juries then would represent the indifference point. This implies that a
crude estimate for the CPS’s threshold opinion on a defendant’s likelihood of guilt
is to be slightly less than Simon’s. This is because if a jury’s threshold was the same
as the CPS’s for each case, then there would never be any acquittals. Juries know a
priori that there is at least some compelling evidence against the defendant, given
the very fact the case has been sent to trial following prior appraisal of the evidence
by the CPS. This results in jurors having to weigh up the evidence (especially in
light of the defence counsel) to determine whether guilt is implied beyond reasonable
doubt.
C.4 Defendant Distributions
A defendant is either truly guilty (G) or truly innocent (I) with probability 1, that
is,
7Admittedly it is unlikely that this implied probabilistic burden of proof is consistent in practice
across types of offence being tried. For the most serious offences, such as murder, juries may be
more willing to accept a lower level of evidence, explicitly or implicitly, to ensure a conviction.
Also, despite some individual jurors doubtless possessing idiosyncratic biases, be they positive
or negative, it would be expected that these cancel out on average due to the jury consisting of
(usually) twelve randomly selected members.
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Pr(G) =
 1 if truly guilty,0 if truly innocent.
Pr(I) =
 1 if truly innocent,0 if truly guilty.
However this is private information which only the defendant knows with
certainty. Guilty defendants have a clear incentive to plead not guilty8 because
they will be acquitted with positive probability (due to favourable defence evidence
presented at trial). So assuming a fixed proportion of truly guilty defendants, from
a jury’s perspective we have a binomial set-up, where defendants are assumed guilty
with probability w, and not guilty with probability 1− w.
Verdicts are delivered by juries who assess the likelihood of guilt, given the
evidence. To maintain the analogy with hypothesis testing (i.e. given the prior belief
of innocence), the likelihood of innocence will be considered instead, denoted by the
random variable X. Because juries hear competing arguments (guilt-implying from
the prosecution, innocence-implying from the defence), a jury’s perceived likelihood
of the defendant’s innocence will be strictly greater than 0% and strictly less than
100%, despite the actual Pr(G) and Pr(I) above. As a proportion, this gives
x ∈ (0, 1).
Given the population of defendants are of two types, truly guilty and truly
8Guilty pleas imply no trial and may be viewed as the result of a game theory strategy, i.e.
if the prior likelihood of acquittal is sufficiently small, it pays to plead guilty, show remorse and
consequently receive a lighter sentence. Plea-bargaining is another possibility whereby a defendant
pleads guilty to a lesser offence, ensuring a conviction for the CPS, while again the defender incurs a
more lenient tariff during sentencing. Although the thought of a truly innocent defendant pleading
guilty seems implausible, one of two situations may be sufficient conditions, (i) protecting the true
offender (ii) although innocent, the evidence may be so compelling to a jury of guilt, that a guilty
plea would mean a less severe sentence. For further details on the links between game theory and
statistical decision theory, see Ferguson (1967) and Berger (1985).
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innocent, the overall distribution of X can be modelled as a mixture distribution,
fX(x;Θ) = wfG(x;θG) + (1− w)fI(x;θI), 0 < x < 1, 0 ≤ w ≤ 1. (C.1)
Here, w is the mixture weight and represents the proportion of defendants who
are truly guilty, again assumed constant. The component density functions for the
truly guilty, fG, and truly innocent, fI , have associated parameter vectors θG and
θI respectively, aggregated (with w) in Θ.
Assume guilty beyond reasonable doubt (BRD) represents a sufficiently small
likelihood of innocence, with its upper limit proxied by the fixed proportion α. Thus
the probability of conviction, Pr(C), and acquittal, Pr(A), can be stated respectively
as
Pr(C) =
∫ α
0
wfG(x;θG) + (1− w)fI(x;θI)dx, (C.2)
Pr(A) =
∫ 1
α
wfG(x;θG) + (1− w)fI(x;θI)dx. (C.3)
Our interest lies in the accuracy of this system, namely we seek to maximise Pr(C|G)
and Pr(A|I) while minimising Pr(C|I) and Pr(A|G). These are subsequently given
by,
Pr(C|G) = Pr(C ∩G)
Pr(G)
=
R α
0 wfG(x;θG)dx
w
=
∫ α
0
fG(x;θG)dx, (C.4)
Pr(A|I) = Pr(A ∩ I)
Pr(I)
=
R 1
α (1−w)fI(x;θI)dx
1−w =
∫ 1
α
fI(x;θI)dx, (C.5)
Pr(C|I) = Pr(C ∩ I)
Pr(I)
=
R α
0 (1−w)fI(x;θI)dx
1−w =
∫ α
0
fI(x;θI)dx, (C.6)
Pr(A|G) = Pr(A ∩G)
Pr(G)
=
R 1
α wfG(x;θG)dx
w
=
∫ 1
α
fG(x;θG)dx. (C.7)
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However from a potential miscarriage of justice perspective, alternative
complementary quantities can be introduced, namely the false conviction rate (FCR)
and false acquittal rate (FAR). These error rates are a natural extension of the false
discovery rate (FDR) developed in Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) and the false
nondiscovery rate (FNR). In this context, FCR would provide a measure of the
proportion of false convictions and the FAR the proportion of false acquittals.
Should estimates of these measures prove politically unacceptable, then there would
be a case for reform of the current judicial process.
Returning briefly to the analogy of classical hypothesis testing, previous studies
have concentrated on the p-values of test statistic values. In this context, the p-values
take the place of the likelihood of innocence, whose support is also constrained to
the unit interval. Under the usual null hypothesis of a factor being insignificant,
i.e. equal to zero, it is known that the distribution of these p-values is the uniform
distribution, which corresponds to a component density of 1. Given n (independent)
p-values in a sample of size N (where n ≤ N) to be true under the null, and a
significance level α, the FDR takes the form,
FDR(α) =
n · α
#{p-values ≤ α} . (C.8)
It can be seen from (C.8) that for a single significant (but truly null) p-value, FDR
= α, which is equivalent to the probability of a Type I error. The key point of these
false rates is their application in multiple testing.
The FCR and FAR are functions of α,9 and are defined below. For N
9A lower likelihood of innocence required to convict would, ceteris paribus lead to fewer
convictions. Assuming false convictions and acquittals do not change proportionately, then this
will affect the FCR and FAR.
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independent10 defendants, let NI be the number of truly innocent and NG be the
number of truly guilty, such that NI + NG = N . Given the mixing weight, w, it
follows that NI = (1− w)N and NG = wN .
FCR(α) =
NI ·
∫ α
0
fI(x;θI)dx
NG ·
∫ α
0
fG(x;θG)dx+NI ·
∫ α
0
fI(x;θI)dx
, (C.9)
FAR(α) =
NG ·
∫ 1
α
fG(x;θG)dx
NG ·
∫ 1
α
fG(x;θG)dx+NI ·
∫ 1
α
fI(x;θI)dx
. (C.10)
The greater the values of FCR and FAR, the greater the lack of public confidence
in the criminal justice system. When estimates of fG(x;θG), fI(x;θI) and w are
known, then (C.9) and (C.10) can be solved for α when a politically-acceptable cap
is placed on both FCR and FAR.11 The value of this α solution would then serve
as a well-defined benchmark to overcome the vagueness of BRD. If an independent
assessment of the likelihood of innocence given the trial evidence was presented to
a jury, then this could result in more accurate verdicts.
C.5 Estimation Issues
The theoretical framework outlined above provides a logical model to quantify
miscarriages of justice. Of course in practice an empirical evaluation will be
required to assess the merits of the status quo. As discussed, in order to solve
for the optimal α, estimates of fG(x;θG), fI(x;θI) and w are necessary.
10The assumption of independence is reasonable as criminal trials cover unrelated offences.
11In order for law-makers to establish an appropriate cap on FCR, consideration of the
compensation awarded to the wrongly-convicted needs to be taken into account. As for an FAR
limit, consideration of the costs of repeat offences perpetrated by the wrongly-acquitted is relevant.
In both cases, a measure of the public’s lack of confidence in the judicial system to deliver correct
verdicts should be included.
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In order to estimate FCR and FAR we need data. Therefore a large random
sample of trials12 is required with observations of the defendant’s true guilt status
and the likelihood of innocence displayed by the court evidence. Evans, Osthus, and
Spurrier (2006) discuss potential methods for acquiring data regarding a defendant’s
actual guilt and likelihood of guilt. They note the problem of sampling the actual
defendants to ascertain their true guilt or innocence due to their incentive to always
state innocence regardless. Therefore they suggest sampling defence counsels who,
due to their close proximity to the defendant, are likely to know with high
probability the actual guilt or innocence of their clients.13 However, despite
anonymous testing there is still a possibility that when asked defence lawyers will
tend to state an opinion of innocence for fear of prejudicing their client if the survey
responses were somehow traced back to identifiable defendants which might hinder
subsequent appeals; also they are acting for the defendants and would want to be
seen as doing everything possible to secure an acquittal.
Consequently, due to their neutral impartiality and extensive experience of
hearing cases, judges are perhaps best-placed to offer unbiased (and hopefully broadly
accurate) assessments of (i) true guilt or innocence of a defendant and (ii) the
likelihood of innocence, x, given trial evidence. Therefore an informative survey
would involve sampling several judges and for each case they hear, to give their
opinion on the values of these random variables for each defendant. To allow for the
possibility of different conviction rates for different offences, results should be
categorised by type of offence. The following methodology should therefore be
performed separately for each offence category.
12The court, not statistical, variety.
13As noted in Evans, Osthus, and Spurrier (2006), defence lawyers do not wish to know explicitly
from the defendants whether they are truly guilty, as this can lead to the defence knowingly allowing
their clients to perjure themselves.
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Having obtained a sufficiently large data sample, estimation of fG(x;θG), fI(x;θI)
and w would then be possible. Denoting estimators using the ˆ notation, a suitable
estimator for w, i.e. wˆ, can be obtained from the sample proportion of perceived
guilty defendants relative to all defendants.
The sample can then be partitioned by perceived guilt and innocence into two
parts. A frequency density plot of the likelihood of innocence for each subset can
be constructed, the shape of which would then suggest the appropriate probability
distribution to model, i.e. representing the stylized facts of the empirical
distributions. Given cases are only sent to trial if the prosecution authorities feel
a conviction can be secured and that there will be mitigating and/or contradictory
evidence from the defence, it is expected that such distributions will be positively-
skewed, i.e. an elongated right tail as most of the mass will be concentrated around
lower values of X. A truncated distribution,14 would then be modelled.
Once the parametric form of the component densities fG(x;θG) and fI(x;θI) is
known, maximum likelihood estimation should be performed to obtain the parameter
vectors θˆG and θˆI to yield the estimated densities fˆG and fˆI respectively.
The final stage is then to compute the FCR and FAR and for the legislature to
decide on the acceptability of these current levels. Should the FCR and FAR prove
unacceptable, limits can be imposed, allowing (C.9) and (C.10) to be solved for a
standardised conviction threshold (in terms of likelihood of innocence), α.
14The likelihood of innocence is restricted to the unit interval.
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Table C.2: Summary trial data for England and Wales, 2001-2005. Source: Home Office
Statistical Bulletin, Criminal Statistics 2005, England and Wales.
Description 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Magistrates trials (thousands) 1838 1925 2001 2023 1895
- conviction rate (%) 70.3 70.8 71.6 73.6 75.3
- of which indictable offences (thousands) 501 517 509 453 423
- conviction rate (%) 53.9 54.4 54.6 57.4 59.8
Total convictions quashed 3000 2977 2835 3044 3676
- proportion of appeals quashed (%) 23.7 24.9 24.1 24.2 28.7
Crown Court trials (thousands) 77 76 80 80 76
- conviction rate (%) 72.7 78.9 75.0 75.0 76.3
Total convictions quashed 135 166 178 261 233
- proportion of appeals quashed (%) 30.1 34.2 32.8 38.4 37.7
C.6 Feasibility of Assumptions
This discussion has made various a priori assumptions. For any model to be an
accurate reflection of the real world, the assumptions need to be feasible and
consistent with actual data. The Home Office Statistical Bulletin, Criminal
Statistics 2005, England and Wales is a useful data source consisting of count data
on convictions over recent years. Table C.2 provides some useful observations.
It can be seen that conviction rates (and, by default, acquittal rates) have
remained fairly consistent over the period 2001-2005 across the different categories
of trial. This suggests that there is a consistent application of BRD.15
An interesting observation concerns the level of appeals quashed between
magistrates and Crown Court convictions. A higher proportion of Crown Court
convictions are overturned on appeal. Assuming quashed convictions are a suitable
proxy for false convictions,16 this suggests greater accuracy of magistrates
15This though does not preclude absence of systematic biases (i.e. non-stochastic errors) in
verdict decisions.
16In an ideal world, the appeal courts would ensure all wrong convictions are overturned, and
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convictions over the Crown Courts.17 Given that juries only give verdicts in Crown
Courts, this implies magistrates convictions (given their experience) are of a higher
quality, reinforcing the argument for neutral judges to be best-placed to offer
opinions on a defendant’s guilt and likelihood of innocence in the data collection
exercise outlined previously.
Since there are several quashed convictions each year, with associated damages
awarded, then there is a case for further research to obtain the necessary data to
allow an empirical investigation. This is justified since the potential reduction in
compensation could significantly outweigh the required research finance.
C.7 Conclusions
This discussion has sought to offer a model to examine the vagueness of the widely-
applied criterion of “beyond reasonable doubt” used to assess a defendant’s guilt.
Considering the importance of judicial systems around the world to administer
accurate verdicts, it is perhaps surprising that no formal, standardised benchmark
exists.18 Given the similarities with classical hypothesis testing, compound error
testing analogous to false discovery and indifference rates is possible.
Viewing defendants as being drawn from two heterogeneous populations, truly
guilty and truly innocent, false conviction and acquittal rates can be derived. A
problem occurs in obtaining appropriate data to estimate the unknown component
only wrong convictions overturned.
17However, the seriousness of most Crown Court trials exceeds that of magistrates, hence
prompting a greater proportion of appeals (whether ultimately successful or not). Also, it has
already been mentioned that juries may use a more flexible threshold to ensure convictions for
more serious offences, therefore increasing the probability of false convictions.
18This is in stark contrast to the concept of precedent in terms of sentencing guidelines which is
well-documented.
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densities and weights in the resulting mixture distribution. A potential solution is
offered by sampling judges to offer their impartial opinions as to a defendant’s true
type (regardless of the verdict reached in court), and the likelihood of innocence
based on the evidence presented at trial. The likelihood of innocence is considered,
as opposed to the likelihood of guilt, to maintain the analogy with hypothesis testing
by assuming prior belief in the null hypothesis. Here the maxim of “innocent until
proven guilty” is the corresponding null applied.
Given miscarriages of justice (false convictions and false acquittals) occur, these
should be minimised to ensure public confidence in the judiciary to deliver accurate
verdicts. Government-, therefore tax-, funded compensation in the wake of quashed
convictions, as well as the hidden costs of repeat offences by the wrongly-acquitted,
are just cause to optimise the trial process. By establishing politically acceptable
limits on false conviction and/or acquittal rates, the theoretical model can be solved
for the optimal threshold of evidence required to secure a conviction.
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